Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

called out in English and German for the Norwegians not to fire. Lieutenant Skjefte did not order his troops to fire and soon there were foreign soldiers all around his position. He explained later that he did not order his troops to open fire because he believed he was under Lieutenant Bergli’s command and that officer had not given an order to fire. An officer told a runner sent to the bunker from Bergli’s position that the troops should not fire until otherwise ordered. There was only one officer at the bunker, Lieutenant Skjefte. He testified later that he could not recall giving such an order. German and Norwegian troops ended up looking at each other on opposite sides of the barbed wire. Neither side opened fire.

The rapid German advance through town quickly neutralized most of the units that Colonel Sundlo and his staff had failed to alert. Captain Gundersen, the engineer company commander, and his men awoke to the sound of cannon fire. It took him a while to join his company since he was staying at one of the hotels.

Gundersen ordered his executive officer to prepare the company for movement while he drove to the harbor area to see what was happening. He drove straight into a unit of mountain troops. He was taken to the pier where German troops were disembarking from the destroyers and survivors from Norge were brought ashore.

The Germans believed Gundersen was Colonel Sundlo’s representative. He denied this, but Dietl ordered Gundersen to accompany him in a taxi with eight troops standing on the running boards. Dietl asked Gundersen to arrange a meeting with Sundlo. Gundersen refused. After crossing the railroad, they were stopped by an excited lieutenant. He told Dietl that Colonel Sundlo threatened to open fire if the Germans did not withdraw within 30 minutes. Dietl exclaimed that this must not be allowed to happen and he asked Gundersen to accompany him to Sundlo. Gundersen refused, and in the confusion, he managed to slip away and rejoined his company. He took about 70 troops and moved towards the antiaircraft battery position, to act as a security force. Twelve engineers were assigned to help the gun crews. One squad was sent to the Framnes bunker and two squads to regimental headquarters. The company executive officer took the rest of the company to secure the railroad station in anticipation of a possible withdrawal. German troops surrounded and captured this force before it reached its destination.

The antiaircraft battery commander and his troops also awoke to gunfire in the harbor. He ordered his men to drive to the gun positions in cars parked near their quarters for that purpose. A German unit moving up the street at double-time surrounded the artillery troops before they could get out of the parking lot. The Norwegians were disarmed. A German lieutenant told Munthe-Kaas that the Germans had come as friends and, with the approval of the king, to protect the country against the British. He stated that all major Norwegian cities were in German hands and that Norwegian forces were directed to cooperate with the Germans.

Lieutenant Munthe-Kaas and his bugler managed to slip away and join the 11-man alert detail at the gun positions. The guns were positioned to fire against aircraft and they could not fire on targets in the harbor area. Each 40mm cannon weighed over two tons. With considerable difficulty, the men managed to move one gun through the deep snow, along with the machineguns, to a position where they could fire at targets in the harbor. The other three guns were not moved since there were insufficient personnel to operate them.

Munthe-Kaas was uncertain about the situation since he had not heard a single shot fired in the city. He was unable to get through to the regimental headquarters by telephone and decided to drive there for instructions. On the way, he met Major Omdal who was on his way home to change into a uniform. The lieutenant asked if the situation was such that he should destroy the 40mm guns. The major, who was in a hurry, asked, “Why, can’t you fire them?” Munthe-Kaas answered that he could fire one gun and he turned around and drove back to the battery. The battery never opened fire, partly because of the limited visibility but mostly because of a sense of uncertainty since the city remained quiet.

Sergeant Eriksen and the off-duty crew for the 75mm railroad gun were also awakened by naval gunfire. They managed to move quickly to the gun position but this did not help much. The gun was positioned where it could fire on targets in the fjord and in the harbor entrance but a rock outcropping prevented the gun from firing on the harbor itself. A locomotive was necessary to move the gun and Eriksen tried to requisition one but the Germans had stopped all railroad traffic and posted sentries along the railroad.

It had become obvious to Colonel Sundlo, Major Omdal, and Major Spjeldnæs that they needed to concentrate all available forces as quickly as possible. Sundlo had agreed to Omdal’s proposal to recall Co 3 and the attached machinegun platoon. It is claimed that Major Spjeldnæs ordered Co 3 and the machinegun platoon on Framnes back to the battalion headquarters on his own initiative. It was logical that orders to his subordinate units come through the battalion, but the action also suggests that the senior leaders had reached the same conclusion.

The mortar platoon had orders to take up positions on Framnes where it could fire on the German ships. Sundlo cancelled that mission at the last minute and ordered that all units in the Framnes area withdraw and assemble at the battalion headquarters. While Spjeldnæs may have thought about a withdrawal from Narvik, Sundlo had apparently not given up on the possibility of stopping the German advance. He ordered Spjeldnæs to prepare an advance against the Germans as soon as the recalled units reached the battalion area.

While Sundlo and Spjeldnæs were discussing