William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (book club reads txt) 📕

later, they held to that resolve, in spite of the strong opposition of

George III. But, on 5th August, while they were discussing details,

Bonaparte won a crushing victory over Wurmser at Castiglione, and,

eleven days later, Godoy definitely sided with France. Pitt feared that

the hostile league would include Denmark and Sweden; and, but for his

foresight in gaining over Catharine, this would have been the issue of

events. Even so, Godoy hoped to form a Quadruple Alliance with France,

Holland, and Prussia. He therefore took a high tone with Bute, declaring

that England would not be allowed to attack San Domingo, as it was still

Spanish, and there was a necessary connection between France and Spain;

but he would not hear of Bute accepting that statement as a declaration

of war.

Clearly, Spain was trying to gain time; for reports from Cadiz showed

her fleet to be far from ready, several of the ships being leaky. The

repairs to the French ships at that dockyard also went on in the most

leisurely manner. But on 4th August all was ready. Admiral Mann with a

small blockading force having been called by Jervis into the

Mediterranean, the French ships set sail, escorted by twenty Spanish

sail-of-the-line. The French squadron made for the Bank of Newfoundland

and inflicted great damage. Why it did not proceed along with the

Spaniards to the West Indies is hard to say. The impact of twenty-seven

sail-of-the-line in that quarter would have been decisive; but probably

Godoy did not yet feel warranted in throwing down the gauntlet. Pitt and

Grenville decided to overlook the gross breach of neutrality at Cadiz,

and even now hoped for a change in Godoy's mood. On 26th August

Grenville informed Bute that, though England had good cause for

declaring war, she would await the result of the recent proposals to

Spain. On or about that date Las Casas, the Spanish ambassador,

pettishly left London on a flimsy pretext; and two days later Dundas

warned the commander-in-chief in Hayti of the imminence of war.

Nevertheless, while taking every precaution, he was not to attack the

Spaniards until definite news of a rupture arrived. Further, on the

31st (as will appear in the following chapter) Portland despatched

orders to Sir Gilbert Elliot, Viceroy of Corsica, to prepare for the

immediate evacuation of that island.

It is therefore clear that Pitt and his colleagues used all possible

means to avert war with Spain. Bute, acting on orders from London,

carried complaisance to lengths derogatory, as he thought, to the honour

of Great Britain, and Godoy humoured him to the top of his bent. Thus,

on 10th September, in the course of a singular interview, Godoy assured

him that, even if war broke forth, it would be brief. If (he continued)

England had not annoyed Spain by her naval and colonial policy, the

latter might have arranged to find some indemnity, either at the expense

of Holland, or else "something on the coast of California. You English

have a passion for California, and the trade is in the most flourishing

state." Half amused by these dilatory tactics, Bute sought to find out

the real state of the case; and he discovered that the Franco-Spanish

compact aimed at the joint conquest of Portugal as well as of Naples,

Sicily, and Gibraltar, while England was to be compelled to surrender

Honduras and Hayti. On the 5th of October he received from Godoy the

Spanish declaration of war. It laid stress on the disputes at Toulon,

England's seizure of Corsica, Hayti, and Dutch Demerara, besides the

founding of British mercantile posts on the River Missouri, which

evidently aimed at securing the routes to the Pacific.[394] Of these

schemes, the conquest of Portugal lay the nearest to the heart of Godoy.

The rupture with Spain is an event of prime importance. Because her

fleet was disastrously beaten by Jervis off Cape St. Vincent in February

1797, it has too often been assumed that she counted for little in the

war. An examination of the British Records reveals the error of that

assumption. The evacuation of Corsica and of the Mediterranean by the

British forces resulted solely from the Spanish offensive. Though weak

in herself, Spain held so strong a position in Europe and the West

Indies as to endanger British enterprises at many points, besides

threatening the coasts of Ireland. In truth, but for Spanish support in

the Mediterranean, Bonaparte could never have ventured upon his Eastern

expedition. Thus the defection of the Court of Madrid changed the

character of the war. Thenceforth it revolved more and more around

colonial questions, to the weakening of the royalist and republican

motives which had worked so potently in its early stages. The oriental

adventure of the young Corsican was to emphasize the contrast between

the years 1793 and 1798; but the scene-shifting began with the intrigues

of Godoy. In a sense Pitt himself helped on the transformation. He did

not regard the struggle against France as one of political principle. He

aimed solely at curbing the aggression of the Jacobins upon Holland; and

the obvious device of weakening France by expeditions to the West Indies

further helped to bring events back into the arena of eighteenth-century

strife. Now that Spain, the protagonist of the French Bourbons, deserted

their cause and attacked the Power in which they most trusted, all

pretence of a war of principle vanished. The importance of the change

was not perceived at the time, though signs of it were not wanting. Both

in France and England democratic enthusiasm speedily died down, and the

discontent, which now and again flared forth in both lands, was but a

feeble sputter compared with the devouring flame of 1789.

