The Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza (free ebook novel .txt) 📕

they may through it be conceived. Whereas the only truth

substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in

their existence, because they are conceived through themselves.

Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and

distinct-that is, a true-idea of a substance, but that he is not

sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he

said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it

was false (a little consideration will make this plain) ; or if

anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same

as saying that a false idea was true-in short, the height of

absurdity. It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the

existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth. And

we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning-that there

is but one such substance. I think that this may profitably be

done at once ; and, in order to proceed regularly with the

demonstration, we must premise :-

1. The true definition of a thing neither involves nor

expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. From

this it follows that—

2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number of

individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature

of the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangle

expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle : it

does not imply any fixed number of triangles.

3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a

cause why it should exist.

4. This cause of existence must either be contained in the

nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated

apart from such definition.

It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual

things exist in nature, there must be some cause for the

existence of exactly that number, neither more nor less. For

example, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity’s

sake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have

had no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of

these twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of

human existence in general ; we must also show why there are

exactly twenty men, neither more nor less : for a cause must be

assigned for the existence of each individual. Now this cause

cannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true

definition of man does not involve any consideration of the

number twenty. Consequently, the cause for the existence of

these twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must

necessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we may

lay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist of

several individuals must have an external cause. And, as it has

been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of

substance, existence must necessarily be included in its

definition ; and from its definition alone existence must be

deducible. But from its definition (as we have shown, notes ii.,

iii.), we cannot infer the existence of several substances ;

therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same

nature. Q.E.D.

PROP. IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the

number of its attributes (Def. iv.).

PROP. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be

conceived through itself.

Proof.-An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of

substance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and,

therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.). Q.E.D.

Note-It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in

fact, conceived as distinct-that is, one without the help of the

other-yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two

entities, or two different substances. For it is the nature of

substance that each of its attributes is conceived through

itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed

simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other ;

but each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is,

then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one

substance : for nothing in nature is more clear than that each

and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that

its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its

attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity.

Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite

being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite

attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and

infinite essence.

If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to

distinguish different substances, let him read the following

propositions, which show that there is but one substance in the

universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a

sign would be sought in vain.

PROP. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes,

of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality,

necessarily exists.

Proof.-If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God

does not exist : then his essence does not involve existence.

But this (Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily

exists.

Another proof.-Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason

must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its

non-existence-e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be

granted for its existence ; if, on the contrary, it does not

exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from

existing, or annuls its existence. This reason or cause must

either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be

external to it. For instance, the reason for the non-existence

of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it

would involve a contradiction. On the other hand, the existence

of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its

nature involves existence. (See Prop. vii.)

But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle

does not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the

order of universal nature in extension. From the latter it must

follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is

impossible that it should exist. So much is self-evident. It

follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or

reason be granted which prevents its existence.

If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the

existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must

certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a

reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the

very nature of God, or be external to him-that is, drawn from

another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same

nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But

substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God

(by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or

to destroy his existence.

As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine

existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine

nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn

from God’s own nature, which would involve a contradiction. To

make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and

supremely perfect is absurd ; therefore, neither in the nature of

God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be

assigned which would annul his existence. Therefore, God

necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

Another proof.-The potentiality of non-existence is a

negation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence

is a power, as is obvious. If, then, that which necessarily

exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more

powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously

absurd ; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being

absolutely infinite necessarily exists also. Now we exist either

in ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see

Axiom. i. and Prop. vii.). Therefore a being absolutely

infinite-in other words, God (Def. vi.)-necessarily exists.

Q.E.D.

Note.-In this last proof, I have purposely shown God’s

existence � posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily

followed, not because, from the same premises, God’s existence

does not follow � priori. For, as the potentiality of existence

is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases

in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength

for existence. Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as

God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence,

and hence he does absolutely exist. Perhaps there will be many

who will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as

they are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from

external causes. Of such things, they see that those which

quickly come to pass-that is, quickly come into existence-quickly

also disappear ; whereas they regard as more difficult of

accomplishment-that is, not so easily brought into

existence-those things which they conceive as more complicated.

However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here

show the measure of truth in the proverb, “What comes quickly,

goes quickly,” nor discuss whether, from the point of view of

universal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise : I

need only remark that I am not here speaking of things, which

come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of

substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any

external cause. Things which are produced by external causes,

whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever

perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of

their external cause ; and therefore their existence arises

solely from the perfection of their external cause, not from

their own. Contrrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed by

substance is due to no external cause ; wherefore the existence

of substance must arise solely from its own nature, which is

nothing else but its essence. Thus, the perfection of a thing

does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it.

Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it ; therefore we

cannot be more certain of the existence of anything, than of the

existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect-that is, of

God. For inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and

involves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his

existence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question

is given. This, I think, will be evident to every moderately

attentive reader.

PROP. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived from which

it would follow that substance can be divided.

Proof.-The parts into which substance as thus conceived would

be divided either will retain the nature of substance, or they

will not. If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will

necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self-caused, and (by

Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so

that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one

substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd. Moreover, the parts

(by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and

the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be

conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be

absurd. If we adopt the second alternative-namely, that the

parts will not retain the nature of substance-then, if the whole

substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature

of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is

absurd.

PROP. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

Proof.-If it could be divided, the parts into which it was

divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite

substance, or they would not. If the former, we should have

several substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is

absurd. If the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substance absolutely

infinite