Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

Captain Løken also sent this report to Sundlo and asked what the colonel intended to do with respect to the defense of Narvik. Løken hinted that it might be a good idea to move the remainder of the 1/13th Inf into that city. Løken must have known that defense plans did not call for the move of the whole battalion to the south side of Ofotfjord. Colonel Sundlo answered that he still held the view that Narvik could not be defended by rifles against a naval force. Heavy guns were needed. Therefore, he did not plan to move the battalion to Narvik where it would be of no use.13

However, Colonel Sundlo did order Major Sverre Spjeldnæs, the commander of the 1/13th Inf, to send the machinegun company (Co 4) and the mortar platoon to Narvik. He also alerted Co 2, ordered that unit to send machinegun crews to the two bunkers, and directed its commander, Captain Langlo, to station an officer or senior NCO at each bunker. On his own initiative, Sundlo increased the strength of the guard detail at Nordal Bridge from 10 to 32 troops. This was done around 1800 hours, before the conversation with Captain Løken.

Lindbäck-Larsen’s version is different. He writes that General Fleischer ordered the movement of the 1/13th Inf from Elvegårdsmoen to Narvik after the news he received at 2000 hours and that the above statement by Colonel Sundlo was made when the District Command forwarded that order. Under this version, Sundlo’s statement was tantamount to a refusal to obey an order. Lindbäck-Larsen’s version is suspect and must be viewed in the context of what he writes in the same report:

It was the division’s wish to provoke a disobedience, which would make the removal of Colonel Sundlo from his command justifiable since the division viewed him as not being up to the demands that the current situation would require. The division order was also given the colonel in the most ostentatious way by Colonel Mjelde …14

Lindbäck-Larsen’s version of events and a distorted interpretation of Colonel Sundlo’s reaction to a later directive about firing on Germans but not on the British, led—according to Fleischer’s chief of staff—to a decision to remove the colonel from his command.

District Command passed Colonel Sundlo’s views on bringing additional infantry to Narvik to General Fleischer. On receipt of this information, Fleischer ordered Sundlo, via the District Command, to move the battalion immediately from Elvegårdsmoen to Narvik. If possible, the machineguns and their crews were to move within one hour. This order was issued at 2050 hours. Sundlo had already directed the machinegun company and the mortar platoon to Narvik. Prior to this order, the war plans did not give him authority to move the whole battalion into Narvik, even if he wished to do so, since that would leave Elvegårdsmoen defenseless. Sundlo told Colonel Mjelde, who had conveyed Fleischer’s order, that it was impossible to move the two machinegun platoons to Narvik in one hour. Colonel Mjelde answered that it was an order and as such had to be carried out as quickly as possible, if not feasible in one hour. Sundlo stated that he would comply.

At the same time as he ordered the battalion into Narvik, the division commander, again through Colonel Mjelde, asked for confirmation that Colonel Sundlo understood that his mission to defend Narvik was absolute. If Sundlo did not understand his mission clearly, General Fleischer requested that he state so immediately.15

It appears that General Fleischer used Colonel Mjelde as an intermediary in dealing with Colonel Sundlo. Fleischer’s lack of direct contact with his subordinates during the most critical phase of Norway’s modern history came up during Sundlo’s trial in 1947. Lindbäck-Larsen explained that Fleischer was reluctant to deal directly with subordinate commanders when he was away from his headquarters and that this had become a “principle.” As a result, the District Command functioned as a relay. It forwarded reports to the division commander and orders from the division to subordinate units. It is difficult to see any valid purpose in such an arrangement as long as the general and his chief of staff had means of communications at their disposal. Except for the afternoon of April 8, Fleischer could communicate directly with his subordinates as easily as he did with Mjelde. There appears to have been no direct contact between the general or his chief of staff and his two principal subordinates in the Troms/Ofoten region, Løken and Sundlo, before Narvik was captured.

At about 2050 hours and again through District Command, General Fleischer directed Colonel Løken to “Prepare the 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, including necessary trains, for transport by motor vehicles to the Narvik area. Orders for execution to follow.”16 This appears to be a repeat of directions Lindbäck-Larsen allegedly gave earlier that afternoon. Both Lindbäck-Larsen and Sandvik state that the move was to take place on April 9.

The District Command forwarded another order from General Fleischer at 2055 hours. This one directed the commander of the 3rd Artillery Bn, Lieutenant Colonel Hornslien, to move the motorized field artillery battery in Målselv to Øyjord that night, if possible. An advanced party was to leave for Øyjord at once. Colonel Sundlo was ordered to provide a work-detail to clear snow at the battery position. This work-detail came from Sundlo’s resources in Narvik and proceeded to Øyjord before midnight. The battery of four 75mm guns was created specifically to provide artillery support for the troops in Narvik. The explanation for locating the battery in Målselv, more than 50 miles from its designated wartime position, is that it was a better location for training and maneuvers.

At around 2100 hours, Colonel Sundlo ordered Major Spjeldnæs to move the rest of his battalion to Narvik as quickly as possible and gave him a brief account of what was happening. The colonel also called a hurried staff meeting at his headquarters. He gave the staff a quick orientation on the situation, as