Nuclear Winter First Strike by Bobby Akart (top ten books of all time .TXT) 📕

“Yes, sir,” the undersecretary responded. “Devastatingly so. We’ve reached out to our counterparts in China and Russia, as you know, seeking a means of gathering information about the Pakistani government. The Russians are close to the New Delhi government, as are the French. Nobody has received confirmation as to the status of either heads of state or their parliaments.”

“I might add, Mr. President,” began the defense secretary, “someone must be in charge because there are continuing targeted strikes on both sides of the border. It appears, incredibly, that they intend to empty their respective nuclear vaults.”

The president remained standing throughout. He dropped his chin to his chest as he contemplated the deaths of millions of innocent people, none of whom asked to be embroiled in all-out nuclear war. He finally looked up to his advisors.

“Have they all gone batshit crazy?”

His question was crassly worded but clearly understood.

“Mr. President, tensions have been festering—” began the undersecretary of state before the president cut him off.

“No, I get that. I’m talking about all of these rogue nations who have their fingers on the nuclear triggers. Who’s next? Is it like a damned lunacy epidemic? Is Kim Jong Un the next maniacal despot to fire off nukes?”

The undersecretary of state really didn’t want to answer the question, but the president’s stare had him locked in his sights. “Well, sir, the only rogue nation by U.S. diplomatic definition is North Korea. If you are looking for some kind of pattern from these two events, there’s no indication either South Korea or our allies in Tokyo would dare initiate military hostilities with the DPRK, especially under these circumstances.”

The president, who was generally forthcoming about his weaknesses, especially as it related to foreign policy, repeated the criticisms by the war hawks of his response to the Iranian-Israeli conflict.

“Let’s say my friends across the aisle were right, and my failure to stand by Israel was seen as a sign of weakness across the globe. Might this have emboldened India to launch the airstrikes and Pakistan to counter with nukes? Maybe. Both sides have seen us as all talk and no action, standing down when our allies were in need. Therefore, they took advantage of the chaos in the Middle East to make their move.”

The undersecretary of state squirmed in his chair, but to his credit, he continued in an honest assessment of the president’s stance, how it was perceived, and how it might relate to North Korea.

“Sir, I’m going to respond this way with a caveat. I don’t speak for the secretary of state. However, I believe our assessment of the North Korea situation is closely aligned.”

“Understood,” said the president, who took his seat at the head of the table for the first time.

The undersecretary explained, “When North Korea reneged on its promise to forgo nuclear weapons in the early 1990s, the Clinton administration put together an accord deemed the Agreed Framework that paved Pyongyang’s path to nuclearization. Kim Jong-il withdrew from this Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 2003, confirming that he intended to build a nuclear weapon.

“President George W. Bush pushed for the China-led six-party talks with North Korea that yielded no agreement. When North Korea tested its second nuclear weapon in 2009, President Obama opted for a strategic patience approach. This policy led to an expansion of the North Korean nuclear program, and three subsequent tests showed just how misguided these approaches have been.”

The undersecretary paused and caught his breath. He gulped before he stated his opinion. “Mr. President, it’s time to acknowledge that North Korea has never been interested in negotiating away its nuclear deterrent. Their goals have always been to bide time, get sanctions removed, or even secure humanitarian aid from the West.

“Of course, we should continue to leave the door open for serious discussions if the situation changes. However, sir, in my opinion, our government does our citizens and the world a disservice if we continually discount the central threat of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons to the stability of the Korean Peninsula, Japan, and our western shores.”

President Helton studied the undersecretary, a young man compared to the elderly military personnel in the room. He was anxious to learn more from him, but an aide had rushed into the room.

“We’ve made contact with the prime minister of India.”

Chapter Thirty-One

Tuesday, October 22

U.S. State Department

Washington, DC

Peter had been rushing up and down the halls of the State Department since the news broke about ballistic missiles sailing across the South Asia subcontinent. He raced out of his condo and made it to Foggy Bottom in record time, faster than other journalists assigned to State could ride their subway trains.

The story, and the administration’s response, was certainly foremost on his mind. However, he’d begun to get a nagging feeling that the president, and even the secretary of state, were focused on another nuclear-equipped bad actor, North Korea.

Amidst the chaos in the corridors of the Harry S. Truman Building, Peter hoped to catch a State Department official with his guard down. With the right set of loose lips, they might provide some insight into the Helton administration’s North Korea policy. His ploy worked.

He’d cornered a harried aide to the undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security. The two retreated to her office, where she began to reveal everything she knew. As the conversation began, Peter learned the president had set up a secret task force designed to bypass the intelligence watchdogs and the media. Their purpose was to study the means and justification for attacking North Korea with a first strike.

A preemptive nuclear first strike meant a lot more than being equated with the first ballistic missile to be launched, as had been the case in Iran and Pakistan. Both of those nuclear attacks were ostensibly in response to prior provocations, although most would argue a nuclear response was quite an overreaction.

A first strike was designed to apply overwhelming force against a nuclear-capable enemy with the goal of defeating them by destroying their nuclear arsenal. By