Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

wet and cold, and had not slept for nearly 24 hours. The troops were to remain fully clothed and ready for immediate deployment. The officers were instructed to remain with their units.17

Those present recalled that Colonel Sundlo assumed that the patrol ships on the early warning line and the coastal defense ships, which he believed had deployed to the fjord entrance in accordance with plans, would provide sufficient warning for an orderly deployment of the troops. The staff and subordinate commanders were dismissed before 0330 hours. Sundlo remained at his headquarters. As on the previous evening, he failed to include the engineer company, the 75mm gun crew, and the civilian authorities in his briefing.

Company 3 had just arrived in Narvik and the troops were in the process of moving into the quarters when the meeting took place. Company 4, minus one machinegun platoon, was co-located with the battalion headquarters at the primary school, about 300 meters from the regimental headquarters. The antiaircraft battery personnel were in their quarters except for an alert detail of 11 men at the guns. The two platoons of the engineer company were in their quarters along the railroad tracks leading to the iron ore unloading facilities. An alert detail of three men was located with the 75mm railroad gun. The other four were in quarters near the engineers company. Thirteen men from the machinegun platoon attached to Co 2 occupied the two bunkers. The Fagernes bunker was occupied by one NCO and five men with two machineguns. The machinegun platoon’s second in command, Sergeant Wesche, and six men were at the Framnes bunker. The remaining 30 soldiers of that platoon were on alert in their quarters, about one kilometer from the harbor area. The harbor defense force should have occupied posts along the waterfront from Fagernes to Framnes. Actually, some of them were at their quarters 200 meters from the Steamship Pier.18

Colonel Sundlo reacted to the news that foreign warships had entered Ofotfjord in a rather disorganized fashion. He alerted the battalion and directed Major Omdal, who was in his quarters, to notify all subordinate commanders to assemble at regimental headquarters as quickly as possible, and for Co 2 to deploy its reserve. Again, no one thought to alert the antiaircraft battery, the engineer company, the 75mm gun detachment, or the civilian authorities.

In the process of alerting the units, Major Omdal directed Captain Dalsve to assume command of Co 2. This change in command was apparently planned and had Colonel Sundlo’s blessing, but it was nevertheless a strange thing to do as hostilities were about to begin. It was intended to use Langlo’s familiarity with the local area to help deploy the arriving units since it was dark and snowing heavily. While Major Spjeldnæs was understandably annoyed at being left out of these arrangements, Sundlo and Omdal considered it proper to deal directly with the companies since time was crucial and they were more familiar with the town than Major Spjældnes who had just arrived. Sundlo decided to deploy Co 3, commanded by Captain Bjørnson, to the prepared positions between Lillevik and Kvitvik. A machinegun platoon was attached to the company as it passed the battalion headquarters.

Sundlo considered that stretch of shoreline and Vassvik the most likely enemy landing sites. He believed that Co 2 and its attached machinegun platoon covered the harbor area but there were no troops in the Lillevik-Kvitvik area. From that standpoint, the deployment is understandable. In retrospect, however, it was not a wise decision. Sundlo had insufficient forces to cover adequately all areas where an enemy could strike. It was therefore important to maintain a substantial reserve until the enemy had shown his hand.

The order not to fire on British forces but to fire on Germans was received about 0430 hours and it was relayed quickly to subordinate units without an explanation. As was the case in other areas of the country, this order was not helpful.

Both Major Spjeldnæs and Captain Bjørnson declared later that they were not properly briefed about the friendly situation. According to Sandvik, Bjørnson stated that he did not know how the machinegun company and Co 2 were deployed. This may well be true but a solution to part of the problem would have been for Captain Bjørnson to ask the machinegun company commander who was present at the battalion headquarters. In addition, the former commander of Co 2 was with Major Spjeldnæs and Captain Bjørnson for much of this time and could have explained that unit’s deployment plans. A commander should use every means to obtain information he deems crucial and not wait to be spoon-fed that information. The lack of knowledge mentioned by Spjeldnæs and Bjørnson had little effect on the unfolding events.

Captain Dalsve had meanwhile deployed the rest of Co 2. He sent Lieutenant Bergli with 15–20 men to positions near the Fagernes bunker. Dalsve told Bergli that foreign warships were approaching Narvik. Lieutenant Skjefte commanded the Fagernes Bunker and Lieutenant Bergli assumed that his force would also come under Skjefte’s command.

Captain Dalsve drove to the Framnes bunker with the rest of the company reserve, about 15–20 men. On the way, he stopped at the harbor guard force’s quarters and ordered the senior NCO, Sergeant Sand, to occupy the prepared positions near the Iron Ore Pier. Dalsve apparently forgot that he had a machinegun platoon attached to his company. The platoon leader, Lieutenant Landrø, and 30 men were at their quarters and Captain Dalsve failed to give them any orders. Instead of requesting instructions from Captain Dalsve, Lieutenant Landrø assembled his platoon and marched it to the primary school to obtain instructions from Captain Brønstad, the machinegun company’s commander.

Majors Omdal and Spjeldnæs were both in the school courtyard when they heard cannon fire from the direction of the harbor. The only uncommitted force available was a machinegun platoon. They decided to deploy this platoon to a position above the Iron Ore Pier from where it would be able to fire on targets in