Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

the second convoy with approximately 20,000 troops, passengers, and crewmembers would truly have been calamitous.

The Admiralty and Forbes made the dangerous error of assuming that the lack of evidence for actual or intended German naval operations off Norway meant that they did not intend or were incapable of such operations. As in the case of the invasion in April, they based their decisions on what they viewed as the most likely German course of action rather than on German capabilities and the most dangerous course of action.

Captain MacIntyre may be correct in his conclusion that divided authority on the British side contributed to the disaster. Churchill’s appointment of Admiral Cork, much senior to Admiral Forbes, to command an area within the Home Fleet’s region of responsibility was bound to create confusion and misjudgments but it is also a damaging conclusion about the professionalism at the highest levels of the Royal Navy at this stage of the war. Marschall was recalled for his perceived errors during Operation Juno. No action was taken against commanders of the Home Fleet.

The loss of one of the four carriers available was severe for the British Navy. Few survivors were rescued. The Norwegian ship Borgund rescued 38 men from Glorious and the lone survivor from Acasta on June 11 and brought them to the Faeroe Islands. Two were also rescued by a German seaplane. In all, 1,515 lost their lives. All aircraft and pilots from Norway that could have been used in the looming Battle of Britain were lost.

Admiral Marschall took the Gneisenau, Hipper, and four destroyers back to sea on June 10 to continue the operation against the convoys. The sortie did not lead to any contacts and was cancelled by Naval Group West when it concluded that the Allied evacuation was completed and there was therefore nothing of importance to be accomplished in the north. Marschall brought his ships to Trondheim in the morning of June 11. On that day, 12 aircraft from Bomber Command carried out an unsuccessful attack against the German ships. Early on 13 June, 15 Skuas from Ark Royal attacked the German ships in their anchorage in Trondheim. One 500-lb bomb struck Scharnhorst but rolled overboard without detonating. Eight British aircraft were downed by antiaircraft fire and fighters.

Admiral Lütjens took Gneisenau and Hipper back to sea on June 20. He headed for the Iceland-Faeroe Island gap in an attempt to divert British attention from Scharnhorst’s return to Germany. Gneisenau was hit by a torpedo from the British submarine Clyde shortly before midnight on June 20 while 40 nautical miles off the Norwegian coast. The torpedo tore a large hole through both sides of the forward portion of the battleship. No armaments were affected and there were no casualties. However, the sortie was aborted and the ships returned to Trondheim to make emergency repairs.

It was decided that the battleship needed to return to Germany in order to make more extensive repairs. A fleet consisting of Gneisenau, Hipper, the light cruiser Nürnberg, and the destroyers Galster, Ihn, Lody, and Jacobi left Trondheim on July 25. Five torpedo boats were later added as escorts. The torpedo boat Luchs happened to be in the track of a torpedo fired at Gneisenau by a British submarine. The torpedo boat sank after a violent explosion. The German ships arrived in Kiel in the morning of July 28. Operation Juno was concluded after eight weeks.

EPILOGUE

“It was a marvel—I really do not know how—I survived and maintained my position in public esteem while all the blame was thrown on poor Mr. Chamberlain.”

CHURCHILL’S REFLECTION ON THE NORWEGIAN CAMPAIGN IN HIS DRAFT OF THE GATHERING STORM, AS QUOTED BY DAVID REYNOLDS.

The Human and Material Costs of the Campaign

In comparison to other theaters of operations in World War II, the losses in lives in Norway were small. However, when viewed against the number of combatants involved (about 100,000 German, 55,000 Norwegians, and 38,000 Allied), the number of casualties in the 62-day campaign came to over six percent. Even today, some of the statistics covering losses vary and are misleading, particularly as they apply to specific actions. Ash’s statement that “German Army casualties were a good third higher than the casualties of the Norwegians and all the Allied units put together,” even when losses at sea are discounted, is not supported by figures released by the various participants. Norwegian and Allied casualties on land were about 25% higher than those of the Germans.

One example of these discrepancies is the two-day engagement between British and German troops at Kvam, in which 54 British soldiers fell and are buried at the Kvam Cemetery. Norwegian and British eye witness accounts, which prevailed in the postwar period, told about a large number of German killed and that their bodies were cremated on large wooden funeral pyres. Kersaudy, writing in 1989, claims that there were over 50 Germans killed at Kvam.

Official German sources give different statistics for this action that are confirmed by records of the Norwegian War Cemetery Service. The Germans claimed that they lost ten killed in the Kvam engagement and Norwegian cemetery records show that 13 Germans were buried in Kvam, three of those apparently killed in nearby areas. Furthermore, it was not customary for the Germans to cremate their fallen, at least not at this stage of the war.

Another problem that should be kept in mind when looking at the casualty figures is the very low number of wounded in relation to the number killed. Historically the ratio of wounded to killed in land combat is greater than 3:1. This ratio has increased over the years as means of evacuation and field medical services have improved. Nevertheless, Norwegian statistics show a ratio of less than 1:1. Similarly, the ratio resulting from German figures for land combat losses, gives us a ratio of killed to wounded of roughly 1:1.2. It is possible that the Germans and Norwegians used