Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

not to Colonel Sundlo. He called Major Spjeldnæs and ordered him to place Sundlo under arrest and to drive the Germans out of Narvik. It is obvious from this order that the general did not understand the situation in Narvik. Spjeldnæs told Fleischer that Sundlo was a German prisoner of war. He also told the general that it was impossible to drive the Germans out of town since he had only about 100 troops at his disposal and these were surrounded by a much larger German force. Fleischer then changed his order. He directed Spjeldnæs to assemble as many units as possible, break through the German lines, and thereafter position the troops to defend the Ofot Railway. Major Omdal appeared while Spjeldnæs talked to Fleischer and Spjeldnæs pointed out that Omdal was his senior and the general then repeated his orders to Omdal.

The Germans had occupied the high ground around the school and the possibility of a fighting breakout was not promising. The two majors decided to try to bluff their way through the German lines. Company 3 had now arrived at the school. It was obvious that an attempt to leave Narvik would not succeed unless it was undertaken immediately. They could not wait for the other elements of the battalion to arrive.

Parts of Co 3, Co 1, and a machinegun platoon were ordered to form up in a column with weapons slung over the shoulder. The troops were told to bring only weapons and what ammunition they could carry. Skis and other equipment were left behind. The troops assembled within a few minutes and they marched out of the schoolyard with Major Spjeldnæs in the lead. As they approached a group of German troops blocking the street, a German officer ordered them to halt and asked their destination. Spjeldnæs stopped for a moment and answered truthfully that they were leaving town. The German officer stated that they would not be permitted to leave Narvik. Spjeldnæs gave the officer a smile and said calmly in German, “Doch wir marschieren. Guten Morgen.” This brazen action caught the Germans off guard. While they hesitated, about 180 Norwegians marched through their position. They passed the railroad station, which was already in German hands, without interference.

Two messengers caught up with the formation as it approached the first railroad tunnel. They had a written message, purportedly from Colonel Sundlo, ordering them back to town. Another Norwegian officer, with a pistol to his head, had forged Sundlo’s name. The two messengers joined the withdrawal. The Norwegians occupied positions near Djupvik where there was an exchange of fire with a German patrol that had followed them. The firefight lasted for less than 30 minutes and there were no losses among the Norwegians. The Norwegians remained near the Hundal railroad station until the morning of April 11. They then decided to continue the withdrawal to the Nordal Bridge, where the terrain was well suited for defense. The force grew to 210 with the addition of the bridge guard detail.

General Dietl had secured all first-day objectives by 0615 hours on April 9. The lack of shore batteries at the Ofotfjord entrance was his only major disappointment. In less than two hours, the Germans had captured the key town in North Norway, sunk two of the largest warships in the Norwegian Navy, captured three patrol vessels, secured a critically important mobilization depot, and captured nearly 600 Norwegian troops, all without sustaining a single casualty.

The Norwegian forces left in Narvik were disarmed and imprisoned. This included the headquarters company that had been the the last unit to move from Elvegårdsmoen. The troops in this company were welcomed by German troops as they came off the ferry at Vassvik. Many officers and men managed to slip out of town later and join Norwegian forces in the interior. About three-fourths of the engineer company managed to escape in this manner.

Colonel Sundlo’s Performance

Finally, a few words about Colonel Sundlo and his actions on April 8 and 9 are necessary. Sundlo is mentioned in the German directives for Narvik. Admiral Raeder describes him as “an officer with reportedly pro-German feelings,” with whom they should establish contact at the earliest opportunity. Quisling provided information about Sundlo to the Germans but there is no indication that Sundlo was aware of this. Rosenberg mentions him in the memorandum he prepared for Hitler in preparation for his December 16 meeting with Quisling. Sundlo was not the only officer mentioned by Quisling, who was eager to convince the Germans that he had important connections within the Norwegian military establishment. There is no evidence that Sundlo provided any useful information to the Germans. The best indication of this is the fact that the Germans were unaware that there were no Norwegian shore batteries at the Ofotfjord entrance.

Despite this, Konrad Sundlo became Norway’s Benedict Arnold. Word spread everywhere after April 9 that Colonel Sundlo was in German service and that he had betrayed his country by surrendering Narvik. For example, the very competent researcher Hans-Martin Ottmer, writing in 1994, refers to Sundlo as a betrayer of his country. He claims that he failed to carry out the orders from the division by not alerting his troops or occupying defensive positions, despite having adequate time to do so. Consequently, the Germans were able to land their troops at their leisure without any resistance.24

Sundlo’s scapegoating began when General Fleischer sent out a communiqué after the loss of Narvik. The communiqué, while carefully worded, left no doubt that Fleischer meant to convey that Narvik fell to the enemy due to Colonel Sundlo’s treason and several newspapers receiving the communiqué stated so without hesitation. The communiqué read, in part:25

Colonel Sundlo initiated immediate negotiations for a cease-fire and withdrew the troops to Framnes. The Germans occupied the city and the Norwegian troops were surrounded between the Germans and the sea. The division commander, who was in East Finnmark, was notified about the situation by telephone and he ordered Colonel Sundlo’s second in command, Major Omdal,