The Religion of Nature Delineated by William Wollaston (mystery books to read .txt) π
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Wollaston attempts to determine what rules for the conduct of life (that is, what religion) a conscientious and penetrating observer might derive simply from reasoning about the facts of the world around him, without benefit of divine revelation. He concludes that truth, reason, and morality coincide, and that the key to human happiness and ethical behavior is this: βlet us by no act deny anything to be true which is true; that is: let us act according to reason.β
This book was important to the intellectual foundations of the American Revolution (for example, the phrase βthe pursuit of happinessβ originates here). It also anticipates Kantβs theory of the categorical imperative and the modern libertarian non-aggression principle.
This edition improves on its predecessors by, for the first time, providing both translations and sources for the over 650 footnotes that, in Wollastonβs original, are cryptically-attributed Greek, Hebrew, and Latin.
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- Author: William Wollaston
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There remains yet another questionβ βsupposed also to be proposed by an objectorβ βwhich must not be forgot, and upon which I shall bestow this very short section. The question was this: βIf a man can find out truth, may he not want the power of acting agreeably to it?β
I. Nothing is capable of no obligation. For to oblige nothing is the same as not to oblige.
II. So far as any being has no power or opportunity of doing anything, so far is that being incapable of any obligation to do it: or, no being is capable of any obligation to do that which it has not power or opportunity to do. For that being, which has not the faculties or opportunity necessary to the doing of anything, is, in respect of that thing, a being utterly inactiveβ βno agent at allβ βand therefore, as to that act, nothing at all.
To require, or command, one to do anything is to require him to apply a power superior to the resistence to be met with in doing it. To require him to apply such a power is the same as to require that his power, of such a kind and degree, be applied. But if he has no such power, then his power of that kind and degree is nothing: and it is nothing that is required to be applied. Therefore, nothing is required to be done. It is just the same as if a man was commanded to do something with his third hand, when he has but two: which would be the same as to bid him to do it with no hand, or not bid him do it.
Without more ado, it is a truth confessed by everybody, that nobody is obliged to impossibilities.
From hence will follow, after the manner of corollaries, the two following propositions:
III. Inanimate and inactive beings are capable of no obligation: nor merely sensitive of any obligation to act upon principles, or motives above sense.
IV. The obligations of beings intelligent and active must be proportionable to their faculties, powers, opportunities; and not more.
V. To endeavor may fitly express the use of all the opportunities and powers that any intelligent and active, but imperfect, being has to act. For to endeavor is to do what one can, and this as every such being may do, wherever he stands in the scale of imperfects; so none can do more. One may exert his endeavors with greater advantage or success than another, yet still they are but endeavors.
VI. The imputations of moral good and evil to beings capable of understanding and acting must be in proportion to their endeavors: or, their obligations reach as far as their endeavors may. This follows again from what has been said; and so does this:
VII. and lastly, They who are capable of discerning truth, though not all truths, and of acting conformably to it, though not always or in all cases, are nevertheless obliged to do these, as far as they are able: or, it it is the duty of such a being sincerely to endeavor to practice reason; not to contradict any truth, by word or deed; and in short, to treat everything as being what it is.
Thus the general duties of rational beings, mentioned in or resulting from the preceding sections, are brought together and finally fixed under the correction or limitation in this last proposition. This is the sum of their religion, from which no exemption or excuse lies. Everyone can endeavor; everyone can do what he can. But in order to that, everyone ought to be in earnest, and to exert himself heartily: not stifling his own conscience, not dissembling, suppressing, or neglecting his own powers.
And now, needless to me seem those disputes about human liberty, with which men have tired themselves and the world. The case is much the same as if a man should have some great reward or advantage offered to him, if he would get up and go to such a place to accept it, or do some certain thing for it, and he, instead of going or doing anything, falls into a tedious disquisition about his own freedom: whether he has the power to stir, or whether he is not chained to his seat and necessitated to sit still. The short way of knowing this, certainly, is to try. If he can do nothing, no labor can be lost; but if he is capable of acting, and does not act, the consequences and blame must be justly chargeable upon himself. And, I am persuaded, if men would be serious, and put forth themselves,161 that their wills are not so universally and peremptorily determined by what occurs, nor predestination and fate so rigid,162 but that much is left to their own conduct.163 Up and try.164
Sure it is in a manβs power to keep his hand from his mouth; if it is, it is also in his power to
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