In the West Indies the effects of the rupture with Spain were speedily

felt. On 9th September 1796 Dundas instructed Forbes, commander-in-chief

in Hayti, to help the Spanish settlers if they resisted the transfer of

their part of the island to France. He also enjoined the utmost possible

economy in public expenditure, and urged that the French settlers should

have a large share in the conduct of local affairs. This zeal on behalf

of local self-government was markedly opportunist. It arose from a

suggestion of Colonel Wigglesworth, Commissary-General in Hayti, that

the expenses of that colony would not lessen until there was a regular

Government. In the midst of the financial strain at home Pitt and his

colleagues desired that the French settlers should bear their share of

the expense of maintaining bands of native auxiliaries. By one of the

unaccountable impulses that sway the negro mind, a considerable force

was now available; but it could not be utilized owing to the rigid

economy enjoined by the Home Government. As the financial outlook

darkened, Portland and Dundas sent urgent warnings to the new Governor

of Hayti, Major-General Simcoe, bidding him concentrate the whole of the

British force at Cape Nicholas Mole, the probable objective of the

French and Spaniards. The military administration must be withdrawn to

that fortress, the British cavalry being sent home. Further, as Great

Britain could in no case bear a larger financial burden than £300,000 a

year for Hayti, expenses were to be reduced on all sides, the residue

falling to the share of the colonists. A larger naval force would,

however, be sent; and Simcoe was advised to seize the island of Tortuga

and to alarm the Spaniards by feints against Havannah.

This was the beginning of the end at Hayti. Ministers, in despair of

pacifying that racial cauldron, now looked on the Spanish colonies as an

easier prize. Dundas therefore ordered Abercromby to capture Porto Rico

or Trinidad; and he even dallied with a fantastic scheme for shipping

the Haytian colonists to Porto Rico. Abercromby, however, who again set

sail from Portsmouth in November 1796, decided to make for Trinidad, and

by a brilliant stroke captured its capital, Port of Spain. The attack on

San Juan, in Porto Rico, met with unexpected difficulties, and ended in

failure (February and April 1797). Matters now became desperate in

Hayti. The rebels captured several posts near Port-au-Prince, largely

owing to dissensions among the defenders. Simcoe, despite a serious

illness on his way out, worked miracles with his skeleton regiments, but

both he and his subordinates failed to cut down expenses as the Cabinet

demanded. Accordingly, on 9th June 1797, Portland and Dundas reminded

him that no further reinforcements could be sent out, and added this

ominous sentence: "It is but too obvious that ... the immense sacrifices

this country has made for the protection of the French part of San

Domingo have too frequently been diverted from purposes of public

utility to answer the worst ends of private peculation and inordinate

cupidity."

In a recent debate in the House of Commons St. John assessed the

expenses of Hayti for January 1797 at £700,000; and stated that, for the

discharge of judicial duties, a Frenchman was receiving £2,500 a year,

which he was now squandering in London. Pitt remained silent. Dundas did

not deny these allegations, but begged members to recollect the great

difficulties of our officials in Hayti.[395] This was undeniable. It is

the curse of a policy of retirement that waverers haste to leave betimes

with all the spoils obtainable. The signs of abandonment of Hayti caused

a stampede, demoralizing to all concerned. On 1st January 1798,

Portland and Dundas penned the order for the evacuation of Hayti, owing

to the impossibility of making good the loss of troops or of recruiting

in the island. After dwelling on the impossibility of reducing the

expenditure to the requisite amount, Ministers explained that they had

deferred the evacuation of Hayti "as long as the negotiation which His

Majesty had opened with the enemy at Lille, and the disposition of a

majority in the two Councils of Legislature in France, left a hope that

some immediate arrangement might be made with that country, which in its

consequences might operate to relieve England from the intolerable

burdens by which the British part of St. Domingo is retained, and to a

certain degree to ensure to its inhabitants a continuance of security

and protection.... The rupture of the negotiation and the avowed system

of the present Government of France appear on the one hand to render the

attainment of this desirable end precarious, if not remote, whilst on

the other they impose on H.M.'s confidential servants an additional

obligation of reducing the heavy burdens of a war, the continuance of

which is unavoidable, within the narrowest limits, in order to be able

to persevere in it until adequate terms of peace can be obtained; and it

is certainly their first and essential duty to appropriate the resources

of the country with such management and economy as may ensure the

preservation and defence of the essential possessions of the Crown...."

The good faith of Pitt in the Lille negotiation appears clearly in this

interesting statement, which further proves that he held on to Hayti in

the hope of ceding it to France on terms satisfactory to Great Britain

and the colonists. Doubtless it was the perception of this truth which

led many of the settlers to decamp after spoiling the Egyptians. The

thankless duty of evacuation devolved on Brigadier-General Maitland, who

carried it out with skill and patience. Especially admirable is his

secret bargain with Toussaint, whereby that able chief agreed not to

molest the British either in Hayti or in Jamaica, while in return he was

to receive provisions at certain ports under his control. Ministers had

not advised any such proceeding, but they cordially approved of it,

despite the clamour of the West India planters at a compact with a

negro.[396] Thus was laid the basis of that good understanding which

subsequently enabled Toussaint to defy Bonaparte.

The success attending this agreement shows what power England might have

wielded had not her King, her Princes, and her Parliament insisted on

maintaining intact the institution of slavery. They thereby aroused an

enemy more terrible than yellow fever, the negro. France profited by the

blunder; but she rushed blindly forward, using the black man with a

recklessness which gave him the mastery. On the other hand, if Pitt and

Wilberforce had succeeded in carrying out their programme in the years

1790-2, the incendiary devices of Brissot and Victor Hugues would have

come to nought. In that case the transfer of Hayti to England would have

placed at her disposal myriads of devoted blacks, ready and able to

plant the Union Jack on every fortress in the West Indies, and to

conquer the colonies of Spain if she changed sides. It was not to be.

Far from gaining an accession of strength in that quarter, England lost

heavily in men and treasure, and at the Peace of Amiens retained only

Trinidad in return for all her sacrifices.

In no part does Pitt's war policy appear to more disadvantage than in

the West Indies. He entered into those expeditions when the army at home

was unable to meet the demands of the service in