Napoleon III and the French Second Empire by Roger Price (read e books online free txt) 📕

Emperor surrendered on 2 September. News of this humiliating capitulation was received in Paris on the evening of 3 September and became public knowledge during the following day. The contrast with past military glory was extreme. With this the Empire lost all credit. It simply faded away. Catastrophic defeat had destroyed its claims to legitimacy. In this political vacuum, the small group of 27

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republican deputies in the Corps législatif demanded the replacement of the regime. They were supported by crowds which on 4 September, as in 1848, invaded the Palais Bourbon. There was no resistance and no bloodshed. Troops and police guarding the building had been unwilling to resort to force against the

demonstrators in such an uncertain political situation. The more moderate among the republican députés de Paris seized their opportunity and established a Provisional Government of National Defense partly to prevent the much feared seizure of power by the Parisian revolutionaries, partly from a determination to re-organise the military effort. This would be presided over by the military governor of Paris, General Trochu. A similar, unopposed republican take-over had occurred in Lyon and Marseille even before the news of events in the capital had been received. Elsewhere, in the provinces news of military defeat and revolution frequently came as a great surprise. The Imperial administration collapsed and only the republicans had the organisation and record of consistent opposition which allowed them to present themselves as the legitimate successors to the Empire.

Thus, Republican notables were able to take over local administration virtually without opposition. There were odd exceptions: at Tourcoing (Nord) workers

demonstrated against their employers, and peasants in a number of places were reported to have complained that the Emperor had been ‘betrayed by the rich and the republicans’ (Corbin 1992). Generally, even the conservative press, like the Mémorial de Lille (5 September) called for unity in defence of the nation. If the liberal Empire had attracted substantial support from all social groups, and in particular had satisfied the demand of the social elites for a greater role in decision making, military defeat represented governmental failure on a scale sufficient to destroy the regime’s legitimacy.

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Conclusion

After Sedan, Napoléon remained a prisoner in Germany for over six months, until his release in March 1871. Subsequently, he established his family in England, in a mansion at Camden Place, Chiselhurst. There he began to plan another coup d’état, but the continued deterioration of his health made this an unrealistic prospect. He died on 9 January 1873 following an operation to remove a stone from his bladder.

This was not, however, the end of Bonapartism. The outbreak of the Paris

Commune, within days of the deposed ruler’s arrival in Britain, which culminated in the slaughter of 20, 000 men and women by the former imperial army, released from its German prisoner-of-war camps for the purpose, revealed once more the intensity of social fear within the elites and the potential for conflict in French society. The death of the discredited Emperor had left Bonapartists with an attractive candidate for the throne in the person of his son, born in 1856. By 1874, a propaganda campaign in favour of the Prince-Imperial supported by over 70

newspapers and an outpouring of pamphlets and prints was being organised by former pillars of the Empire such as Rouher and Pietri. In the general election of January–March 1876, some 75 Bonapartist deputies were elected, notably in the south-west. At its peak in October 1877, there were 104 Bonapartist deputies. They were overwhelmingly conservative and clerical, wealthy and paternalistic, and enjoying solid local political bases – men like Granier de Cassagnac in Gers, Echassériaux in Charente and the Baron de Bourgoigne in the Nièvre. Elsewhere, although much of the previous popular support for a democratic Bonapartism was draining away to the republicans, a latent sympathy survived. This continued to associate the Empire with prosperity and attracted support in regions as diverse as 64

the cereal cultivating plains of the Beauce in the Paris basin and the vineyards of the Hérault. There were also many sympathisers within the bureaucracy and the army. However, with the futile death of the Prince-Imperial in Africa, fighting the Zulus with the British army, the movement largely expired.

How should we conclude? Previous assessments have very much reflected

historians’ personalities and contemporaneous public concerns. These have

ranged from the political stability of the early Third Republic to the need to promote economic development and political stability during the inter-war depression and the period of post-war reconstruction, as well as the emergence of de Gaulle at the head of another ‘Bonapartist’ regime. The label has been used as an explanatory category by both historians and political sociologists, and as a term of abuse by politicians and journalists. In the aftermath of the mid-century crisis, given the intensity of the social fear caused by the 1848 Revolution, the preference of elites for a strong authoritarian government was not surprising. Conservatives would probably have made a pact with the devil in order to safeguard their property and privileges. Indeed, much wider sections of the population desperately desired a return to order and prosperity, to ‘normality’ as they conceived it. The parallels with Germany in 1933 and the rise of Hitler are, in this respect, striking. The authoritarian option carried substantial risks, however. It involved granting considerable power to a single individual, an opportunist with his own agenda, his own strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, effective government would depend on the ruler’s physical and mental well-being and Napoléon III’s capacity to rule was soon reduced by persistent ill-health and premature ageing. In the longer term, the dangers of personal rule would become increasingly apparent to many erstwhile supporters of the regime, in a series of policy decisions which appeared contrary to the interests of powerful vested interest groups. From personal inclination, and under pressure, Napoléon III was at least prepared to adapt and to engage in a process of transition from