Discourses by Epictetus (good books to read for beginners txt) 📕
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Raised a slave in Nero’s court, Epictetus would become one of the most influential philosophers in the Stoic tradition. While exiled in Greece by an emperor who considered philosophers a threat, Epictetus founded a school of philosophy at Nicopolis. His student Arrian of Nicomedia took careful notes of his sometimes cantankerous lectures, the surviving examples of which are now known as the Discourses of Epictetus.
In these discourses, Epictetus explains how to gain peace-of-mind by only willing that which is within the domain of your will. There is no point in getting upset about things that are outside of your control; that only leads to distress. Instead, let such things be however they are, and focus your effort on the things that are in your control: your own attitudes and priorities. This way, you can never be thrown off balance, and tranquility is yours for the taking.
The lessons in the Discourses of Epictetus, along with his Enchiridion, have continued to attract new adherents to Stoic philosophy down to the present day.
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- Author: Epictetus
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Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo [ipso]:
Impetus hic sacrae semina mentis habet.
↩
See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on παραδέδωκεν. ↩
See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩
This is τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, a word often used by Marcus Aurelius, Meditations ii 2; vi S. ↩
“The philosopher had forgot that fig-trees do not blossom” (Elizabeth Carter). The flowers of a fig are inside the fleshy receptacle which becomes the fruit.
Johann Schweighäuser prints μὴ δ̓ ἂν, ἐγώ σοι λέγω, προσδόκα: and in his Latin version he prints: “Id vero, ego tibi dico, ne expectes.” I neither understand his pointing, nor his version. Hieronymus Wolf translates it, “Etsi ego tibi dixero (virtutem brevi parari posse), noli credere”: which is right. Wolf makes ἄν go with λέγω. ↩
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations v 33. ↩
See John Upton’s note on ὁδῷ. ↩
ᾁδοντα is Johann Schweighäuser’s probable emendation. ↩
Λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ διαρθρῶν. Διαρθροῦν means “to divide a thing into its parts or members.” The word “analyse” seems to be the nearest equivalent. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on ὑπὸ τίνος διαρθρωθῆ. ↩
This is obscure. The conclusion, “Reason therefore is analysed by itself” is not in Epictetus; but it is implied, as Johann Schweighäuser says (p. 197, notes). So Marcus Aurelius, Meditations xi 1, writes: “These are the properties of the rational soul; it sees itself, analyses itself.” If reason, our reason, requires another reason to analyse it, that other reason will require another reason to analyse that other reason; and so on to infinity. If reason then, our reason, can be analysed, it must be analysed by itself. The notes on the first part of this chapter in the edition of Johann Schweighäuser may be read by those who are inclined. ↩
“Our opinions.” There is some defect in the text, as Hieronymus Wolf remarks. “The opponent,” he says, “disparages Logic (Dialectic) as a thing which is not necessary to make men good, and he prefers moral teaching to Logic: but Epictetus informs him, that a man who is not a Dialectician will not have a sufficient perception of moral teaching.” ↩
He repeats the words of the supposed opponent; and he means that his adversary’s difficulty shows the necessity of Dialectic. ↩
Antisthenes who professed the Cynic philosophy, rejected Logic and Physic (Johann Schweighäuser note p. 201). ↩
Xenophon, Memorabilia iv 5, 12, and iv 6, 7. Epictetus knew what education ought to be. We learn language, and we ought to learn what it means. When children learn words, they should learn what the thing is which is signified by the word. In the case of children this can only be done imperfectly as to some words, but it may be done even then in some degree; and it must be done, or the word signifies nothing, or, what is equally bad, the word is misunderstood. All of us pass our lives in ignorance of many words which we use; some of us in greater ignorance than others, but all of us in ignorance to some degree. ↩
The supposed interpreter says this. When Epictetus says “the Roman tongue,” perhaps he means that the supposed opponent is a Roman and does not know Greek well. ↩
Enchiridion, chapter 49. “When a man gives himself great airs because he can understand and expound Chrysippus, say to yourself: If Chrysippus had not written obscurely, this man would have had nothing to be proud of.” See the rest. ↩
Compare Xenophon, Memorabilia i 1, 3. ↩
This is true. If you place before a man the fear of death, you threaten him with the fear of death. The man may yield to the threat and do what it is the object of the threat to make him do; or he may make resistance to him who attempts to enforce the threat; or he may refuse to yield, and so take the consequence of his refusal. If a man yields to the threat, he does so for the reason which Epictetus gives, and freedom of choice, and consequently freedom of will really exists in this case. The Roman law did not allow contracts or agreements made under the influence of threats to be valid; and the reason for declaring them invalid was not the want of free will in him who yielded to the threat, but the fact that threats are directly contrary to the purpose of all law, which purpose is to secure the independent action of every person in all things allowed by law. This matter is discussed by Savigny, Des Heutigen Römische Recht, iii §114. See the title “Quod metus causa,” in the Digest, 4, 2. Compare also book IV chapter I at 68, etc. ↩
τὸ παθεῖν ὅτι, etc.: Johann Schweighäuser has a note on the distinction between τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι and
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