Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

the Sildvik positions. The Norwegians in Sildvik, to avoid being isolated by forces moving east from Elvegårdsmoen, would have to retreat if other units were unable to block the enemy.

The failure to complete the coastal artillery batteries, and to establish a naval base with adequate forces meant that the army became the most important force in the defense plans for Narvik and the Ofot Railway. The political decision to rely on army forces rather than on coastal defense installations and the navy in the Narvik area went against all military recommendations since well before World War I.6

The German attack in 1940 was exactly the type of attack that had served as a basis for the military recommendations. The political leadership’s reordering of military priorities, and the national military leadership’s reluctant acceptance, had severe consequences. The government’s failure to provide adequate resources forced local military leaders to improvise a defense in which they did not have much faith. In a recommendation on February 2, 1940 for completion and occupation of the coastal artillery batteries as soon as possible, General Fleischer notes that the failure to complete the coastal artillery batteries at the Ofotfjord entrance had forced the division to try to organize a harbor defense as means to thwart a surprise attack.7

Attempts to obtain heavy guns for use in Narvik failed. The intention was to use these guns in flanking positions against an attack from the sea. Those that were available, such as the 65mm mountain artillery pieces or 105mm guns, were unsuitable. In the end, only a single 75mm gun on an armored railroad car was made available.

The 6th Division’s operational directive to the commander in Narvik dated February 19, 1937 instructed him to use two-thirds of his main force (the infantry battalion at Elvegårdsmoen) on the south side of the fjord, for the defense of Narvik and the Ofot Railway. The regiment’s mission with respect to Narvik was to defend against air attacks and troop landings. The remaining third of the force was to stay on the north side of the fjord for use as security for Elevgårdsmoen. Differences in views between the division and the regiment on how to defend Narvik and the Ofot Railway surfaced because of this operational directive although they had probably been present for some time.

Colonel Sundlo conveyed the regimental views about the defense of Narvik to the Major General Carl Johan Erichsen, who was the divisional commander at the time, on several occasions following the issuance of the operational directive. The regiment believed that the most likely threats against Narvik were either a naval attack to destroy facilities to prevent the export of iron ore or a landing of troops from naval vessels to secure those facilities. The regiment felt it was imperative that some kind of defense measures be taken in the Ramsund area, such as a well-guarded minefield.

When the division threw cold water on this possibility, the regiment suggested that, as an interim measure, one reinforced company equipped with 65mm mountain artillery should be deployed to the fjord entrance. A reinforced infantry company, the train-mounted 75mm gun, some 65mm mountain artillery pieces, and one or two air defense batteries was considered the minimum force that should be stationed in Narvik. The regiment suggested that the force left at Elvegårdsmoen be reduced to one infantry platoon while the rest of the reinforced company be given the mission of defending the Ofot Railway (at the end of the fjord) and also used as a reserve for the force in Narvik.

The plan for the neutrality watch issued by the division at the end of 1937 dropped the idea of a forward deployed company at the fjord entrance, since the responsibility for guarding the coastline belonged to the navy based on an agreement between the commanders of the two services. The limit on the size of the force to be used on the south side of the fjord was retained.

The construction of bunkers and other defensive works in the Narvik area was, as Fleischer noted on February 2, 1940, a result of the government’s failure to complete the long-promised fortifications at the fjord entrance. In the fall of 1939, divisional engineers constructed two reinforced concrete bunkers in Narvik and one for the defense of the largest of the railroad’s bridges, known as the Nordal Bridge. The construction of bunkers in and around Narvik and Fleischer’s order on February 17, 1940 for an absolute defense of the city signaled a major departure from the World War 1 plans.

The partial mobilization in late January 1940 included an engineer company that the division stationed in Narvik except for one platoon that was sent to East Finnmark. However, during the winter, the division pressed the regiment to use infantry units to construct the defensive works planned for the Narvik area, Elvegårdsmoen, and Øyjord. The construction in Narvik was delayed for several reasons. First, the regiment felt that the work was so technical in nature that it should be delayed until an experienced engineer officer became available. Second, the 1/15th Inf battalion that was stationed in the Narvik area at the time had been sent to East Finnmark. Finally, in addition to the difference of views between General Fleischer and Colonel Sundlo about the wisdom of defending Narvik relying primarily on infantry forces, they also differed on where the defense positions in Narvik should be located.

Sundlo considered it foolish to confront an attacker on the flat terrain in the harbor area where the defenders would be subject to the full fury of naval firepower. He wanted to establish the main defense line along the high ground in the eastern part of the town, with a covering force in the harbor area. This covering force was not expected to become involved in decisive combat but to delay and channel an enemy advance towards the main defensive line. It appears that Sundlo intended to use his forces in an offensive role and did not think elaborate defense works were called for. The