Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

information he could on his own before taking any further action. He stopped at Tranøy Lighthouse (on the east side of Vestfjord, about 50 miles north of the British minefield) around 1600 hours (GMT) and sent two officers ashore to find out what the officials at the pilot station knew about the conditions in Ofotfjord and enemy strength in Narvik. While at Tranøy, a fifth destroyer, Hostile, joined the British force.5

The British party sent ashore did not speak Norwegian and the Norwegians they met did not speak English. The communications that followed boiled down to a mixture of a few words of English and gestures. The two officers came away from the encounter with the impression that there was some disagreement among the Norwegians whether four or five German warships had passed on their way to Narvik. For unknown reasons, the two officers reported that six German warships had headed for Narvik.

It appears likely that the Norwegians were trying to tell the British that two groups of German warships had passed, one consisting of five vessels and the other of four. This is logical since one German destroyer, Erich Giese, had fallen 50 miles behind the others. The remaining nine destroyers passed Tranøy around 0300 hours (local). Erich Giese passed several hours later and may not have been observed in the midst of heavy snow squalls.

The two British officers concluded from their conversation with the Norwegians that a submarine had also passed on its way to Narvik, that the Norwegians believed the Ofotfjord narrows were mined, that the German warships were much larger than the British ships that were now at Tranøy, and that strong German forces had occupied Narvik. Finally, the Norwegians warned them not to attack until they had twice as many warships.

Captain Warburton-Lee’s task was now altered drastically. He was no longer dealing with a lone German transport, but with six warships reported to be twice as large as his own as well as with at least one submarine. He could not ignore the possibility that the Germans had mined the narrows behind them and he still had to worry about the imaginary shore batteries. He had received a message from the Admiralty about 1300 hours (GMT) that read: “Battery at Narvik reported to consist of three 12 or 18 pounders mounted on Framnes and facing northwest [first mention of a shore battery in Narvik harbor]. Guns 4-inch or less may be in position on both sides of Ofotfjord near Ramnes.” Finally, he had to consider the possibility that the Norwegian coastal defense ships were in German hands.

Warburton-Lee was well aware that the odds against him were considerable and he spent some time pondering what to do. If he launched an attack in the knowledge that he was facing superior enemy forces and it led to failure or disaster, he would bear the responsibility and his superiors could determine his action foolhardy. Heavy reinforcements were available and could join him at the entrance to Ofotfjord before morning. The battle cruiser Repulse, the cruiser Penelope, and four destroyers had arrived at the entrance to Vestfjord as Warburton-Lee’s destroyers departed their patrol station. The Renown was also within striking distance, although it was doubtful that the Admiralty would risk either of the two battle cruisers in the restricted waters of Ofotfjord. Furthermore, two German battleships were still prowling the northern seas. On the other hand, Warburton-Lee may have feared that failure to proceed aggressively after receiving orders to attack from both the Commander-in-Chief and the Admiralty could be interpreted as timidity that would damage his ambitions.

Captain Warburton-Lee’s officers reported that he spent about 30 minutes by himself agonizing about the decision he had to make. In the end, he told his men that they would attack and sent a message to the Admiralty at 1751 hours (GMT) that read: “Norwegians report Germans holding Narvik in force, also six destroyers and one U-Boat are there and channel is possibly mined. Intend attacking at dawn high water.” It may be as Dickens writes that Warburton-Lee opted to follow the well-established naval custom of “Never ‘propose’ when you can ‘intend’, and never, never, ask for guidance.”6 Tactically, it made sense to attack at dawn and at high tide. High tide might allow the British warships to pass safely over the reported minefield. Dawn was viewed as the most likely time to achieve surprise.

Most British accounts place emphasis on the famous last sentence of Warburton-Lee’s message and neglect to consider why the captain began his message with an alarming report of the obstacles in his way. It may well be that this young officer had found a way to avoid being labeled either timid or foolhardy. He may have hoped that on receipt of this new intelligence, either Whitworth, Forbes, or the Admiralty would intervene and tell him to wait for reinforcements. This would keep him from being considered too cautious. On the other hand, if they did not intervene and the attack was unsuccessful, his superiors would not be able to label him a dangerous risk-taker since their silence indicated their acquiescence.

Warburton-Lee’s message made Admiral Whitworth concerned about the wisdom of the planned attack. The five British destroyers were not only outnumbered but the German ships were much larger and better armed. The responsibility for the operation now underway would have been his had it not been for the Admiralty’s earlier intervention. He knew that every ship in his powerful force could reach Narvik before dawn but how would the Admiralty react to his entrance in what had now become their operation? He decided to intervene and sent the following visual signal to the ships in his vicinity at 1959 hours (GMT):

To Penelope, repeat to Warburton-Lee. Take Bedouin, Punjabi, Eskimo, Kimberley under your orders and proceed to support of Captain (D) 2 in dawn attack on Narvik as directed by him. Unless otherwise ordered by him you should pass through position 20 miles southwest of Tranøy at 0100 tomorrow, 10th.

Before the