More Guns Less Crime by John Jr (best free e book reader .txt) 📕

differences in rental prices for "business" spaces, etc.). The concern is not why these cost differentials exist, but simply that they do and that this will be related to the accessibility of drugs.

Suppose, for example, that it costs $8 to sell an ounce of cocaine in Atlanta and $3 in Washington, DC. If the price of a one-ounce bag of cocaine were $10 in Washington and $13 in Atlanta, then minus these selling costs an importer of illegal drugs would make $7 in Washington and $5 in Atlanta. Where is he going to ship more of his drugs? Clearly Washington, and he will continue doing so until the relative price net of these costs in Washington falls until the difference between the two markets is $5.

87. An example of one of the other criticisms is by Ayres and Donohue where they write that "the ultimate criticism of Lott will be that the model is too flawed to provide any information on the effect of the law.... One of the strongest results to emerge from Lott's book is that shall issue laws, as he models them, lead to higher property crime. If you don't believe this, then you cannot endorse any of Lott's findings. But, to believe that property crime rose you must believe that the rate of robbery fell, because the only reason that more concealed handguns would cause property crime to go up is that some other money-generating activity became less available or less attractive. One would hardly expect that someone desiring to beat up an individul would instead decide to steal a car if the assaultive option were foreclosed. But since the robbery results are arguably weak, it is hard to tell a convincing story that would explain the alleged shift from violent crime to property crime that the Lott model attributes to shall issue laws" (Ian Ayres and John J. Donohue HI, "Nondiscretionary Concealed Weapons Laws: A Case Study of Statistics, Standards of Proof, and Public Policy," American Law and Economics Review 1, nos. 1—2 (Fall 1999): 436-70.

88. The "recidivism" referred to by Ayres and Donohue is actually not a good measure for what they are discussing, since recidivism refers to whether criminals keep on committing a crime after they have been punished by the legal system.

89. Ayres and Donohue raise another issue that should be discussed at least briefly, and that is the use of the percentage of a state's population that is in prison as an enforcement variable. They find that including this variable strengthens the results, but while the variable provides some information, there are some important theoretical problems with it. One problem is that the prison population and the crime rate are simply in different units. The prison population measures a "stock," while the crime rate represents a "flow." The simplest comparison is between the amount of water in a bathtub (a stock)

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and the rate at which water is flowing into the bathtub (a flow). The amount of water in the bathtub is only loosely related to the current flow into it because it depends upon not only flows in previous periods but also the rate at which water is flowing out of it. A second problem is that I have focused on county-level data because of the heterogeneity in law enforcement across counties within a state, and this variable is available only at the state level.

90. For example, Sarah Brady, "Q: Would New Requirements for Gun Buyers Save lives? Yes: Stop Deadly, Unregulated Sales to Minors, at Gun Shows and on the Internet," Insight, June 21, 1999, p. 24; or "More Guns, Less Crime? A Debate between John Lott and Douglas Weil."

91. Gary Kleck, Targeting Guns: Firearms and Their Control (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter Publishers, 1997), p. 371.

92. This is true whether one uses the 430,000 instances in 1997 in which crimes with guns were reported to police in the Uniform Crime Report or the number that is about twice as large from the National Crime Victimization Survey.

93. Stephanie Elizondo Griest, "Group: Arrest Data Show Flaw in Concealed-Gun Law: Permit Holders Have Been Arrested 2,080 times: NRA Says Low Conviction Rate Proves Licensees Abide by Law," Austin American-Statesman, Mar. 23, 1999, p. B2.

94. John Lott, Jr., "License to Kill? Careful Look at Critical Study Actually Backs Gun Permit Holders " Dallas Morning News, Feb. 8, 1998, p. J6.

95. Jonathan Rauch, "And Don't Forget Your Gun," National Journal, Mar. 20, 1999.

96. Based upon a telephone conversation with the Alaska bureau responsible for issuing permits.

97. Source: Lt. Bill Whalen, Arizona Department of Public Safety, 602-223-2704. Peak issuance of permits was November 1998, when 63,040 permits were issued. The renewal rate is about 42 percent. Based on that number and the fact that about 26,000 permits were issued by July 1995, over 76,000 permits must have been issued during the period.

98. http://licgweb.dos.state.fl.us/stats/cw_monthly.html.

99. Based upon a telephone conversation with the Indiana State Firearms Bureau.

100. Revocation rate obtained from "North Carolina Handgun Permit Statistics by County from Dec. 1,1995 and Aug. 4,1999" (available on the North Carolina state government Web site). The other information is based upon a telephone conversation with Julia Nipper and Susan Grissom.

101. James N. Thurman, "As More Carry Hidden Guns, Who's Safer?" Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 1, 1999, p. 1.

102. Information from Steve Anderson with the Utah State Firearms Bureau.

103. Based on an E-mail message sent to me by Mr. Wilson of the Criminal Department of Investigation, Wyoming). His telephone number is 307-777-7181.

104. Frank Main, "Taxpayers Pay Big Part of