Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

a more restrictive classification for those that they listed as wounded. For example, they may not have counted as wounded troops that were able to return to duty during the campaign. The terrain and climatic conditions under which the fighting took place contribute to this low ratio. Evacuation of wounded in a timely manner was difficult. Most British, French, and Polish sources do not break down the figures into killed, wounded, or missing and their losses at sea are not included. By using the figures that are available, it appears that there were about 12,000 military casualties in the 62-day campaign. Probably about 70% of these were killed.

The official German figure for losses in the Norwegian campaign is 5,296 killed, wounded, and missing. Hubatsch and Moulton give a figure of 5,660 but this includes the small number that died in the invasion of Denmark. German records break the 5,296 figure into 1,317 killed, 1,604 wounded and 2,375 lost at sea. This last number includes over 1,000 who were killed when Blücher was sunk in the Dröbak Strait.

On the Allied side, British casualties are listed as 1,869 killed, wounded, and missing while those of the French and Poles are given as 533. These do not include losses at sea where at least 2,500 perished.

Norwegian losses have not been established with complete accuracy, even today. Most sources list about 860 killed. Lindbäck-Larsen places the number of killed and wounded at about 1,700, not including the approximately 400 civilians who died during the campaign.

The loss of military equipment was most serious for the Allies. Most losses occurred in the five evacuations that they undertook from Åndalsnes, Namsos, Mosjøen, Bodø, and Narvik. The Germans ended up with a net gain in this area, due primarily to the sudden capture of Norwegian depots and the surrender of Norwegian Army units.

The naval losses in the campaign were significant. The German Navy was prepared for the loss of more than half its fleet. That expectation was largely realized. Among the larger units of the German Navy, both battleships were damaged. Of the three heavy cruisers involved in the operation, one was sunk, one badly damaged, and the third sustained moderate damage but it returned to service during the campaign. Two of the four light cruisers were sunk and one was damaged. Ten destroyers, six submarines, two large torpedo boats, and 15 lighter units were also lost. Six destroyers sustained various degrees of damage, as did many lighter units. Churchill stresses the importance of these losses:

On the other hand, at the end of June, 1940, a momentous date, the effective German Fleet consisted of no more than one eight-inch cruiser, two light cruisers, and four destroyers. Although many of their damaged ships, like ours, could be repaired, the German Navy was no factor in the supreme issue of the invasion of Britain.1

Churchill overstates the case. It is debatable whether the German Navy as it existed before the invasion of Norway could have seriously interfered with the Dunkirk evacuation or tempted the Germans to undertake an invasion of Great Britain in 1940 unless they also achieved air superiority. There is no doubt, however, that the German naval losses gave the British considerable comfort during a period of continuous bad news.

The Norwegians effectively lost their whole navy. Two destroyers made their way to Great Britain from western Norway. A number of smaller ships escaped to England from both western and northern Norway. However, for the most part, the naval units were sunk, scuttled, or captured. Within a relatively short period, the Germans put about 50 captured vessels into service. With the exception of a minelayer and two destroyers, these were small or obsolete units.

The Allies also sustained heavy, but not crippling, naval losses. The most serious was the aircraft carrier Glorious. In addition, the British lost two cruisers, seven destroyers, one sloop, four submarines, and a number of armed trawlers. The French and Poles each lost one destroyer and one submarine. The British also had six cruisers, eight destroyers, and two sloops disabled but repairable.

Aircraft losses in the Norwegian Campaign were relatively light and had minor effects on the future conduct of the war. Statistics given for aircraft losses vary significantly. Kersaudy writes that the Luftwaffe lost 240 planes, including 80 transports. These are essentially the same numbers used by Derry. Ziemke puts German air losses at 127 combat aircraft and this is ten more than given by Hubatsch. Levsen, quoting official German sources, place the total number of German aircraft lost at 90.

Except for some aircraft flown to England or interned in Finland, the Norwegians lost all their aircraft. British air losses are placed at 112. These losses had little effect on future operations, because the Gladiators were too slow and cumbersome to have made a difference in the Battle of Britain.

The losses in transports and other merchant ships were significant, especially for the Germans. They lost 21 transports with a tonnage of 111,700, or about ten percent of available shipping. Levsen writes that the Allies lost over 70 transports. This number, if correct, must include Norwegian ships.

Von Falkenhorst assessed the losses in the Norwegian Campaign as surprisingly light, justified, and acceptable. He writes that much greater losses were expected, particularly because of British and French naval superiority. It must be remembered that he wrote the assessment against the background of the horrible losses sustained during the remainder of World War II.

Achievement of Objectives

The Germans achieved most of their objectives in what must be viewed as a stunning military success in the face of overwhelming odds. The source of iron ore was secured and the navy was able to remove some of the limitations imposed on it by geography. The occupation of Norway not only complicated British blockade measures but also cracked open the door to the Atlantic for possible interference with the British supplies coming from overseas. The air threat to the Baltic by a British presence in Norway was avoided, as was the possibility of