William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (book club reads txt) 📕

always been loath

to declare for the restoration of the Bourbons. To do so would be to

flaunt the _fleur-de-lis_ in the face of a nation which hated all that

pertained to the old régime. Besides, it implied a surrender to the

clique headed by Burke and Windham, which scoffed at the compromise

between monarchy and democracy embodied in the French constitution of

Pitt, with his innate moderation and good sense, saw the folly of

these reactionary views and the impossibility of forcing them upon the

French people. Nevertheless, as an experiment in the course of that

bewildering strife, he had recourse to the _émigrés_.

 

The accession of Windham to the Cabinet, in July 1794, had strengthened

their influence at Westminster; and incidents which occurred in France

during the winter of 1794-5 evinced a decline of Jacobinical enthusiasm.

The sentiment of loyalty, damped by the chilling personality of

Louis XVI and the follies of his brothers, revived now that the little

Louis XVII was being slowly done to death by his gaolers in the Temple.

The rapacity and vulgar ostentation of the Thermidorian party, then in

power, provoked general disgust; and despair of any satisfactory

settlement began to range friends of order on the side of the monarchy.

The late American envoy at Paris, Gouverneur Morris, informed Bland

Burges at our Foreign Office, on 28th June 1795, that the state of

France was so desperate as to admit of cure only by the restoration of

the old dynasty; that the recent death of Louis XVII was a benefit to

the cause inasmuch as his mind had been completely brutalized; and

finally the envoy heartily wished success to every effort to overthrow

the despicable Government at Paris.

 

Though the Royalist leaders in the west of France early in the year 1795

made a truce with the Republic, yet the resumption of the civil war in

that quarter was known to be only a question of time. Windham,

therefore, urged the despatch of an expedition to Brittany. His royalist

zeal had now developed his powers to their utmost. Early in the course

of the French Revolution the chivalry of his nature detached him from

the Foxites. The glow and beauty of his periods marked him out as the

successor of Burke in the House of Commons; yet in no respect did he

attain complete success. His speeches were too refined and subtle for

that audience; and, worse still, his diffidence or torpor led him often

to miss opportunities of effective intervention. The sensitiveness of

his nature appeared in his falling in love at first sight with a

Highland girl whom Burke and he casually met during a tour. His loss of

her made a painful impression on him.[406] The butt of an unkind fate,

he seemed destined also to be the leader of lost causes; and the proud

and penniless _émigrés_ found in him their most devoted friend.

 

Despite the opposition of Dundas, and the doubts of Pitt, his views

prevailed; and preparations began for an Anglo-French expedition to the

coast of Brittany. During the winter there had arrived in London a

Breton leader of gigantic stature and considerable mental powers, the

Comte de Puisaye. He had fought devotedly for the constitutional

monarchy in that great province and had the confidence of its

inhabitants, whether nobles or peasants (_Chouans_). But French princes

and the cliques of "pure" Royalists looked on him, as Marie Antoinette

looked on Mirabeau, merely as a rebel who had partly seen the error of

his ways. Secretly they resolved to make use of him, as he had gained

the confidence of Windham and Pitt, but to throw him over at the first

opportunity.

 

Meanwhile the Cabinet began to equip regiments of French Royalists

destined to form the spearhead of the "Royal and Catholic Army." Various

causes delayed the preparations, the chief being the absence in North

Germany of seasoned corps of _émigrés_ whose presence in Brittany, was

essential. Puisaye therefore urged Ministers to allow him to enrol

recruits from among the French prisoners of war in England--a dangerous

device which, unfortunately, was adopted. Undoubtedly the initiative in

this matter rested with him; and it is noteworthy that other royalist

leaders had tried the plan, hitherto with no untoward results.[407]

Prisoners were not forced into the new corps; but it is clear that some

of them enlisted in order to get back to France. As for the finances of

the enterprise, they were partly met by the manufacture of royalist

_assignats_. Whether they were like the forged _assignats_ manufactured,

with the connivance of Government, near Hexham and Durham, is not clear.

It is alleged by royalist writers that they bore a mark ensuring

identification, so that, in case of a monarchist triumph, they would be

duly honoured. The chief aim, however, certainly was to discredit the

republican notes and to embarrass the Parisian Government. That Pitt

should in any way have countenanced these underhand devices is

discreditable.

 

Owing to the declaration of war by Holland (May 1795), the vacillations

of Spain, and the determination of George III to keep troops in

Hanover,[408] very few British were available for the enterprise. It is

worth noting that the King disliked the _émigrés_ and often shocked

Windham by assertions at Court that they would prove false. His

influence was used steadily against all attempts in their favour. There

were, indeed, good grounds for suspicion even at this time. Seeing that

Charette and other Breton leaders still observed the truce with the

Republic, the risks of a landing were great; and this explains the

reluctance of the Cabinet to allow the Comte d'Artois to proceed with

the first contingent.[409] It was charged to occupy the Quiberon

Peninsula as a base for further exertions, to supply arms to the

Bretons, and thus prepare for a general rising, the effect of which

would be clinched by the arrival of a larger force. The vanguard set

sail from Spithead on 17th June 1795. It consisted of some 3,800

_émigrés_, under the general command of Puisaye, though by some mistake

in drafting the orders, considerable power was given to Comte

d'Hervilly, the senior officer of the subsidized regiments. At first all

went well. The convoying fleet under Lord Bridport, after capturing

three French sail-of-the-line off l'Orient, made Quiberon Bay and

assisted in the capture of Fort Penthièvre, commanding the narrow

isthmus (3rd July).

