More Guns Less Crime by John Jr (best free e book reader .txt) 📕

"fell" after the law was adopted, yet once one graphs out the before-and-after trends it is clear that this average effect is quite misleading—the crime rate was falling until the law went into effect and rising thereafter. Finally, the fourth diagram (17d) shows a case in which the average crime rate is obviously lower after the law than beforehand but the drop is merely a continuation of an existing trend. Indeed, if anything, the rate of decline in crime rates appears to have slowed down after the law. Looking at the simple before-and-after averages provides a very misleading picture of the changing trends in crime rates.

6Is the way criminals learn about victims ability to defend themselves inconsistent with the results?

Zimring and Hawkins observe that there are two potential transmission mechanisms by which potential criminals respond to the passage of a shall issue law. The first, which they term the announcement effect, changes the conduct of potential criminals because the publicity attendant to the enactment of the law makes them fear the prospect of encountering an armed victim. The second, which they call the crime hazard model, implies that potential criminals will respond to the actual increased risk they face from the increased arming of the citizenry. Lott adheres to the standard economist's view that the latter mechanism is the more important of the two—but he doesn't fully probe its implications. Recidivists and individuals closely tied to criminal enterprises are likely to learn more quickly than non-repeat criminals about the actual probability of encountering a concealed weapon in a particular situation. Therefore, we suspect that shall issue laws are more likely to deter recidivists.... Thus, if Lott's theory were true, we would also suspect that the proportion of crime committed by recidivists should be decreasing and that crime categories with higher proportions of recidivism—and robbery is likely in this category—should exhibit the highest reductions. Once again, though, the lack of a strong observed effect for robbery raises tensions between the theoretical predictions and Lott's evidence. (Ian Ayres and John J. Do-

nohue HI, "Nondiscretionary Concealed Weapons Laws: A Case Study of Statistics, Standards of Proof, and Public Policy," American Law and Economics Review 1, nos. 1-2 [Fall 1999]: 458-59)

I have always viewed both the mentioned mechanisms as plausible. Yet the question of emphasis is an empirical issue. Was there a once-and-for-all drop in violent crimes when the law passed? Did the drop in violent crimes increase over time as more people obtained permits? Or was there some combination of these two influences? The data strongly suggest that criminals respond more to the actual increased risk, rather than the announcement per se. Indeed, all the data support this conclusion: table 4.6, the before- and after-law time trends, the county-level permit data for Oregon and Pennsylvania, and the new results focusing on the predicted percentage of the population with permits. The deterrence effect is closely related to the percentage of the population with permits.

I have no problem with Ayres and Donohue's hypothesis that criminals who keep on committing a particular crime will learn the new risks faster than will criminals who only commit crimes occasionally. 88 However, that hypothesis will be difficult to evaluate, for data on the number and types of crimes committed by criminals are known to be notoriously suspect, as they come from surveys of criminals themselves. Some of the criminals appear to be bragging to surveyors and claim many thousands of crimes each year. But one thing is clear from these surveys: criminals often commit many different types of crimes, and hence it is generally incorrect to say that criminals only learn from one type of crime. In any case, even if Ayres and Donohue believe that robbers are more likely to learn from their crimes, the estimated deterrent effect on robbery turns out to be very large when the before-and-after trends are compared. 89

It is interesting that one set of critiques attacks me for allegedly assuming a once-and-for-all drop in crime from right-to-carry laws (see point 3 above), while at the same time I am attacked for assuming that the drop can be related only to the number of permits issued.

7Have prominent "pro-gun " researchers questioned the findings in my hook?

To dispel the notion that Lott is simply being victimized by the "PC crowd," it may be helpful to mention the reaction of Gary Kleck, a Florida

State criminologist known for his generally "pro-gun" views Kleck

argues in his recent book that it is "more likely [that] the declines in crime coinciding with relaxation of carry laws were largely attributable to other factors not controlled in the Lott and Mustard analysis." (Jens Ludwig, "Guns and Numbers " Washington Monthly, June 1998, p. 51)

EPILOGUE/219

Even Gary Kleck, a researcher long praised by the NRA and identified as an authority on gun-violence prevention by Lott himself, has dismissed the findings. (Sarah Brady, "Q: Would New Requirements for Gun Buyers Save Lives? Yes: Stop Deadly, Unregulated Sales to Minors, at Gun Shows and on the Internet," Insight, June 21, 1999, p. 24)

The quote by Kleck has frequently been mentioned by Jim and Sarah Brady and other members of Handgun Control and the Violence Policy Center. 90 However, it is a rather selective reading of what he wrote. Their claim that Kleck "dismissed the findings" is hard to reconcile with Kleck's comment in the very same piece that my research "represents the most authoritative study" on these issues. 91

Let me try to explain the meaning of Kleck's quote. I have talked to Gary on several occasions about what additional variables I should control for, but he has been unable to concretely suggest anything; it rather seemed to be more a "feeling" of his that there might be other factors out there. But the issue is more complicated than simply stating that something else should be accounted for: there must exist some left-out factor