An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (ebook reader macos .TXT) π
The causes of this improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the order according to which its produce is naturally distributed among the different ranks and conditions of men in the society, make the subject of the first book of this Inquiry.
Whatever be the actual state of the skill, dexterity, and judgment, with which labour is applied in any nation, the abundance or scantiness of its annual supply must depend, during the continuance of that state, upon the proportion between the number of those who are annually employed in useful labour, and that of those who are not so employed. The number of us
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- Author: Adam Smith
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above all this, the centre and principal mart of what is called
the country trade of the East Indies; not only of that part of it
which is carried on by Europeans, but of that which is carried on
by the native Indians; and vessels navigated by the inhabitants
of China and Japan, of Tonquin, Malacca, Cochin-China, and the
island of Celebes, are frequently to be seen in its port. Such
advantageous situations have enabled those two colonies to
surmount all the obstacles which the oppressive genius of an
exclusive company may have occasionally opposed to their growth.
They have enabled Batavia to surmount the additional disadvantage
of perhaps the most unwholesome climate in the world.
The English and Dutch companies, though they have established no
considerable colonies, except the two above mentioned, have both
made considerable conquests in the East Indies. But in the manner
in which they both govern their new subjects, the natural genius
of an exclusive company has shewn itself most distinctly. In the
spice islands, the Dutch are said to burn all the spiceries which
a fertile season produces, beyond what they expect to dispose of
in Europe with such a profit as they think sufficient. In the
islands where they have no settlements, they give a premium to
those who collect the young blossoms and green leaves of the
clove and nutmeg trees, which naturally grow there, but which
this savage policy has now, it is said. almost completely
extirpated. Even in the islands where they have settlements, they
have very much reduced, it is said, the number of those trees. If
the produce even of their own islands was much greater than what
suited their market, the natives, they suspect, might find means
to convey some part of it to other nations; and the best way,
they imagine, to secure their own monopoly, is to take care that
no more shall grow than what they themselves carry to market. By
different arts of oppression, they have reduced the population of
several of the Moluccas nearly to the number which is sufficient
to supply with fresh provisions, and other necessaries of life,
their own insignificant garrisons, and such of their ships as
occasionally come there for a cargo of spices. Under the
government even of the Portuguese, however, those islands are
said to have been tolerably well inhabited. The English company
have not yet had time to establish in Bengal so perfectly
destructive a system. The plan of their government, however, has
had exactly the same tendency. It has not been uncommon, I am
well assured, for the chief, that is, the first clerk or a
factory, to order a peasant to plough up a rich field of poppies,
and sow it with rice, or some other grain. The pretence was, to
prevent a scarcity of provisions; but the real reason, to give
the chief an opportunity of selling at a better price a large
quantity of opium which he happened then to have upon hand. Upon
other occasions, the order has been reversed ; and a rich field
of rice or other grain has been ploughed up, in order to make
room for a plantation of poppies, when the chief foresaw that
extraordinary profit was likely to be made by opium. The servants
of the company have, upon several occasions, attempted to
establish in their own favour the monopoly of some of the most
important branches, not only of the foreign, but of the inland
trade of the country. Had they been allowed to go on, it is
impossible that they should not, at some time or another, have
attempted to restrain the production of the particular articles
of which they had thus usurped the monopoly, not only to the
quantity which they themselves could purchase, but to that which
they could expect to sell with such a profit as they might think
sufficient. In the course of a century or two, the policy of the
English company would, in this manner, have probably proved as
completely destructive as that of the Dutch.
Nothing, however, can be more directly contrary to the real
interest of those companies, considered as the sovereigns of the
countries which they have conquered, than this destructive plan.
In almost all countries, the revenue of the sovereign is drawn
from that of the people. The greater the revenue of the people,
therefore, the greater the annual produce of their land and
labour, the more they can afford to the sovereign. It is his
interest, therefore, to increase as much as possible that annual
produce. But if this is the interest of every sovereign, it is
peculiarly so of one whose revenue, like that of the sovereign of
Bengal, arises chiefly from a land-rent. That rent must
necessarily be in proportion to the quantity and value of the
produce; and both the one and the other must depend upon the
extent of the market. The quantity will always be suited, with
more or less exactness, to the consumption of those who can
afford to pay for it; and the price which they will pay will
always be in proportion to the eagerness of their competition. It
is the interest of such a sovereign, therefore, to open the most
extensive market for the produce of his country, to allow the
most perfect freedom of commerce, in order to increase as much as
possible the number and competition of buyers ; and upon this
account to abolish, not only all monopolies, but all restraints
upon the transportation of the home produce from one part of the
country to mother, upon its exportation to foreign countries, or
upon the importation of goods ofβ any kind for which it can be
exchanged. He is in this manner most likely to increase both the
quantity and value of that produce, and consequently of his own
share of it, or of his own revenue.
