Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

instructions, particularly with respect to a possible British raid on the merchant ships in Narvik. Diesen’s answer at midnight stated that force should be used to defend Narvik and the ships in the harbor. Askim sent this information to his subordinates. He also had a conference with Captain Odd Isachsen Willoch, Eidsvold’s skipper.

The two captains decided that the coastal defense ships should meet an eventual attack on Narvik outside the harbor because of the many merchant ships located there.11 This was a deviation from plans and the 3rd Naval District staff, 6th District Command, and Colonel Sundlo continued to assume that the two coastal defense ships were near the Ofotfjord entrance. The bad weather and very limited visibility appear to have been the reasons for this change in plans. Eidsvold took up a position outside the harbor entrance, about 500 meters from the Framnes shoreline, while Norge remained in the harbor. Both these senior naval officers realized that a fight between the two coastal defense ships and a substantial force of modern warships would be short.

Between 0130 and 0300 hours, the 3rd Naval District received several reports about shore batteries in the approaches to Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim engaging foreign naval forces. The report from Bergen identified the warships as German. Captain Askim again called Admiral Diesen and asked if there were any instructions in case of a German attack on Narvik. It had finally become obvious to Diesen that such an attack was underway and, at 0420 hours, he amended his earlier instructions by ordering Askim to engage German warships but not to fire on British ships.

Askim increased the number of patrol craft at the Ofotfjord entrance from one to two after darkness on April 8. The patrol vessels had orders not to fire on foreign warships, only to report their sightings to the Ofot Division. At midnight, it was blowing a southwest breeze with frequent snow showers at the entrance to the fjord. Visibility was limited but the two patrol vessels maintained visual contact and had radio communications with Norge.

Army Activities on April 8

As already mentioned, General Fleischer and his chief of staff, Major Lindbäck-Larsen, were in East Finnmark, several hundred kilometers from Narvik on April 8. At about 1000 hours, the District Command notified the general by telephone that the British had mined Vestfjord. Fleischer took some tentative steps to prepare his command for possible war. He directed that quarters be requisitioned in Øyjord, which was across the fjord from Narvik, for a motorized mountain artillery battery. Øyjord was the planned position for an artillery battery to support the troops in Narvik. Fleischer also asked the District Command for an estimate of how soon the 2/15th Inf at Setermoen could be ready to move to Elvegårdsmoen.

Fleischer decided to remain in East Finnmark despite the gathering war clouds and the most serious breach to date of Norwegian neutrality. As previously planned, he went on maneuvers with the Varanger Battalion. In doing so, Fleischer removed himself from any means of communicating with his headquarters and subordinates during this crisis-filled day.

Major Lindbäck-Larsen left the maneuver in the afternoon and drove to Gornitak from where he was able to contact the District Command in Harstad. He was briefed on the situation, including the steps taken by the 3rd Naval District. Lindbäck-Larsen was informed that Askim had conferred with Colonel Sundlo.

The term “confer” may have given the recipients a false sense of security since it seemed to indicate that the army and navy were working closely together in Narvik. In fact, Askim was apparently not aware of what was happening in Narvik and Sundlo did not know that the coastal defense ships remained in or near the harbor instead of at the Ofotfjord entrance. Lindbäck-Larsen made several decisions on his own authority and communicated these to the District Command.

First, he directed the motorized artillery battery to move to Øyjord on April 9. It appears that this order did not reach the artillery battalion until 1750 hours. Second, he ordered the 2/15th Inf from Setermoen to Elvegårdsmoen as quickly as possible. It was assumed that this move would take place on April 9. Colonel Sundlo was not notified and learned about the order to reposition the battalion shortly before 0400 hours on April 9 when Colonel Løken called to coordinate the move.12 Third, he ordered the deployment of sufficient machineguns and crews from Elvegårdsmoen to man all the bunkers in Narvik. Fourth, he gave a “be-prepared” order for the District Command to move from Harstad to Målselv. Finally, he requested an estimate on how quickly the Hålogaland Air Group could deploy to Bardufoss and ordered preparations for that move. General Fleischer arrived in Gornitak at 1800 hours and approved Lindbäck-Larsen’s actions. The only change he made was to order the move of the District Command to Målselv on April 9. Thereupon, the general and his chief of staff drove to a hotel in Vadsø.

The District Command was informed around 1400 hours that German naval forces were northbound in the Kattegat and about the sinking of Rio de Janeiro. Lindbäck-Larsen does not mention receiving this intelligence when he talked to the District Command around 1600 hours. Captain Steen, in the official naval history, states that all important information received by the District Command from the 3rd Naval District, including the reports cited above, was forwarded immediately to General Fleischer and his principal subordinates. Furthermore, Captain Løken, the District Command’s chief of staff, states that these reports were communicated to Major Lindbäck-Larsen in their telephone conversation at 1600 hours.

At 2000 hours, District Command gave Fleischer the British warning that German naval forces were on their way to Narvik and could be there as early as 2200 hours. The 3rd Naval District had received it by telephone from the naval staff at 1925 hours and, according to the naval history, forwarded it promptly to the District Command. Captain Løken claims that the report from the 3rd Naval District was received at 2000 hours and a