The Grammar of English Grammars by Goold Brown (free ebook reader .txt) 📕

of course his book teaches us to account "the termination ish, in some sort, a degree of comparison."—Octavo Gram., p. 47. But what is more absurd, than to think of accounting this, or any other suffix, "a degree of comparison?" The inaccuracy of the language is a sufficient proof of the haste with which Johnson adopted this notion, and of the blindness with which he has been followed. The passage is now found in most of our English grammars. Sanborn expresses the doctrine thus: "Adjectives terminating with ish, denote a degree of comparison less than the positive; as, saltish, whitish, blackish."—Analytical Gram., p. 87. But who does not know, that most adjectives of this ending are derived from nouns, and are compared only by adverbs, as childish, foolish, and so forth? Wilcox says, "Words ending in ish, generally express a slight degree; as, reddish, bookish."—Practical Gram., p. 17. But who will suppose that foolish denotes but a slight degree of folly, or bookish but a slight fondness for books? And, with such an interpretation, what must be the meaning of more bookish or most foolish?

[180] "'A rodde shall come furth of the stocke of Jesse.' Primer, Hen. VIII."—Craven Glossary.

[181] Midst is a contraction of the regular superlative middest, used by Spenser, but now obsolete. Midst, also, seems to be obsolete as an adjective, though still frequently used as a noun; as, "In the midst."—Webster. It is often a poetic contraction for the preposition amidst. In some cases it appears to be an adverb. In the following example it is equivalent to middlemost, and therefore an adjective: "Still greatest he the midst, Now dragon grown."—Paradise Lost, B. x, l. 528.

[182] What I here say, accords with the teaching of all our lexicographers and grammarians, except one dauntless critic, who has taken particular pains to put me, and some three or four others, on the defensive. This gentleman not only supposes less and fewer, least and fewest, to be sometimes equivalent in meaning, but actually exhibits them as being also etymologically of the same stock. Less and least, however, he refers to three different positives, and more and most, to four. And since, in once instance, he traces less and more, least and most, to the same primitive word, it follows of course, if he is right, that more is there equivalent to less and most is equivalent to least! The following is a copy of this remarkable "DECLENSION ON INDEFINITE SPECIFYING ADNAMES," and just one half of the table is wrong: "Some, more, most; Some, less, least; Little, less, least; Few, fewer or less, fewest or least; Several, more, most; Much, more, most; Many, more most."—Oliver B Peirce's Gram., p. 144.

[183] Murray himself had the same false notion concerning six of these adjectives, and perhaps all the rest; for his indefinite andsoforths may embrace just what the reader pleases to imagine. Let the following paragraph be compared with the observations and proofs which I shall offer: "Adjectives that have in themselves a superlative signification, do not properly admit of the superlative or [the] comparative form superadded: such as, 'Chief, extreme, perfect, right, universal, supreme,' &c.; which are sometimes improperly written, 'Chiefest, extremest, perfectest, rightest, most universal, most supreme,' &c. The following expressions are therefore improper. 'He sometimes claims admission to the chiefest offices;' 'The quarrel became so universal and national;' 'A method of attaining the rightest and greatest happiness.' The phrases, so perfect, so right, so extreme, so universal, &c., are incorrect; because they imply that one thing is less perfect, less extreme, &c. than another, which is not possible."—Murray's Gram., 8vo, Vol. i, p. 167. For himself, a man may do as he pleases about comparing these adjectives; but whoever corrects others, on such principles as the foregoing, will have work enough on his hands. But the writer who seems to exceed all others, in error on this point, is Joseph W. Wright. In his "Philosophical Grammar," p. 51st, this author gives a list of seventy-two adjectives, which, he says, "admit of no variation of state;" i. e., are not compared. Among them are round, flat, wet, dry, clear, pure, odd, free, plain, fair, chaste, blind, and more than forty others, which are compared about as often as any words in the language. Dr. Blair is hypercritically censured by him, for saying "most excellent," "more false," "the chastest kind," "more perfect" "fuller, more full, fullest, most full, truest and most true;" Murray, for using "quite wrong;" and Cobbett, for the phrase, "perfect correctness." "Correctness," says the critic, "does not admit of degrees of perfection."—Ib., pp. 143 and 151. But what does such a thinker know about correctness? If this excellent quality cannot be perfect, surely nothing can. The words which Dr. Bullions thinks it "improper to compare," because he judges them to have "an absolute or superlative signification," are "true, perfect, universal, chief, extreme, supreme, &c."—no body knows how many. See Principles of E. Gram., p. 19 and p. 115.

[184] The regular comparison of this word, (like, liker, likest,) seems to be obsolete, or nearly so. It is seldom met with, except in old books: yet we say, more like, or most like, less like, or least like. "To say the flock with whom he is, is likest to Christ."—Barclay's Works, Vol. i, p. 180. "Of Godlike pow'r? for likest Gods they seem'd."—Milton, P. L. B. vi, l. 301.

[185] This example, and several others that follow it, are no ordinary solecisms; they are downright Irish bulls, making actions or relations reciprocal, where reciprocity is utterly unimaginable. Two words can no more be "derived from each other," than two living creatures can have received their existence from each other. So, two things can never "succeed each other," except they alternate or move in a circle; and a greater number in train can "follow one an other" only in some imperfect sense, not at all reciprocal. In some instances, therefore, the best form of correction will be, to reject the reciprocal terms altogether—G. BROWN.