But a company of merchants, are, it seems, incapable of
considering themselves as sovereigns, even after they have become
such. Trade, or buying in order to sell again, they still
consider as their principal business, and by a strange absurdity,
regard the character of the sovereign as but an appendix to that
of the merchant ; as something which ought to be made subservient
to it, or by means of which they may be enabled to buy cheaper in
India, and thereby to sell with a better profit in Europe. They
endeavour, for this purpose, to keep out as much as possible all
competitors from the market of the countries which are subject to
their government, and consequently to reduce, at least, some part
of the surplus produce of those countries to what is barely
sufficient for supplying their own demand, or to what they can
expect to sell in Europe, with such a profit as they may think
reasonable. Their mercantile habits draw them in this manner,
almost necessarily, though perhaps insensibly, to prefer, upon
all ordinary occasions, the little and transitory profit of the
monopolist to the great and permanent revenue of the sovereign;
and would gradually lead them to treat the countries subject to
their government nearly as the Dutch treat the Moluccas. It is
the interest of the East India company, considered as sovereigns,
that the European goods which are carried to their Indian
dominions should be sold there as cheap as possible; and that the
Indian goods which are brought from thence should bring there as
good a price, or should be sold there as dear as possible. But
the reverse of this is their interest as merchants. As
sovereigns, their interest is exactly the same with that of the
country which they govern. As merchants, their interest is
directly opposite to that interest.
But if the genius of such a government, even as to what concerns
its direction in Earope, is in this manner essentially, and
perhaps incurably faulty, that of its administration in India is
still more so. That administration is necessarily composed of a
council of merchants, a profession no doubt extremely
respectable, but which in no country in the world carries along
with it that sort of authority which naturally overawes the
people, and without force commands their willing obedience. Such
a council can command obedience only by the military force with
which they are accompanied ; and their government is, therefore,
necessarily military and despotical. Their proper business,
however, is that of merchants. It is to sell, upon their masterβs
account, the European goods consigned to them, and to buy, in
return, Indian goods for the European market. It is to sell the
one as dear, and to buy the other as cheap as possible, and
consequently to exclude, as much as possible, all rivals from the
particular market where they keep their shop. The genius of the
administration, therefore, so far as concerns the trade of the
company, is the same as that of the direction. It tends to make
government subservient to the interest of monopoly, and
consequently to stunt the natural growth of some parts, at least,
of the surplus produce of the country, to what is barely
sufficient for answering the demand of the company,
All the members of the administration besides, trade more or less
upon their own account; and it is in vain to prohibit them from
doing so. Nothing can be more completely foolish than to expect
that the clerk of a great counting-house, at ten thousand miles
distance, and consequently almost quite out of sight, should,
upon a simple order from their master, give up at once doing any
sort of business upon their own account abandon for ever all
hopes of making a fortune, of which they have the means in their
hands; and content themselves with the moderate salaries which
those masters allow them, and which, moderate as they are, can
seldom be augmented, being commonly as large as the real profits
of the company trade can afford. In such circumstances, to
prohibit the servants of the company from trading upon their own
account, can have scarce any other effect than to enable its
superior servants, under pretence of executing their masterβs
order, to oppress such of the inferior ones as have had the
misfortune to fall under their displeasure. The servants
naturally endeavour to establish the same monopoly in favour of
their own private trade as of the public trade of the company. If
they are suffered to act as they could wish, they will establish
this monopoly openly and directly, by fairly prohibiting all
other people from trading in the articles in which they choose to
deal; and this, perhaps, is the best and least oppressive way of
establishing it. But if, by an order from Europe, they are
prohibited from doing this, they will, notwithstanding, endeavour
to establish a monopoly of the same kind secretly and indirectly,
in a way that is much more destructive to the country. They will
employ the whole authority of government, and pervert the
administration of Justice, in order to harass and ruin those who
interfere with them in any branch of commerce, which by means of
agents, either concealed, or at least not publicly avowed, they
may choose to carry on. But the private trade of the servants
will naturally extend to a much greater variety of articles than
the public trade of the company. The public trade of the company
extends no further than the trade with Europe, and comprehends a
part only of the foreign trade of the country. But the private
trade of the servants may extend to all the different branches
both of its inland and foreign trade. The monopoly of the company
can tend only to stunt the natural growth of that part of the
surplus produce which, in the case of a free trade, would be
exported to Europe. That of the servants tends to stunt the
natural growth
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