William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (book club reads txt) 📕

Domingo. Unfortunately the greater the prominence accorded to colonial

affairs, the wider grew the breach with Spain, until in October 1796 the

Court of Madrid declared war. Is Pitt to be blamed for the rupture with

Spain? From the standpoint of Burke and Windham he is open to grave

censure. Surveying the course of events from their royalist minaret,

these prophets ceased not to proclaim the restoration of the Bourbons to

be the sole purpose of the war. Let there be no talk of indemnities. Be

content with crushing Jacobinism and restoring order. Such was their

contention; and much may be said for it.

On the other hand, we must remember that at first England was not a

principal in the contest. It was thrust upon her by the aggressions of

the Jacobins, and perforce she played a subordinate part in continental

campaigns, the prizes of which Austria and Prussia had already marked

out. The reproaches hurled by Burke and Windham were the outcome of

ignorance as to the aims of the powerful Allies, whose co-operation,

illusory though it came to be, was at that time deemed essential to

success. Further, in striking at the French colonies, Pitt followed the

course successfully adopted by England in several wars. But here again

his difficulties were greater than those of Chatham. Indeed, they were

enhanced by the triumphs of Chatham. Where now could he deal the most

telling blow? Not against Canada; for his father had reft that prize.

The French settlements in the East Indies were of small account. It was

in Hayti, Martinique, and Guadeloupe that French commerce could be

ruined. At them, therefore, he struck. But in so doing he reopened the

old disputes with Spain. In vain did he seek to avert bickerings by

suggesting a friendly understanding about Hayti. Godoy was determined to

bicker. And, as the war changed its character, the old Latin affinities

helped that adventurer to undermine the monarchical league and to draw

back Spain to the traditional connection with France.

The Spanish declaration of war in October 1796 opens the fourth phase of

the struggle. Thenceforth England stood on the defensive in Europe in

order to guard and strengthen her Colonial Empire. She abandoned Corsica

and Elba; she withdrew her fleet from the Mediterranean so that Ireland

might be screened from attack. Pitt's views also underwent a change.

Foreseeing the collapse of Austria, he sought to assure peace with

France and Spain by conquering enough territory oversea to

counterbalance the triumphs of Bonaparte and Moreau in Italy and the

Rhineland. If he could not restore the Balance of Power on the

Continent, he strove to safeguard British interests at all essential

points. Failing to save Holland from the Jacobins' grip, he conquered

and held the Cape. This was the bent of his policy during the peace

overtures of the year 1796. He struggled on reluctantly with the war,

opposing as inopportune the motions of Fox, Grey, or Wilberforce for

peace, but ever hoping that France would be compelled by the pressure of

bankruptcy to come to terms and surrender some of her continental

conquests on consideration of recovering her colonies. Wilberforce heard

him declare that he could almost calculate the time when her resources

would be exhausted. On the philanthropist repeating this at a dinner

party, one of his guests, de Lageard, wittily remarked: "I should like

to know who was Chancellor of the Exchequer to Attila."[418] This remark

shore asunder Pitt's financial arguments and reveals the weak point of

his policy. He conducted the war as if it were a Seven Years' War. It

was a Revolutionary War; and at this very time a greater than Attila was

at hand. Bonaparte was preparing to use the spoils of Italy for the

extension of the arena of strife. Nelson, then seeking to intercept the

supplies of Bonaparte's army in the Riviera, foresaw the danger and thus

graphically summarized it: "Italy is the gold mine; and if once entered,

is without means of resistance." As by a flash we see in this remark and

in that of de Lageard the miscalculation which was to ruin the life work

of Pitt and almost ruin his country.

Despite the opposition of the King and Grenville to the negotiations for

peace, Pitt held firm; and early in 1796 advances were made through

Wickham, our enterprising envoy in Switzerland. They were foredoomed to

failure; on 26th March the Directory declared its resolve to listen to

no proposals involving the surrender of any of the lands incorporated in

France by the terms of the constitution of 1795. This implied that she

would retain the Rhine boundary, along with Savoy, Nice, and Avignon.

Grenville received the news with satisfaction, remarking to Wickham that

the Directory had acted clumsily and "in fact played our game better

than we could have hoped."[419] The effect on public opinion was even

better when it appeared that France expected England to surrender her

colonial conquests. That France should gain enormously on land while the

British acquisitions oversea were surrendered, was so monstrous a claim

as to arouse the temper of the nation. Even Fox admitted that if France

retained her conquests in Europe, England must keep those gained at sea.

As Pitt pointed out in his speech of 10th May 1796, the French demands

blighted all hope of peace; and we must struggle on, "waiting for the

return of reason in our deluded enemy."

Pitt regarded the French conquest of Italy as counterbalanced by the

triumph of Jervis and Nelson at Cape St. Vincent in February 1797; and

he therefore refused to consider the cession of Gibraltar to Spain.

Wholeheartedly he sought for peace in that year. But it was to be peace

with honour. In fact, Great Britain fared better after 1796 than before.

As Allies fell away or joined the enemy, her real strength began to

appear. The reasons for the paradox are not far to seek. Open enemies

are less dangerous than false friends. Further, the complexities of the

war, resulting from the conflicting aims of the Allies, vanished.

