Napoleon III and the French Second Empire by Roger Price (read e books online free txt) 📕

were divided in their response to the plebiscite, most monarchists, liberals and clericals voted ‘yes’ and most, but not all, moderate republicans ‘no’.

Nationally, there were 7, 350, 000 affirmative votes against 1, 538, 000 negative and 1, 900, 000 abstentions. The centres of opposition remained the cities. Along with Paris and the department of the Seine, Marseille and Bouches-du Rhône was the only department to produce a majority of ‘no’ votes. In Paris, 59 per cent of the votes were negative – a much less decisive rejection of the regime than in the 1869

elections. The figure rose to 72–77 per cent in the predominantly working-class arrondissements of the north-east (11th, 18th, 19th, 20th) and to 57–71 per cent in the old revolutionary quarters of central Paris. Elsewhere, the opposition vote was substantial in the eight departments of the south-east where less than 55 per cent voted ‘yes’. Support for a negative response came from all social groups, but with a heavy worker and lower-middle class preponderance. Generally, it did appear to be waning. In the relatively industrialised Nord, 75.6 per cent voted ‘yes’, 5.9 per cent ‘no’, and 16.5 per cent abstained. Even in Lille, the proportion of ‘no’s only reached 5 1 per cent (Girard 1960). Fear of social revolution had been particularly intense in the Nord and former liberal critics of the regime had been particularly active in supporting an affirmative vote. Indeed, two of their most prominent leaders, Plichon and Brame, were soon to enter the government. Everywhere

republicans were bitterly disappointed. The results, nationally, indicated that a substantial majority of the population supported the regime. Whereas opposition candidates in 1869 had received 40–43 per cent of the votes cast, in the plebiscite only 17.6 per cent voted against the liberal empire. These were, of course, very different kinds of vote, but even Gambetta felt bound to admit that ‘the Empire is 57

stronger than ever’. The only viable prospect seemed to be a lengthy campaign to persuade the bourgeoisie and the rural populations that the republic did not mean revolution. The combination of concessions by the regime to its liberal and clerical critics and the appeal to their fear of revolution had successfully taken advantage of the fundamental disagreements between the various opposition groups and

resulted in a major political re-alignment. The regime had escaped from the political isolation which had threatened it, and although the Bonapartist right saw the result as an opportunity for a return to an authoritarian agenda, the Emperor on 19 May, with far greater realism, re-affirmed his commitment to liberalisation.

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Defeat and collapse

In this situation, the final collapse of the regime was to be caused by the incompetent management of foreign policy. Official and public concern about Prussian aspirations had been growing as a result of its government’s hostility to French intervention in Italy in 1859, due to its support for Russian repression of the Polish revolt of 1863 and as a result of the war with Denmark in 1864. The rapidity with which Austria was defeated in 1866, however, had come as a considerable shock to the French establishment. It undoubtedly represented a major upset of the balance of power and a challenge to what had been assumed to be France’s

predominant position in Europe. Subsequently, relations continued to deteriorate.

Napoléon III had hoped for territorial compensation for France on the left bank of the Rhine in return for his role as a mediator between Austria and Prussia, and subsequently for the cessation of Luxembourg. Failure to achieve these much publicised aspirations severely weakened the regime’s internal and international reputation. Politically and militarily the balance of power was altered further, and greatly to the detriment of France, by the establishment of a Prussian dominated confederation of north German states in 1867. The subsequent negotiation of alliances between Prussia and the south German states, previously seen by French diplomats as potential allies against Prussian ambition, shifted the balance further.

The outbreak of war was coming to be seen as inevitable by much of French public opinion. However, there was a clear reduction in international tension in 1869 and particularly following the establishment of the liberal Empire in 1870. Ollivier was well known for his commitment to improving relations with Prussia.

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Logically a belief in the likelihood of war should have promoted an effort to ensure that the army was ready. Napoléon was fully aware of the need for military reform following the chaotic mobilisation in 1859. Prussian success in 1866

suggested an urgent need to increase the size of both the regular army and its reserves, as well as for better organisation and equipment. The question of conscription was crucial. In France, young men drew lots to determine who should join the annual contingent and serve for up to seven years. The numbers called depended on assessments of military requirements and especially budgetary

constraints. It was possible, moreover, for those families who could afford the fees to purchase a replacement for unlucky participants in the ballot. On paper the system provided for an army of around 650, 000 men, but because of the regime’s reluctance to increase taxation the number of conscripts called was invariably well below the army’s requirements. In practice, the army in the mid-1860s was made up of 385, 000 men, of whom only around 250, 000 would have been available for front line service against a Prussian enemy. Alarmingly, in 1866 the Prussians had been able to rapidly mobilise a force of 750, 000. The problem was all too obvious.

Napoléon’s solution, announced in September 1866, was the Prussian one of

requiring quasi-universal military service. The system of drawing lots would have been maintained with the unfortunates serving for six years followed by a period in the reserve, but with the remainder now required to serve in a reserve for six years and undergo periodic training. The objective was to create a force which, with its trained reserves, would number 1, 200, 000 (Becker and Audoin-Rouzeau 1995: 44). The