Afghanistan and the Anglo-Russian Dispute by Theo F. Rodenbough (easy books to read .TXT) 📕

IV. Also the well-known road by Balkh and Mamiana, direct to Herat.

Routes III. and IV. having just been discussed, let us look at Routes I. and II.

Referring to the small outline map of the trans-Caspian region, herewith, it will be seen that troops could embark from Odessa in the fleet of merchant steamers available, and, if not molested en route by hostile cruisers, would reach Batum in from 2 to 3 days, thence by rail to Baku in 24 hours, another 24 hours through the Caspian Sea to Krasnovodsk, a transfer in lighters to the landing at Michaelovsk, and the final rail transportation to the present terminus of the track beyond Kizil Arvat; this, it is said, will soon reach Askabad, 310 miles from Herat. The Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society, Mr. Cust, with his wife, passed over this route in 1883, and testifies to the ease and comfort of the transit and to the great number of vessels engaged in the oil trade, which are available for military purposes, both on the Black and Caspian seas. He estimates that they could easily carry 8,000 men at a trip. [Footnote: Mr. Cust says: “There are three classes of steamers on the Caspian. 1, the Imperial war steamers with which Russia keeps down piracy; 2, the steamers of the Caucasus and Mercury Company, very numerous and large vessels; 3, petroleum vessels—each steamer with a capacity of 500 men.”]

General Hamley [Footnote: Lecture before R. U. S. Institution (London), 1884.] says: “We may assume that if on the railway (single track) the very moderate number of 12 trains a day can run at the rate of 12 miles an hour, the journey would occupy 40 hours. The successive detachments would arrive, then, easily in two days at Sarakhs. A division may be conveyed, complete, in 36 trains. Thus, in six days a division would be assembled at Sarakhs ready to move on the advanced guard. An army corps, with all its equipments and departments, would be conveyed in 165 trains in 17 days. It would then be 200 miles—another 17 days’ march—from Herat. Thus, adding a day for the crossing of the Caspian, the army corps from Baku would reach Herat in 35 days. Also the advance of a corps from Turkestan upon Kabul is even more practicable than before.” [Footnote: In his plan of invasion, Skobeleff thought 50,000 men might undertake the enterprise without fear of disaster. This force could be doubled from the Caucasus alone.]

The route from Tchikishliar via Asterabad (where it strikes the main Teheran-Mashed-Herat road) would be an important auxiliary to the railway line, via Asterabad. There is also a more direct caravan track running south of this across the Khorassan, from Asterabad (through Shahrud, Aliabad, Khaf, Gurian) to Herat; or, at Shahrud, an excellent road running between the two already described straight (via Sabzawar and Nishapar) to Mashed.

From Sarakhs to Merv the road is said to be good and fairly supplied with water. From Merv to Herat the well-worn expression “coach and four” has been used to denote the excellent condition of the road. [Footnote: For the first 100 miles the road follows the Murghab, which Abbott describes as “a deep stream of very pure water, about 60 feet in breadth, and flowing in a channel mired to the depth of 30 feet in the clay soil of the valley; banks precipitous and fringed with lamarisk and a few reeds.”] Yalatun is described as fertile, well populated, and unhealthy. [Footnote: Band-i-Yalatun, or “bank which throws the waters of the Murghab into the canal of Yalatun.”] From Penjdeh, where the river is sometimes fordable, the road follows the Khusk River, and, ascending the Koh-i-Baber Pass, descends into the Herat valley, immediately beneath it. [Footnote: Before closing the chapter on the “Russian Forces,” a brief description of the order of march customary in Central Asia may be proper. From a translation by Major Clarke, R.A., from Kotensko’s “Turkestan,” it appears that the horses accompanying Central Asian detachments are so considerable that the latter form, as it were, the escort of the former. As an Asiatic enemy nearly always attacks from every side, the distribution of the troops, during the march, must be such that they may be able to repulse the enemy no matter where he may appear. Usually, a half sotnia (70 men) of cavalry marches in advance at a distance from 3/4 to 1-1/3 miles, so as to be in view of main body. Immediately in front of main body marches a detachment of sappers and a company or two of infantry; then part of the artillery; then more infantry; the train; behind the train, remainder of artillery and infantry; as a rear guard, a sotnia of cavalry. Bivouacs in the Steppe are usually chosen at wells, and are, in many respects, similar to those customary in the Indian country in America. First, an outer line of carts or wagons; then the troops; and inside, all the animals. The accompanying diagram is from The Journal Royal United Service Institution (London).]

[Illustration: NORMAL ORDER OF MARCH IN CENTRAL ASIA. NORMAL BIVOUAC IN CENTRAL ASIA.]

V.

REVIEW OF THE MILITARY SITUATION.

The purpose of this volume has been to give as much reliable information upon the cause of the Anglo-Russian dispute, the nature of the probable theatre of operations in case of war, and of the armies of the Powers concerned, as could be obtained and printed within a single fortnight. The richness of the available material made this especially difficult, comprising as it did the record of recent campaigns in Afghanistan, as well as the opinions of those who, like Vambery, Veniukoff, Rawlinson, Napier, and Cust, are authorities upon Asiatic topics.

