Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

With the exception of those in the harbor, the German ships were in excellent positions to respond to an attack. The three destroyers in Herjangsfjord threatened the flank of any force attacking Narvik. The two in Ballangen Bay could strike an attacking force from the rear. If instructions were in fact lacking, we can only conclude that the German destroyer captains responded in a professional manner and it is difficult to see how instructions could have improved on their actions.

General Dietl’s main concern was a Norwegian counterattack and he placed his emphasis on improving and strengthening the defenses in the two beachheads. There were five armed British merchant ships in Narvik harbor when the Germans attacked. These were seized, the crews imprisoned, and attempts were begun to bring their guns ashore to support Dietl’s troops. Bonte understood how exposed and ill equipped the German troops were, and he ordered all small arms and ammunition on the destroyers brought ashore for their use. The German operational plan called for Dietl to seize Bardufoss Airfield and the Setermoen depot and training area as quickly as possible after landing. The heavy snowfall blocked all roads leading north and it was therefore not possible to begin this part of the plan immediately.

The German dispositions at Narvik remained generally unchanged during April 9. The preponderance of the 139th Mountain Infantry Regiment (two battalions) remained near Elvegårdsmoen. This part of the 139th Regiment is later referred to as Group Windisch, after its commander, Colonel Windisch. Platoon and company-size security forces were positioned north of Bjerkvik and on both sides of Herjangsfjord. Dietl had to rely on Norwegian telephone facilities to communicate with Windisch since most of the division’s communications equipment was lost on the stormy passage from Germany.

In retrospect, General Dietl’s worries about a Norwegian counterattack were not well founded. The only Norwegian force near Narvik was the remnants of the 1/13th Inf that had managed to slip out of town. It was in no position to undertake offensive operations of any kind. The only other forces within a reasonable distance were the 2/15th Inf and the 3rd Mountain Artillery Bn. The 2/15 Inf, located at Setermoen, and a motorized artillery battery were ordered to Elvegårdsmoen late in the evening of April 8, but the heavy snowfall kept these units from making any appreciable progress.

General Fleischer remained in Vadsø on April 9 since the weather prevented a return to his headquarters. He kept in contact with District Command by telephone. Fleischer did not wait for the government to order mobilization. At 0445 hours on April 9 he ordered the mobilization of the remaining two line battalions of the 16th Infantry Regiment and later the same morning he expanded the mobilization to include the Alta Battalion and the remaining battalion of the 14th Infantry Regiment in Mosjøen. He also ordered all aircraft to Bardufoss where they could support operations near Narvik. Fleischer halted the move of the units from Setermoen to the Narvik area and these were instead concentrated in defensive positions in Salangsdal, south of Setermoen.

The British Reaction to the Capture of Narvik and Admiralty Intervention

It will be recalled that Admiral Whitworth finally dispatched his destroyers in the morning of April 9 to take up positions at the entrance to Vestfjord to prevent the Germans from reaching Narvik. The British were operating in an intelligence vacuum. The concentration of naval forces at the entrance to Vestfjord was based on the faulty assumption that the Germans were still to their south. When the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, commanded by the 45-year old Captain Bernard Armitage Warburton-Lee, established a patrol line across the Vestfjord entrance at 0930 hours (GMT) on April 9, the Germans were already in firm control of Narvik.

Shortly after establishing the patrol line across Vestfjord, Captain Warburton-Lee began receiving a stream of contradictory orders and directives from his superiors. At 0952 hours (GMT) An order from Admiral Forbes, bypassing Admiral Whitworth, directed him to send destroyers to Narvik to ensure that no German troops landed in that city. Five minutes later, Warburton-Lee received an order from Admiral Whitworth to join him about 50 nautical miles southwest of Skomvær Lighthouse. Finally, at midday, the Admiralty intervened by sending the following message directly to Captain Warburton-Lee:

Press reports state one German ship has arrived Narvik and landed a small force. Proceed Narvik and sink or capture enemy ship. It is at your discretion to land forces if you think you can recapture Narvik from number of enemy present. Try to get possession of battery if not already in enemy hands.3

This Admiralty message bypassed both Admirals Forbes and Whitworth. The Admiralty had no business in directing tactical operations in this way, but it is possible that Churchill was behind this order. While the Admiralty had now concluded that the Germans were already in Narvik, their intelligence was limited only to press reports, which were wildly inaccurate.

These messages must have both flattered and frustrated Warburton-Lee, but the conflicting orders gave him an opportunity to use his initiative and to follow his own instincts. The order from Forbes allowed Warburton-Lee to ignore the order from Whitworth to withdraw, since Admiral Forbes was the senior of the two. Warburton-Lee, the central actor in the coming events, is described as follows by Dickens:4 “He was a man of integrity, honour and ambition; a dedicated man, intensely professional and although an excellent games-player, somewhat aloof and single-minded.” This officer took his four destroyers, Hardy, Hunter, Havock, and Hotspur, and proceeded up Vestfjord to carry out the order of his Commander-in-Chief.

Warburton-Lee was more than a little skeptical about the information forwarded by the Admiralty. It appeared inconceivable that the Germans would have undertaken an expedition to Narvik with only one ship, and equally unlikely that they would have entrusted such an important operation to only a few troops. He was also concerned about the Norwegian shore batteries in the fjord. The general lack of intelligence led him to make an effort to gather whatever