Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕
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- Author: Henrik Lunde
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Major Omdal recommended to Colonel Sundlo that Co 3 be recalled from the Lillevik-Kvitvik area since it was now obvious that an attack was in progress in the harbor. Sundlo agreed. He had just received a call from a customs official informing him that German troops were disembarking from warships at the Steamship Pier. This was the first message to give the attackers’ nationality. Captain Bjørnson was in the process of deploying his company when a battalion runner appeared with an order directing him to return to the battalion headquarters area. It took most of an hour before this repositioning was completed.
Colonel Sundlo decided that they should try to drive the Germans out of town. This decision was wishful thinking at this stage. The Norwegian forces were spread throughout town in small groups and it was not possible to bring them to a central location in time to stop the Germans, who were advancing into town rapidly. There were no reserves available until the next unit arrived from Elvegårdsmoen.
Major Omdal proceeded to the school area and tried to scrape together whatever soldiers he could find at or near the school. Company 1, commanded by Captain Strømstad, and the mortar platoon arrived from Vassvik at this time. It was the only organized force available. Due to the seriousness of the situation, Omdal suggested that Sundlo come to the battalion headquarters. When Sundlo arrived, Omdal, who was in civilian clothes, ran home to put on a uniform.
Major Spjeldnæs ordered Co 1 to advance towards the market place and the harbor. It took only a few minutes for Captain Strømstad to brief his platoon leaders and ready the company for the advance. The machine gun platoon previously attached to Co 2 was ordered to support Strømstad’s advance.
The Norwegians had advanced no more than a city block when they encountered a German force of at least equal size. Neither side opened fire. In addition to the force to his front, Captain Strømstad saw several groups of Germans on the north side of the railroad tracks. He tried to spread his force and reported to the battalion that he was in an untenable position if the Germans opened fire.
In 1947, Major Spjeldnæs testified that he had already started thinking about assembling his units for a withdrawal and therefore he had not given Strømstad orders to open fire. He reasoned that all hope of a withdrawal would be destroyed if hostilities were initiated. He only wanted the German advance stopped. Based on the testimony of one of the lead platoon leaders and the company executive officer, Major Spjeldnæs’ involvement was more proactive. Both lieutenants stated that their platoons left the school area with orders to open fire. Before they confronted the Germans, new directives arrived directing them not to fire until further orders.19
Company 2’s reserve had been located astride the route taken by the two German columns entering the town. When Major Omdal awakened Captains Langlo and Dalsve at Victoria Hospice, he ordered Dalsve to occupy the Framnes and Fagernes bunkers at once. It is uncertain what this order meant, since personnel from the machinegun platoon already occupied the bunkers. Captain Dalsve must have concluded that the order pertained to the 30-40 men of the reserve and, as noted earlier, these troops were sent to the two bunkers. This left no Norwegian infantry along the German routes into town.
Sergeant Wesche and his troops at the Framnes bunker had a few glimpses of warships around the harbor entrance but could not make out their nationality. It became obvious that they were not friendly when Eidsvold blew up a few hundred meters from the Framnes shoreline. Wesche found it useless to open fire on warships with rifles and machineguns. Captain Dalsve arrived at the Framnes bunker with part of the company reserve shortly after Eidsvold sank. The heavy snowfall prevented the Norwegians at or near the bunker from observing what was happening in the harbor. Three survivors from Eidsvold came ashore on Framnes and a large number of dead were floating near land. Captain Dalsve moved men from the reserve down to the water’s edge to help bring the living and dead ashore.
Sand and his men witnessed the sinking of Norge, located only 300 meters from the Iron Ore Pier and they also saw what they believed was a foreign warship at the Steamship Pier. Sergeant Sand ran back to the quarters where they had come from earlier and warned both bunkers about these happenings. He also tried to contact the company commander for instructions. He was unable to reach Captain Dalsve, who was on his way to the Framnes bunker. Sand had just returned when German soldiers appeared and quickly disarmed his 20 men. They did not resist.
Lieutenant Skjefte and his men at the Fagernes bunker could hear cannon fire from the harbor and they received a call from the Framnes bunker that Eidsvold had been sunk. It was snowing heavily and the German warships could not be seen from the Fagernes bunker. Lieutenant Bergli arrived shortly after the firing in the harbor area started, with half of the company reserve. He passed Lieutenant Skjefte’s position without talking to him and deployed his men on the hillside above, and out of sight from the bunker. Each officer related later that he assumed the other was in command.
When the snowfall eased momentarily, a warship was seen about 250-300 meters from shore. The Norwegians observed soldiers moving in their direction from the east and shortly thereafter, other soldiers, landed at the entrance to Beisfjord, were seen approaching from the west. The approaching soldiers
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