Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

the planned attack, a lieutenant arrived with a request from a German lieutenant colonel for a meeting with the Norwegian commander, apparently meaning the battalion commander. Colonel Sundlo decided to talk to the German officer himself, and he asked Major Spjeldnæs to accompany him. Spjeldnæs describes the meeting in a report he made on August 27, 1940:20 “The German officer stated, as soon as we met him: ‘We will not fire if you don’t fire.’ Colonel Sundlo answered immediately: ‘On the contrary, we will fire. If you don’t withdraw immediately, we will open fire.’”

The German officer also told Sundlo that Denmark had surrendered without a fight and that the Norwegian Government had decided not to resist. Sundlo recommended a 15-minute cease-fire while he consulted his superiors. Spjeldnæs suggested that the cease-fire be extended to 30 minutes and the German agreed. Spjeldnæs hoped that the extra 15 minutes would allow the units withdrawing from Framnes to reach his location.

Colonel Sundlo proceeded to his headquarters, called the District Command at 0600 hours, and talked to Colonel Mjelde. Not surprisingly, we have two versions of the conversation that followed. First, Colonel Mjelde’s version:21

Colonel Sundlo reported that the Germans are spread throughout the city and are handing out leaflets. He has talked to the German commander and they have agreed on a 30-minute cease-fire. The German commander will confer with his superiors. The colonel requested instructions. The colonel was reminded about his responsibilities and his earlier orders. The responsibility was his as the local commander in accordance with earlier orders.

Colonel Sundlo’s version is that he first briefed Colonel Mjelde on the situation in Narvik. Then he told Mjelde that he intended to attack the German forces that were already in the city. Sundlo asked Mjelde for comments on the intended course of action. Mjelde answered: “You are on the scene and fully responsible.”22

Although it is impossible to know which version is more accurate, it is worth noting that Colonel Sundlo had discussed mounting an attack with Majors Omdal and Spjeldnæs. The mad scramble to concentrate forces in a central location could also serve to facilitate a withdrawal, a course of action Spjeldnæs was considering. The German forces that had captured the railroad station had swung to the north and they were about to cut the Narvik-Vassvik road. The Norwegian forces would be trapped if the Germans captured that road as well as the railway.

Sundlo may have tried to find some moral support for the most difficult decision of his career. It was obvious that a decision to fight would lead to a high number of civilian casualties. While Mjelde was correct in pointing out that Sundlo was best qualified to make the decisions, his answer nevertheless strikes one as evasive and not very encouraging. Whatever happened, Mjelde was in the clear.

Colonel Sundlo headed back to the battalion headquarters after his telephone conversation with Mjelde. Outside the school that served as battalion headquarters, he encountered General Dietl, members of his staff, and the German Consul in Narvik. The general explained that the Germans had come as friends, to which Sundlo answered that the sinking of two Norwegian warships was not exactly an act of friendship.

General Dietl gave the colonel a short, inaccurate orientation of the overall situation, including his assertion that he had a full division at his disposal and that the major cities in southern Norway were occupied peacefully. He pointed out to Sundlo that powerful elements of his division were already ashore, that numerous German warships in the fjord were ready to bombard the town, and that Norwegian resistance would only lead to needless bloodshed. He demanded that the Norwegians surrender and that all units be disarmed and assembled in their quarters to await further orders.

Colonel Sundlo made a quick assessment of the situation. Despite an agreement that units would remain in their positions during the cease-fire, the Germans had used the period to secure key terrain and machineguns were set up at all critical junctions. From his headquarters, he had observed the German advance towards the town’s municipal center and the railroad station. The Germans had passed to the left of the Norwegian troops, seized the high ground near the regimental headquarters, and set up machineguns that covered the area around the school where the battalion headquarters and assembly area were located. The Germans occupied the regimental headquarters shortly after Sundlo left.

Norwegian and German troops in Co 1’s area had become intermingled, looking at each other with surprise and curiosity. Civilians had come into the streets to watch the drama unfold, not realizing the seriousness of the situation. Many, including women and children, were intermingled with German troops. It was obvious that a large number of civilians would be killed as soon as the first shots were fired. The Norwegian troops ordered to withdraw from Framnes had not arrived. The same was true for Co 3, ordered back from the Lillevik-Kvitvik area. Besides Co 1, the mortar platoon was the only force available to Colonel Sundlo. He concluded that the city was, for all practical purposes, already occupied.

Sundlo requested an extension of the cease-fire so that he could contact General Fleischer for instructions. General Dietl, fully aware of the untenable situation in which the Norwegians found themselves and Colonel Sundlo’s hesitation and indecisiveness, refused to extend the cease-fire. After a tense period of silence, Colonel Sundlo informed Dietl in German, “Ich übergebe die Stadt” (I surrender the city). The time was approximately 0615 hours.23

General Dietl asked Sundlo to recall all units and insure that there were no incidents. Any incident would lead to immediate reprisals. Sundlo ordered Major Omdal to notify all units. He then proceeded to his headquarters under German guard. Sundlo informed District Command that he had surrendered the city. District Command notified General Fleischer at 0620 hours.

General Fleischer was convinced that Sundlo had failed to perform his duties. The fight that the general expected in Narvik had not developed. Fleischer finally called Narvik direct, but the call was