Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

Government in the immediate aftermath of the German landings, the irrational mobilization decision, and premature withdrawals in the region around Oslo facilitated the efforts by the Germans to secure their beachheads. Likewise, the failure of the Allies to settle quickly on an appropriate strategy and the hurried dispatch of disorganized and ill-equipped forces without clear missions created delays and uncertainties.

Without Admiralty interference and Whitworth’s withdrawal, Narvik might have remained in Norwegian hands and the divisive debate over strategy–Narvik versus Trondheim–would not have taken place. In the debate over strategy, Churchill’s insistenced on the importance of Narvik led to an unfortunate compromise that split the Allied effort, with the best troops employed in Narvik. This compromise apparently ignored the fact that Trondheim was the key objective. Capturing and holding central Norway would have made the German position in Narvik untenable. The recapture of Narvik at the expense of giving up the Trondheim area had little effect on the eventual outcome of the campaign.

The invasion of Norway was history’s first three-dimensional military campaign and it illustrated the dangers of not using the three elements in harmony. The Luftwaffe has been identified by most writers as a factor of decisive importance. Derry and Roskill emphasise its undermining of sea power and conclude that the period of fleet operations without air cover was over. Moulton and Liddell-Hart view British failure to understand the concept of three-dimensional warfare as a root cause for the defeat. It was not only the physical damage inflicted by the Luftwaffe but the psychological effects of its domination of the skies over the battlefield and the rear areas that had to be taken into account. In his after-action report on operations in Norway, General Auchinleck writes, “that to commit troops to a campaign in which they cannot be provided with adequate air support is to court disaster.”2

The British air force was never much interested in the Norwegian operations. It was responsible for the defense of Great Britain and the forces in France and saw the operations in Norway as an unwelcome distraction. This is at least a partial explanation for the failure to provide adequate air units to support operations in Norway. The fleet air arm proved incapable in countering the German air threat. This was partially due to the type of aircraft employed but also because the carriers stayed so far offshore that they could not effectively support the troops fighting in the valleys of eastern Norway or north of Trondheim.

The movement of troops, equipment, and supplies into Norway by air was history’s largest airlift operation up to that time. The Norwegians and the Allies also underestimated the German capability to move reinforcements and supplies by air to isolated beachheads. This was an important factor in saving General Dietl’s forces at Narvik and supplying General Feurstein’s drive through Nordland Province. The air-bridge established to Oslo and from Oslo to Trondheim allowed for a rapid build-up of forces in both areas.

Operations in Norway gave the Allies their first taste of the German doctrine of close air support for ground operations. Norwegian and British forces were unable to counter the devastating effectiveness of coordinated German ground and air operations. In this respect, the operation in Norway was a curtain raiser for what was soon to follow on the western front.

The Allies also failed to provide their troops with adequate artillery and anti-tank weapons, leaving their troops helpless against German employment of only a few light tank units in eastern Norway.

The British command structure was not geared for quick decision-making. The time-consuming coordination between the British cabinet and its subsidiary committees was nothing short of disastrous when trying to cope with the tempo of German operations. Most issues requiring quick decisions were debated and studied in a leisurely manner more appropriate for a peacetime environment. Studies and recommendations were thrown back and forth between committees until it was too late. The events leading to the cancellation of Hammer is a typical example. The only member in the War Cabinet with any experience in military matters was Churchill, and it is not an overstatement to say that his experience and views were primarily focused on naval matters.

The Norwegian campaign revealed the glaring inadequacies in inter-allied cooperation and coordination. Mistrust, suspicions, and too much emphasis on national versus coalition objectives infected the decision-making apparatus. The cavalier and insensitive manner in which the British treated their brothers-in-arms, particularly the Norwegians, had a deleterious effect on the campaign.

One aspect of the campaign in Norway that is often neglected is the effect of differences in operational philosophies. These differences, and their effects, are illustrated repeatedly in this book. German officers and NCOs were taught to expect the unexpected on the battlefield and were instructed to deviate from plans in order to achieve their goals. Higher German commanders intervened in operations of subordinate units to a far lesser extent than the Allied commanders, who tended to be schooled in a much more centralized operational philosophy. The Germans expected quick decisions and equally quick execution, a cornerstone in the German military doctrine. The speed at which operations at all levels were executed resulted in keeping an opponent, operating under more centralized and methodical guidelines, off balance. There is a long-standing principle that one of the most lucrative objectives for a military commander is the mind of the enemy commander. The Germans achieved this objective by confusing, demoralizing, and paralyzing the enemy through unrelenting pressure.

The operations in eastern Norway, in Trøndelag, and in Nordland Province are full of examples of how well the differences in the two doctrines worked to Germany’s advantage.

In their after-action and lessons learned reports, the Germans show a relatively high regard for the operations of smaller Norwegian units, particularly in defensive operations. Special mention is given to ski units and to the marksmanship abilities of the average Norwegian soldier. However, they held a rather low opinion of how larger units functioned. The Norwegian lack of large-scale maneuvers and exercises in the 1930s was telling, and their