Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

had to be considered. The nationalistic movement that led to Finnish independence at the end of World War 1 posed another possible threat because of large Finnish settlements in North Norway. An expansionist movement for creation of a “greater” Finland could result in demands for parts of the two northernmost provinces, Finnmark and Troms. German naval maneuvers in northern waters in 1911 added a new potential danger and the period prior to and during World War 1 saw considerable activity with respect to Narvik’s defenses.

Defense Plans for Narvik

Narvik is located on terrain that is not a very defensible. The military authorities demanded and received promises from the politicians that coastal fortresses would be constructed in the Narvik approaches as a condition for their blessing of the Ofot Railway project. The promise was only partially fulfilled, and after World War 1, it was ignored.

The early defense plans for Narvik focused primarily on a series of coastal artillery batteries supplemented by submarines and torpedo boats. Plans were set in motion to establish a naval base at Ramsund near the Ofotfjord entrance and for the construction of coastal artillery battery positions covering the fjord entrance from the north and west. A battery of 105mm guns was established at Forholten covering the northern entrances to Ramsund, which was dredged, and Tjeldsund. This battery was operational in 1916 but not activated in 1940. The battery at Ramnes, at the junction of Ramsund and Ofotfjord, was never completed. The three 6-inch guns for this battery were kept in storage for many years and in March 1940, they were sent to Bergen to be used in a planned gun battery on that city’s northern approach. They were at the naval depot in Bergen on April 9 and were captured by the Germans.

The elaborate plans for a strong naval base at Ramsund never came to fruition and they were shelved in 1925 when Ramsund was designated as a naval depot rather than a naval base. The severe reduction in defense expenditures after World War I and the lack of any immediate threats were the primary reasons for the abandonment of these sensible plans. The navy did not resist the changed status for Ramsund and it did not see the same need as the army for a coastal battery at Ramnes. The navy viewed the battery as being part of the framework of the naval base, while the army viewed it as an important factor in the defense of Narvik and the Ofot Railway. After the 1933 defense reorganization, the coastal artillery came under the navy’s jurisdiction.

Both General Fleischer and his predecessor requested repeatedly that the planned coastal fortifications at the Ofotfjord entrance be completed but they were turned down. Fleischer sought a promise from the navy for a three-hour early warning of an enemy attack on Narvik. The navy refused—with good reasons—to commit to such a promise.

Before and during World War 1, army plans for the defense of the railroad leading to the Swedish border were given a lower priority since the establishment of coastal artillery batteries and use of navy assets were viewed as the primary means of defense. However, since the defenses in the outer part of Ofotfjord were never completed, the army plans for the defense of the Ofot Railway took on added significance even during World War I.

Army plans called for the establishment of a blocking position in the Sildvik area, about 20 kilometers east of Narvik, and preparations for the destruction of the railroad if the defensive positions could not be held. The defenses in this blocking position consisted of bunkers for machineguns and artillery, and an armored railroad car with a 75mm gun. Searchlights, magazines, sidings, etc. to support the blocking position were installed. These projects were completed during World War I.

A reinforced company-size task force was initially designated to occupy these positions, and it was referred to as the “Narvik Detachment.” The planners anticipated the need for a quick occupation of the defensive line and the troops were therefore located in Narvik where adequate quarters were available. From there, they would be able to occupy the defensive positions on short notice, something that would not be possible from the regimental base at Elvegårdsmoen.5 The “Narvik Detachment” was a rapid reaction force, to be augmented as the situation dictated. It was not a force designed to defend the town of Narvik.

The plans for the defense of the railroad line to Sweden were rational. They recognized that the primary objective of any seaward attacker was Narvik and the railroad to the Swedish border. The capture of Narvik without also seizing the railroad would be meaningless, since the flow of Swedish iron ore would cease. The planners assumed that the attacker would have naval dominance before landing troops. A force defending Narvik would therefore be exposed to heavy naval gunfire and it could be cut off from a retreat along the railroad by an enemy landing at any point along the southern shore of Rombakfjord, possibly at Djupvik or Straumsnes. The plan to occupy a defensive line in the Sildvik area was therefore a sound solution. The positions would be less exposed to naval gunfire and more difficult to envelop.

The plan did have some weaknesses. The Sildvik position was difficult to reinforce from Elvegårdsmoen. With enemy control of the fjord, reinforcements had to come through the mountainous wilderness to the east of Elvegårdsmoen, a difficult and time-consuming operation. Moreover, it was prudent to anticipate that an attack on Narvik would also involve an attack on Elvegårdsmoen. It was therefore important to make the Sildvik blocking force as large and self-sustaining as resources would allow. The capture of Elvegårdsmoen would make it possible for the enemy to send a force through the mountains and reach the Ofot Railway behind the Norwegian blocking force, between Bjørnefjell and Nordal Bridge. A similar operation could also be launched from the village of Beisfjord, south of Narvik, but it was possible to block such a move without abandoning