England therefore could act in the way in which Pitt would all along

have preferred her to act, namely, against the enemy's colonies. In

Europe her attitude was defensive; and for a time in the summer and

autumn of 1796 fears of invasion were rife. Accordingly the

Quarter-Master-General, Sir David Dundas, drew up a scheme of coast

defence, especially for the district between Pegwell Bay and Pevensey

Bay; he also devised measures for "driving" the country in front of the

enemy. In November of that year he recommended the construction of

batteries or entrenchments at Shooter's Hill, Blackheath, on the hills

near Lee, Lewisham, Sydenham, Norwood, Streatham, Merton, and

Wandsworth. The failure of Hoche's attempt at Bantry Bay and the victory

off Cape St. Vincent somewhat assuaged these fears; but, owing to the

alarming state of Ireland, England remained on the defensive through the

years 1797-8, until Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition enabled her to

strike a crushing blow at the chief colonial enterprise of her

antagonist. That adventure, together with the aggressions of France at

Rome and in Switzerland, aroused the anger or fear of Russia, Austria,

and Naples, and thereby led up to the war of the Second Coalition.

                  *       *       *       *       *

Amidst the conflict of aims which distracted the Allies in the First

Coalition, Pitt's foresight was not seldom at fault. But only those who

have weighed the importance of the diplomatic issues at stake, and have

noted their warping influence on military affairs, have the right to

accuse him of blindness and presumption. The problem before him was of

unexampled complexity, and its solution could be effected only by a

succession of experiments. That he put forth too many efforts at one

time may be granted; and yet in each case, if the details are fully

known, the reasons for making the attempt seem adequate. Did not Chatham

fail in most of the expeditions which he sent against the coasts of

France? Even those who censure Pitt for his blunders in the war will

admit that the inspiring influence of his personality and patriotism

nerved the nation and Parliament for the struggle. True, the Opposition

indulged in petty nagging and in ingeniously unpatriotic tactics; but

they only served to throw up in bold relief the consistent and

courageous conduct of the Prime Minister. It was an easy task to refute

the peevish efforts of Fox to justify the French Jacobins alike before

the war, throughout its course, and in their rejection of the British

overtures for peace. But in every encounter Pitt won more than a

personal triumph. He proved that the war was forced upon us; that on our

side it was a defensive effort; and that despite the perverse conduct of

Prussia and Spain, England had won notable gains oversea and might

expect an advantageous peace, provided only that the nation persevered.

One question remains. Why did not Pitt call the nation to arms? The

reasons for his caution are doubtless to be found in the ingrained

conservatism of the English character, and in the political ferment

which marked the years 1794-5. The mere proposal to merge Line, Militia,

and Volunteers in one national array would have seemed mere madness. For

the populace had recently been protesting against the facilities given

to the loyal to arm and drill themselves. It was rumoured that, by way

of retort, the men of Sheffield, Southwark, and Norwich secretly

mustered for practice with pikes. In such circumstances, conscription

might well spell Revolution. Here was the weak place in Pitt's armour.

By parting company with the reformers, he had embittered no small

section of his countrymen. In 1794, as we have seen, he was considered a

reactionary and an oppressor. He therefore could not appeal to the

nation, as Carnot did in France. Even his Bill of March 1794 for

increasing the Militia by an extension of the old custom of the ballot

or the drawing of lots produced some discontent. A similar proposal,

passed a year earlier by the Dublin Parliament for raising 16,000

additional Militiamen in Ireland, led to widespread rioting, especially

in Ulster. Not until 1797 did the Scottish Militia Act ensure the

adoption of similar methods by Scotland, though regiments of Fencibles

were raised in the meantime.

The preparations for national defence continued to proceed in these

parochial ways. Pitt's authority at Westminster was at no time more

firmly founded than at the time of the meeting of the new Parliament in

the autumn of 1796. Yet the piecemeal methods went on as before. He

proposed to raise by means of the ballot a levy of 15,000 men in order

to recruit the navy and the Line regiments; and he further asked for a

levy of 60,000 men as a Supplementary Militia, one tenth being embodied

by turns so as not to withdraw from work too many hands at one time. Nor

was this all. For the purpose of strengthening the irregular cavalry, he

proposed that every person who kept ten horses should be required to

furnish one horseman and a horse for such a corps, and those who owned

more than ten horses were to subscribe a proportionate sum towards its

maintenance. He also required gamekeepers and those who took out

licenses to shoot either to serve on horseback or to find a substitute.

In all he expected to raise 20,000 horsemen by these means.

The attitude of the House was on the whole highly favourable to these

proposals. Fox accused Ministers of raising an invasion scare in order

to compass their own nefarious designs; but Pitt's first proposals

passed without a division; that on the cavalry by 140 votes to 30.

Nevertheless, Pitt did nothing towards securing cohesion in these

diverse forces, except by a provision which obliged Volunteers to enrol

in the Supplementary Militia, to take the oath as such, and to train by

turns for twenty days at a time in any part of the country, instead of

training once or twice a week in their own towns. This must have been

beneficial where it was carried out; but, as the Militia was controlled

by the Home Office, it is doubtful whether enough energy was thrown into

the scheme to ensure success.

These arrangements are miserably inadequate in comparison with the

_levée en masse_ of Carnot, which baffled the calculations of foreign

statesmen, flung back the armies of the Coalition, and opened up the

path of glory for Bonaparte. Here the popular armament did not become in

any sense national until after the renewal of war in 1803. The

possibilities open to England, even in that trying year 1795, were set

forth by Major Cartwright in a suggestive pamphlet--"The Commonwealth in

Danger." After pointing out that, having been deserted by Prussia and

Spain, we must now depend on ourselves alone, he depicted the contrast

between England and France. The French Republic, relying on the

populace, had more than a million of men under arms. Great Britain was

"a disarmed, defenceless, unprepared