The Ego and his Own by Max Stirner (most read books txt) π
Those not self-conscious and self-willed are constantly acting from self-interested motives, but clothing these in various garbs. Watch those people closely in the light of Stirner's teaching, and they seem to be hypocrites, they have so many good moral and religious plans of which self-interest is at the end and bottom; but they, we may believe, do not know that this is more than a coincidence.
In Stirner we have the philosophical foundation for political liberty. His interest in the practical development of egoism to the dissolution of the State and the union of free men is clear and pronounced, and harmonizes perfectly with the economic philosophy of Josiah Warren. Allowing for difference of temperament and language, there is a substantial agreement between Stirner and Proudhon. Each would be free, and sees in every increase of the number of free people and their intelligence an a
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the other hand, even the most deserving commoner could not reach that station,
then an inequality of political rights would exist. Among the States of today
one has carried out that maxim of equality more, another less.
The monarchy of estates (so I will call absolute royalty, the time of the
kings before the revolution) kept the individual in dependence on a lot of
little monarchies. These were fellowships (societies) like the guilds, the
nobility, the priesthood, the burgher class, cities, communes. Everywhere the
individual must regard himself first as a member of this little society, and
yield unconditional obedience to its spirit, the esprit de corps, as his
monarch. More, e. g. than the individual nobleman himself must his family,
the honor of his race, be to him. Only by means of his corporation, his
estate, did the individual have relation to the greater corporation, the State
-- as in Catholicism the individual deals with God only through the priest. To
this the third estate now, showing courage to negate itself as an estate,
made an end. It decided no longer to be and be called an estate beside other
estates, but to glorify and generalize itself into the "nation." Hereby it
created a much more complete and absolute monarchy,' and the entire previously
ruling principle of estates, the principle of little monarchies inside the
great, went down. Therefore it cannot be said that the Revolution was a
revolution against the first two privileged estates. It was against the little
monarchies of estates in general. But, if the estates and their despotism were
broken (the king too, we know, was only a king of estates, not a
citizen-king), the individuals freed from the inequality of estate were left.
Were they now really to be without estate and "out of gear," no longer bound
by any estate, without a general bond of union? No, for the third estate had
declared itself the nation only in order not to remain an estate beside
other estates, but to become the sole estate. This sole estate is the
nation, the "State." What had the individual now become? A political
Protestant, for he had come into immediate connection with his God, the State.
He was no longer, as an aristocrat, in the monarchy of the nobility; as a
mechanic, in the monarchy of the guild; but he, like all, recognized and
acknowledged only -- one lord, the State, as whose servants they all
received the equal title of honor, "citizen."
The bourgeoisie is the aristocracy of DESERT; its motto, "Let desert wear
its crowns." It fought against the "lazy" aristocracy, for according to it
(the industrious aristocracy acquired by industry and desert) it is not the
"born" who is free, nor yet I who am free either, but the "deserving" man, the
honest servant (of his king; of the State; of the people in constitutional
States). Through service one acquires freedom, i. e., acquires "deserts,"
even if one served -- mammon. One must deserve well of the State, i.e. of
the principle of the State, of its moral spirit. He who serves this spirit
of the State is a good citizen, let him live to whatever honest branch of
industry he will. In its eyes innovators practice a "breadless art." Only the
"shopkeeper" is "practical," and the spirit that chases after public offices
is as much the shopkeeping spirit as is that which tries in trade to feather
its nest or otherwise to become useful to itself and anybody else.
But, if the deserving count as the free (for what does the comfortable
commoner, the faithful office-holder, lack of that freedom that his heart
desires?), then the "servants" are the -- free. The obedient servant is the
free man! What glaring nonsense! Yet this is the sense of the bourgeoisie,
and its poet, Goethe, as well as its philosopher, Hegel, succeeded in
glorifying the dependence of the subject on the object, obedience to the
objective world. He who only serves the cause, "devotes himself entirely to
it," has the true freedom. And among thinkers the cause was -- reason, that
which, like State and Church, gives -- general laws, and puts the individual
man in irons by the thought of humanity. It determines what is "true,"
according to which one must then act. No more "rational" people than the
honest servants, who primarily are called good citizens as servants of the
State.
Be rich as Croesus or poor as Job -- the State of the commonalty leaves that
to your option; but only have a "good disposition." This it demands of you,
and counts it its most urgent task to establish this in all. Therefore it will
keep you from "evil promptings," holding the "ill-disposed" in check and
silencing their inflammatory discourses under censors' canceling-marks or
press-penalties and behind dungeon walls, and will, on the other hand, appoint
people of "good disposition" as censors, and in every way have a *moral
influence* exerted on you by "well-disposed and well-meaning" people. If it
has made you deaf to evil promptings, then it opens your ears again all the
more diligently to good promptings.
