Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

message could be encoded and sent by radio, Whitworth changed his mind and at 2038 hours (GMT), he signaled his ships, “Cancel my 1959”.7 The assessment and decision reflected in Whitworth’s original message was obviously correct and it was unfortunate that he reconsidered and sent the second message. Whitworth, Forbes, and the Admiralty received Captain Warburton-Lee’s original message simultaneously at about 1830 hours (GMT). Admiral Whitworth had not ordered the Narvik attack. Admiral Forbes had ordered Warburton-Lee to proceed to Narvik almost nine hours earlier and about seven hours earlier, the Admiralty had ordered him to go on to Narvik and sink or capture the lone German transport they believed to be in that city. Both the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief left Whitworth out of the loop. Knowing that both Forbes and the Admiralty had received Warburton-Lee’s message giving the latest intelligence and intention, Whitworth no doubt expected them to amend their previous orders. This is probably the reason he waited one and a half hours before intervening.

If Whitworth had stuck with his original plan as reflected in his visual message, it may well have changed the outcome of the upcoming battle and perhaps alleviated the need for another attack three days later. In the 39 minutes that passed between his initial order and its cancellation, Admiral Whitworth may have decided that it was not his prerogative to amend or change the earlier orders of his superiors that they had left standing by their silence.

Whitworth did have the authority and prerogative to reinforce, from his own resources, a unit under his own command about to engage the enemy. It is possible that Admiral Whitworth simply decided not to run the risk of offending his superiors by interfering in actions they had commenced.

Derry and MacIntyre conclude that Admiral Whitworth decided not to reinforce the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla because such action could delay the attack and that the element of surprise would therefore be lost. Derry writes that the Repulse, Penelope, and the four destroyers had not joined Admiral Whitworth’s forces at the time when he contemplated reinforcing Warburton-Lee. This is not correct, as is demonstrated by the fact that Whitworth used visual signals to communicate his orders to Penelope. In fact, the Hotspur made visual contact with Repulse when it departed its patrol line to enter Vestfjord around 1300 hours (GMT).

Churchill takes note of Admiral Whitworth’s consideration to reinforce Captain Warburton-Lee and writes, “…but the time seemed too short and he felt that intervention by him at this stage might cause a delay. In fact, we in the Admiralty were not prepared to risk the Renown—one of our only two battle cruisers—in such an enterprise.”8 This is misleading. Admiral Whitworth did not intend to use the Renown or Repulse to reinforce Warburton-Lee. Moreover, Whitworth and his staff had calculated that Penelope and the four destroyers could be at the pass through position southwest of Tranøy at 0100 hours (GMT) and the distance from there to the Ofotfjord entrance is about 30 miles. The fact that the Penelope and the four destroyers did not depart immediately upon receiving Admiral Whitworth’s first message indicates that they did not think that the time factor was critical. They were about 40 miles from the pass through position designated in Whitworth’s first message and they could reach that point at the designated time by leaving as late as 2300 hours (GMT). In fact, the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla was still to the south of Tranøy at midnight and the flotilla navigation officer sighted Tranøy Light at 0030 hours (GMT). Warburton-Lee’s destroyers entered Ofotfjord at 0130 hours and it is therefore true that Penelope and its escorts could not have made it from the designated pass-through position to the Ofotfjord entrance in time unless a more northerly pass-through position or an earlier pass-through time was designated. There are no obvious reasons why this could not have been done.

The silence from Admirals Whitworth and Forbes must have served as a reminder to the Admiralty that they had ordered the operation and that they should therefore reply to Captain Warburton-Lee. A message sent to the destroyer flotilla commander at 2100 hours (GMT) directed him to patrol east of Ramnes to keep the German warships from slipping out through channels leading to the north. MacIntyre concludes that the Admiralty worried that the Germans would escape to Vågsfjord through Tjelsund. It is more likely that they worried about escape through Ramsund since Tjelsund can be blocked without entering Ofotfjord.

Churchill and the Admiralty were obviously concerned that the German destroyers could slip out of Narvik during the night. This had in fact been the original plan but the loss of Kattegat made its implementation impossible. The Admiralty was not aware of Bonte’s problems and was determined not to allow him to add insult to injury by slipping past them twice.

The Admiralty message ended with, “Attack at dawn: all good luck”. This was the green light that Captain Warburton-Lee needed and must have come as a relief. He had reported what he believed he was up against and the Admiralty’s blessing on his intention to attack meant that he would not be responsible for a foolhardy action in case things went wrong.

The British chain of command above Warburton-Lee took a major and unwarranted risk in not providing reinforcements. This failure is not attributable solely to the lack of intelligence. A German force of one battleship, two cruisers and ten destroyers was sighted on a northbound course in the North Sea late on April 7, and a large part of this force was known to be north of Trondheim on April 8. The Admiralty, Admiral Forbes, and Admiral Whitworth should have asked themselves what happened to the ten destroyers. The Renown had encountered the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau without their destroyers on April 9. This, combined with the report received from the Norwegians at the Tranøy Pilot Station, should have led to the conclusion that the residue of the German force sighted in the North Sea