[186] This doctrine of punctuation, if not absolutely false in itself, is here very badly taught. When only two words, of any sort, occur in the same construction, they seldom require the comma; and never can they need more than one, whereas these grammarians, by their plural word "commas," suggest a constant demand for two or more.—G. BROWN.

[187] Some grammarians exclude the word it from the list of personal pronouns, because it does not convey the idea of that personality which consists in individual intelligence. On the other hand, they will have who to be a personal pronoun, because it is literally applied to persons only, or intelligent beings. But I judge them to be wrong in respect to both; and, had they given definitions of their several classes of pronouns, they might perhaps have found out that the word it is always personal, in a grammatical sense, and who, either relative or interrogative.

[188] "Whoso and whatso are found in old authors, but are now out of use."—Churchill's Gram., p. 76. These antiquated words are equivalent in import to whosoever and whatsoever. The former, whoso, being used many times in the Bible, and occasionally also by the poets, as by Cowper, Whittier, and others, can hardly be said to be obsolete; though Wells, like Churchill, pronounced it so, in his first edition.

[189] "'The man is prudent which speaks little.' This sentence is incorrect, because which is a pronoun of the neuter gender."—Murray's Exercises, p. 18. "Which is also a relative, but it is of [the] neuter gender. It is also interrogative."—Webster's Improved Gram., p. 26. For oversights like these, I cannot account. The relative which is of all the genders, as every body ought to know, who has ever heard of the horse which Alexander rode, of the ass which spoke to Balaam, or of any of the animals and things which Noah had with him in the ark.

[190] The word which also, when taken in its discriminative sense (i.e. to distinguish some persons or things from others) may have a construction of this sort; and, by ellipsis of the noun after it, it may likewise bear a resemblance to the double relative what: as, "I shall now give you two passages; and request you to point out which words are mono-syllables, which dis-syllables, which tris-syllables, and which poly-syllables."—Bucke's Gram., p. 16. Here, indeed, the word what might be substituted for which; because that also has a discriminative sense. Either would be right; but the author might have presented the same words and thoughts rather more accurately, thus: "I shall now give you two passages; and request you to point out which words are monosyllables; which, dissyllables; which, trissyllables; and which, polysyllables."

[191] The relative what, being equivalent to that which, sometimes has the demonstrative word that set after it, by way of pleonasm; as, "What I tell you in darkness, that speak ye in light, and what ye hear in the ear, that preach ye upon the house-tops."—Matt., x, 27. In Covell's Digest, this text is presented as "false syntax," under the new and needless rule, "Double relatives always supply two cases."—Digest of E. Gram., p. 143. In my opinion, to strike out the word that, would greatly weaken the expression: and so thought our translators; for no equivalent term is used in the original.

[192] As for Butler's method of parsing these words by always recognizing a noun as being "UNDERSTOOD" before them,—a method by which, according to his publishers notice, "The ordinary unphilosophical explanation of this class of words is discarded, and a simple, intelligible, common-sense view of the matter now for the first time substituted,"—I know not what novelty there is in it, that is not also just so much error. "Compare," says he, "these two sentences: 'I saw whom I wanted to see;' 'I saw what I wanted to see. If what in the latter is equivalent to that which or the thing which, whom, in the former is equivalent to him whom, or the person whom."—Butler's Practical Gram., p. 51. The former example being simply elliptical of the antecedent, he judges the latter to be so too; and infers, "that what is nothing more than a relative pronoun, and includes nothing else."—Ib. This conclusion is not well drawn, because the two examples are not analogous; and whoever thus finds "that what is nothing more than a relative," ought also to find it is something less,—a mere adjective. "I saw the person whom I wanted to see," is a sentence that can scarcely spare the antecedent and retain the sense; "I saw what I wanted to see," is one which cannot receive an antecedent, without changing both the sense and the construction. One may say, "I saw what things I wanted to see;" but this, in stead of giving what an antecedent, makes it an adjective, while it retains the force of a relative. Or he may insert a noun before what, agreeably to the solution of Butler; as, "I saw the things, what I wanted to see:" or, if he please, both before and after; as, "I saw the things, what things I wanted to see." But still, in either case, what is no "simple relative;" for it here seems equivalent to the phrase, so many as. Or, again, he may omit the comma, and say, "I saw the thing what I wanted to see;" but this, if it be not a vulgarism, will only mean, "I saw the thing to be what I wanted to see." So that this method of parsing the pronoun what, is manifestly no improvement, but rather a perversion and misinterpretation.

But, for further proof of his position, Butler adduces instances of what he calls "the relative THAT with the antecedent omitted. A few examples of this," he says, "will help us to ascertain the nature of what. 'We speak that we do know,' Bible. [John, iii, 11.] 'I am that I am.' Bible. [Exod., iii, 14.] 'Eschewe that wicked is.' Gower. 'Is it possible he should know what he is, and be that he is?' Shakespeare. 'Gather the sequel by that went before.' Id. In these examples," continues he, "that is a relative; and is exactly synonymous with what. No one would contend that that stands for itself and its antecedent at the same time. The antecedent is omitted, because it is indefinite, OR EASILY SUPPLIED."—Butler's Practical Gram., p. 52; Bullions's Analytical and Practical Gram., p. 233. Converted at his wisest age, by these false arguments, so as to renounce and gainsay the doctrine taught almost universally, and hitherto spread industriously by himself, in the words of Lennie, that, "What is a compound relative, including both the relative and the antecedent," Dr. Bullions now most absurdly urges, that, "The truth is, what is a simple relative, having, wherever used, like all other relatives, BUT ONE CASE; but * * * that it always refers to a general antecedent, omitted,