 

Disputes now began between Puisaye and Hervilly, the former desiring to

push on boldly, while the latter insisted on remaining in the peninsula.

Time was thus given for the republican general, Hoche, to collect his

forces and make spirited attacks upon the invaders, who soon fell a prey

to schism and discouragement. The doom of the expedition was decided by

the treacherous surrender of the fort to Hoche's men at the close of a

night attack (21st July). As day dawned the Republicans drove their foes

into the peninsula. Wild scenes of panic ensued. A storm having

compelled the larger British warships to keep in the offing, Puisaye

went off in a boat to beg succour from Admiral Warren. The defence

speedily collapsed. De Sombreuil, who was left in command near the tip

of the tongue of land, unaccountably surrendered, though a British

corvette, the "Lark," and gunboats were effectively covering his flank.

At the instigation of Tallien, the French Convention disavowed the

promise of its officers at Quiberon to spare the lives of those who laid

down their arms; and 712 Royalists were shot down in cold blood at Auray

and neighbouring places.

 

The evidence proves that the Pitt Ministry had done its best for this

expedition, which went to pieces owing to the quarrels of its leaders

and the refusal of Charette to stir a finger on behalf of Puisaye, whom

he detested. For the final massacre Tallien and the French Convention

are wholly responsible. Yet it suited the tactics of the English

Opposition to accuse Pitt of planning the death of the French Royalists.

Fox, in one of his wildest outbreaks, charged Ministers with

deliberately sending noble gentlemen to a massacre. Sheridan, too,

declared that, though British blood had not flowed, yet "British honour

had bled at every pore." These reckless mis-statements have been refuted

by the testimony of La Jaille, Vauban, and Puisaye, royalist officers

who escaped.

 

Before these horrible events were known in England, Ministers prepared

to succour the vanguard at Quiberon. News that Spain had made peace with

France in a highly suspicious manner weakened this second effort, it

being necessary to safeguard the British West Indies from a probable

attack by the Spaniards. As no more than four newly raised British

regiments could be spared for the Biscay coast, the Earl of Moira threw

up the command, which General Doyle then accepted. It seems probable

that by 3rd August Pitt doubted the expediency of sending a second

expedition to Brittany or la Vendée. Nevertheless, the Comte d'Artois,

who about that time arrived at Spithead from North Germany with a force

of _émigrés_, desired to make the venture, relying on Charette, and

other royalist chiefs who had once more aroused the men of the West. The

Count also cherished the hope that the numerous bands of malcontents in

Paris would overthrow that tottering Government.

 

Events turned out otherwise. The first plan, that of occupying

Noirmoutier, an island close to the Vendéan coast, proving

impracticable, Doyle sailed to a smaller island, Yeu, farther out at

sea. There the 5,500 troops, miserably cramped and underfed, waited

until the Comte d'Artois should make good his boast of throwing himself

into a boat, if need be, in order to join his faithful Charette. It was

soon apparent that he preferred to stay in Yeu with his mistress, Mme.

Polastron. In vain did the Bretons under Puisaye and Vauban, and the

Vendéans under Charette, beg him to join them. Meanwhile, amid the early

autumn rains the troops deteriorated, and the royalist rising at Paris

proved a miserable fiasco, some 30,000 National Guards being scattered

by a small force well handled by Bonaparte and Barras (5th October).

Finally, a deputation of Bretons proceeded to Yeu, and begged Artois to

place himself at the head of the numerous bands of devoted gentlemen and

peasants who still awaited his appearance. All was in vain. _Je ne veux

pas aller Chouanner_ (play the Chouan) was his reply (12th November). On

the morrow he informed Vauban that he had received orders from England

to return at once. This assertion was at the time generally believed to

be false; the letters of Grenville to the Prince prove it to be grossly

exaggerated. To the despair and disgust of his soldiers he departed, and

finally sought refuge from his creditors in Holyrood Castle. The British

and French royalist regiments were withdrawn with much difficulty during

the storms of December 1795. Nearly all the horses had to be destroyed.

 

Undoubtedly Pitt and Grenville had become disgusted with the torpor of

Artois and the follies of the French Royalists. In particular the absurd

failure at Paris seems to have prompted the resolve of the Cabinet to

withdraw the British troops from Yeu. Pitt's letters of the latter half

of October also evince a desire to pave the way for some understanding

with the French Directory. As that Government was firmly installed in

power, an opportunity presented itself, for the first time since the

opening of the war, of arranging a lasting peace. These hopes were to be

blighted; but it is certain that Pitt cherished them; and, doubtless,

among the motives operating in favour of peace the foremost was a

feeling of disgust at the poltroonery of the French Princes and the

incurable factiousness of their followers, in whom the faculties which

command success were lost amidst vices and perversities sufficient to

ruin the best of causes. Pitt continued to support the Chouans by money

and arms; but, despite the frequent protests of Windham, not a British

soldier was landed on that coast.[410]

 

FOOTNOTES

 

[397] "F. O.," Holland, 57.

 

[398] "Cape Records," i, 98.

 

[399] "W. O.," vi, 67.

 

[400] "Cape Records," i, 17, 22.

 

[401] "Cape Records," i, 23-6, 138-40; Cory, "Rise of South Africa," i,

ii.

 

[402] "W. O.," i, 323. In "F. O.," Holland, 57, is a memorial of

Elphinstone and Craig to Grenville, stating why they had detained at the

Cape the U. S.