As these lines are written [Footnore: April 18, 1885.] the civilized nations of the world await with bated breath the next scene upon the Afghan stage.

Seldom when two gladiators, armed and stripped, enter the arena does a doubt exist as to their purpose. Yet such an exceptional uncertainty attends the presence of England and Russia on the border of Afghanistan.

[Illustration: Gorge in the Tirband-i-Turkestan through which the Murghab Flows.]

At least 50,000 British soldiers are drawn up in front of the Indus awaiting a signal from their Queen. Nearly twice that number of Russian troops are massed on or near the northwestern angle of the Ameer’s country. [Footnote: Since the events noted in our first chapter (page 12) transpired, another page has been added to Afghanistan’s blood-stained record. After confronting each other on the Khusk River for some weeks a large Russian force under General Komaross attacked (March 30, 1885) the Afghan troops at Penjdeh, and after a gallant resistance on the part of the native garrison it was utterly routed and the town occupied by the victors. The Russian casualties were inconsiderable, but the Afghans lost nearly 1,000 men.]

It is impossible to eliminate, altogether, from a study of the present military situation, certain political elements.

It is apparent that the Russians near Herat stand practically at “the forks of the road”; it is a three-pronged fork—one branch running due south to the sea and two branches due east to India. The first-named requires but passing comment and only as it relates to Herat, planted on a route which cannot be controlled without its possession, for military and commercial reasons well understood.

As already explained, the routes to India, available to Russia, enable her to move from her base on the Merv-Herat line, both via Balkh and Kabul, for the purpose of flanking a British column moving from Quetta westward, or of raiding the rich valley of the Helmund; from Turkestan above this route, a British force moving from Kabul to Balkh could also be threatened. By the main Herat-Kandahar route an advance from the east could also be directly opposed; the crossing of the Helmund by either army would probably be contested.

In case of war, whether Anglo-Russian or Russo-Afghan, the first great battle would doubtless be fought on the Kandahar-Ghazni-Kabul line.

[Illustration: Jelalabad from Piper’s Hill.]

General Hamley, the leading British military authority, [Footnote: Lieut.-General Sir. E. Hamley, K.C.B.] shows that this line is, of all proposed, at once the most practicable and desirable line for the defence of India. [Footnote: Three lines had been considered: first, the line of the Eastern Sulimani, but this would leave the seaport of Kurrachee unprotected; second, from Pishin northeast to Kabul.] He says: “We should have a strong British governor in Kandahar, and a strong British force on the Helmund and on the road to Kabul; the railway completed to Kandahar, and, in case of a movement from Turkestan against Kabul, a force on our side on its way to occupy that city, and new recruiting grounds open to us amid warlike populations. Surely there can be no question as to which of these two sets of circumstances would give us most influence in Afghanistan, most power to oppose Russia and to maintain confidence in India.” [Footnote: Gen. Hamley’s remarks were made before the Royal United Service Institution (May 18, 1884), and, in the discussion which followed, Colonel Malleson said: “Recently in India some influential natives said to me: ‘Russia will continue her advance; she will not stop until she has gained the fertile country of Herat, and then she will intrigue with the native princes behind the Indus, and when you send an army to meet her, you will find those native princes rising in your rear.’ I may fortify my own experience by what was told me by an Austrian gentleman who visited India about seven years ago. He paid a visit to the Maharaja, of Cashmere, who said to him: ‘From you I hope to get the truth; you are not an Englishman nor a Russian. Tell me which is the stronger— the English power or the Russian; because it will be necessarily my duty, if Russia should advance, and if I should find Russia stronger than England, to go for the defence of my throne on the side of Russia.’”]

The same authority approves Sir Michael Biddulph’s recommendation to utilize the strong natural positions near Girishk on the Helmund. As to Afghanistan he testifies: “With a power like Russia closing on it, holding Persia and Persian resources subject to its will, it is in vain to think that Afghanistan will be long independent even in name. It is between hammer and anvil, or, to use a still more expressive metaphor, between the devil and the deep sea. Bound to us by no traditions, by no strong political influences such as might have been used to constrain them, the Afghan tribes, mercenary and perfidious to a proverb, an aggregate of tribes—not a nation,—will lose no time, when the moment occurs, in siding with the great power which promises most lavishly, or which can lay strongest hold on them.”

The burning words with which General Hamley closed his lecture one year ago are singularly true to-day, and form a fitting termination to this sketch:

“I do not undervalue the many influences which will always oppose any policy entailing expense. But if the present question is found to be—How shall we guard against a terrible menace to our Indian Empire? any cost to be incurred can hardly be admitted as a reason which ought to influence our course. Magnanimous trustfulness in the virtue and guilelessness of rival states; distrust and denunciation of all who would chill this inverted patriotism by words of warning; refusal of all measures demanding expense which do not promise a pecuniary return:—such is the kind of liberality of sentiment which may ruin great nations. The qualities of the lamb may be very excellent qualities, but they are specially inapplicable to dealings with the wolf. Do those who shrink from expense think that the