With the time of the bourgeoisie begins that of liberalism. People want to
see what is "rational," "suited to the times," etc., established everywhere.
The following definition of liberalism, which is supposed to be pronounced in
its honor, characterizes it completely: "Liberalism is nothing else than the
knowledge of reason, applied to our existing relations."(65) Its aim is a
"rational order," a "moral behavior," a "limited freedom," not anarchy,
lawlessness, selfhood. But, if reason rules, then the person succumbs. Art
has for a long time not only acknowledged the ugly, but considered the ugly as
necessary to its existence, and takes it up into itself; it needs the villain.
In the religious domain, too, the extremest liberals go so far that they want
to see the most religious man regarded as a citizen -- i. e., the religious
villain; they want to see no more of trials for heresy. But against the
"rational law" no one is to rebel, otherwise he is threatened with the
severest penalty. What is wanted is not free movement and realization of the
person or of me, but of reason -- i.e. a dominion of reason, a dominion. The
liberals are zealots, not exactly for the faith, for God, but certainly for
reason, their master. They brook no lack of breeding, and therefore no
self-development and self- determination; they play the guardian as
effectively as the most absolute rulers.
"Political liberty," what are we to understand by that? Perhaps the
individual's independence of the State and its laws? No; on the contrary, the
individual's subjection in the State and to the State's laws. But why
"liberty"? Because one is no longer separated from the State by
intermediaries, but stands in direct and immediate relation to it; because one
is a -- citizen, not the subject of another, not even of the king as a person,
but only in his quality as "supreme head of the State." Political liberty,
this fundamental doctrine of liberalism, is nothing but a second phase of --
Protestantism, and runs quite parallel with "religious liberty."(66) Or would
it perhaps be right to understand by the latter an independence of religion?
Anything but that. Independence of intermediaries is all that it is intended
to express, independence of mediating priests, the abolition of the "laity,"
and so, direct and immediate relation to religion or to God. Only on the
supposition that one has religion can he enjoy freedom of religion; freedom of
religion does not mean being without religion, but inwardness of faith,
unmediated intercourse with God. To him who is "religiously free" religion is
an affair of the heart, it is to him his own affair, it is to him a
"sacredly serious matter." So, too, to the "politically free" man the State is
a sacredly serious matter; it is his heart's affair, his chief affair, his own
affair.
Political liberty means that the polis, the State, is free; freedom of
religion that religion is free, as freedom of conscience signifies that
conscience is free; not, therefore, that I am free from the State, from
religion, from conscience, or that I am rid of them. It does not mean my
liberty, but the liberty of a power that rules and subjugates me; it means
that one of my despots, like State, religion, conscience, is free. State,
religion, conscience, these despots, make me a slave, and their liberty is
my slavery. That in this they necessarily follow the principle, "the end
hallows the means," is self-evident. If the welfare of the State is the end,
war is a hallowed means; if justice is the State's end, homicide is a hallowed
means, and is called by its sacred name, "execution"; the sacred State
hallows everything that is serviceable to it.
"Individual liberty," over which civic liberalism keeps jealous watch, does
not by any means signify a completely free self-determination, by which
actions become altogether mine, but only independence of persons.
Individually free is he who is responsible to no man. Taken in this sense --
and we are not allowed to understand it otherwise -- not only the ruler is
individually free, i.e., irresponsible toward men ("before God," we know,
he acknowledges himself responsible), but all who are "responsible only to the
law." This kind of liberty was won through the revolutionary movement of the
century -- to wit, independence of arbitrary will, or tel est notre plaisir.
Hence the constitutional prince must himself be stripped of all personality,
deprived of all individual decision, that he may not as a person, as an
individual man, violate the "individual liberty" of others. The *personal
will of the ruler* has disappeared in the constitutional prince; it is with a
right feeling, therefore, that absolute princes resist this. Nevertheless
these very ones profess to be in the best sense "Christian princes." For this,
however, they must become a purely spiritual power, as the Christian is
subject only to spirit ("God is spirit"). The purely spiritual power is
consistently represented only by the constitutional prince, he who, without
any personal significance, stands there spiritualized to the degree that he
can rank as a sheer, uncanny "spirit," as an idea. The constitutional king
is the truly Christian king, the genuine, consistent carrying-out of the
Christian principle. In the constitutional monarchy individual dominion --
i.e. a real ruler that wills -- has found its end; here, therefore,
individual liberty prevails, independence of every individual dictator, of
everyone who could dictate to me with a tel est notre plaisir. It is the
completed Christian State-life, a spiritualized life.
The behavior of the commonalty is liberal through and through. Every
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