Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

German Fatigue and Complacency

Captain Bonte retired to his cabin on Wilhelm Heidkamp before midnight on April 9 after having made the earlier described deployment of his forces. The fact that the weather and visibility worsened dramatically during the evening undoubtedly gave the German captain a false sense of security. He should have remembered that the dismal weather had worked to his advantage in achieving surprise less than 24 hours earlier. The weather made it more difficult for the British to navigate the narrow fjord but it also made it more difficult for the German submarines to spot the British ships.

The 3rd Destroyer Flotilla was refueling and Commander Gadow, the flotilla commander, was responsible for securing the harbor entrance. He initiated the harbor patrol at 1900 hours with the destroyer Hermann Künne, one of the warships not yet refueled. The lack of fuel contributed to frequent relief of the patrolling destroyers. Hermann Künne’s skipper, Lieutenant Commander Friedrich Kothe, interpreted his order as allowing him to use his own initiative in cruising between Bogen Bay on the north side of Ofotfjord, directly opposite Ballangen Bay, and Ramnes. Lieutenant Commander F. Böhme took his ship, Anton Schmitt, out of the harbor to relieve Hermann Künne at midnight. Bitter cold and continuous snowstorms reduced the visibility to only a few hundred feet.

Fatigue on the part of the Germans may have helped the British achieve surprise at Narvik on April 10. Most of the German destroyer crews had been at their stations for 48 hours. Some were able to rest for a few hours in the afternoon of April 9, but the refueling operations kept most busy. Consideration for the exhaustion of his officers and men may have played a role in Bonte’s decision not to further disperse his destroyers, keeping more than he should in the harbor.

Anton Schmitt was relieved of its patrol duty at 0400 hours (local) by Diether von Roeder. Lieutenant Commander Erich Holtorf, the Dieter von Roeder’s skipper, had received the following order from Commander Gadow via radio: “At 0400 [local] hours relieve ‘Anton Schmitt.’ Anti-submarine defense of harbor entrance until dawn.”9Anton Schmitt anchored near Jan Wellem in anticipation of going alongside the latter to refuel. Lieutenant Commander Böhme retired to his cabin for a rest, but the fact that he remained fully clothed and kept his life jacket on are indications that he did not feel at ease with the situation.

The Attack by British Destroyers

Meanwhile, the 2nd British Destroyer Flotilla proceeded up Vestfjord at 20 knots. It was a nerve-wracking passage in the severely reduced visibility. There were several near misses, not only with the shoreline but also between the destroyers trying to keep within sight of each other in the heavy snow squalls. Skill and the quick reactions of the destroyer crews kept disasters from happening and the line of ships made the starboard turn into Ofotfjord at 0130 hours (GMT) without reducing speed and without being sighted by U51. U25 also failed to see the British warships. Warburton-Lee reduced speed to 12 knots as he neared the narrow part of the fjord between Finnvika and Tjeldøy. Luck was again with the British. They were not sighted by U46, patrolling the narrows near Ramnes.

The Admiralty, in session throughout the operation, had time to consider the hazardous nature of Warburton-Lee’s undertaking and have second thoughts about its wisdom. However, they could not bring themselves to take the responsibility to call off the attack or delay it until the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla could be sufficiently reinforced. Instead, they sent a cautionary message to Warburton-Lee just as the British warships were entering Ofotfjord (0136 hours GMT):10 “Norwegian defense ships Eidsvold and Norge may be in German hands. You alone can judge whether in these circumstances attack should be made. We shall support whatever decision you make.”

The Admiralty knew that there were six German destroyers in Narvik, along with one submarine. They suspected that the Norwegian shore batteries and the two coastal defense ships were in German hands. Finally, they were told that the fjord entrance might be mined. This intelligence about the situation in Narvik should have caused the Admiralty sufficient concern about sending five relatively small destroyers into what could be a hornet’s nest. Warburton-Lee was already in Ofotfjord when the Admiralty threw the ball back into his court. The cautionary message had no effect on his plans. The problem of looking too cautious was still there but the danger of being labeled foolhardy was removed by the last sentence in the Admiralty message.

The British destroyers were now approaching Narvik. Their navigational difficulties and near misses with the shoreline and each other resulted in the exchange of numerous radio signals between the destroyers as they proceeded into the fjord. The signals were sent in the clear. Navigational problems, as they were approaching their target, warranted taking this otherwise unacceptable risk. The British were again lucky. The German radio operators were obviously not searching various frequencies for enemy tactical information.

Diether von Roeder headed for the entrance to Narvik harbor at 0330 hours (GMT), after only 30 minutes on patrol. Lieutenant Commander Holtorf calculated that this would bring him into the harbor at first light, about 0420 hours (GMT). Bonte’s journal notes that Gadow was to arrange for Diether von Roeder to remain on guard until relieved by Hans Lüdemann, Gadow’s flagship. It is obvious that there was some miscommunication, because it is difficult to understand why Holtorf left his post without notifying the flotilla commander. Holtorf could not help but notice that Hans Lüdemann was still alongside Jan Wellem when he entered the harbor and dropped anchor. The Germans claim that Diether von Roeder did not wait to be relieved due to a misunderstanding of orders.11

Diether von Roeder’s navigation officer plotted the ship’s position and it happened to coincide exactly with a plot made by the navigation officer on the British destroyer Hardy at precisely the same time. The British