The Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza (free ebook novel .txt) 📕

intellect.

Corollary II.-It also follows that God is a cause in himself,

and not through an accident of his nature.

Corollary III.-It follows, thirdly, that God is the

absolutely first cause.

PROP. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and

is not constrained by anyone.

Proof.-We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from

the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing,

solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things

absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways ; and we proved

(in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived

; but that all things are in God. Wherefore nothing can exist

outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to

act. Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,

and is not constrained by anyone. Q.E.D.

Corollary I.-It follows : 1. That there can be no cause

which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the

perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.

Corollary II.-It follows : 2. That God is the sole free

cause. For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature

(by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole

necessity of his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the

sole free cause. Q.E.D.

Note.-Others think that God is a free cause, because he can,

as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have

said follow from his nature-that is, which are in his power,

should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him. But

this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about,

that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its

three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles ;

or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is

absurd.

Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this

proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God’s

nature. I know that there are many who think that they can show,

that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God’s nature

; for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can

attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in

ourselves. Further, although they conceive God as actually

supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring

into existence everything which he actually understands, for they

think that they would thus destroy God’s power. If, they

contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he

would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think,

would clash with God’s omnipotence ; therefore, they prefer to

asset that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates

nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute

exercise of will, to create. However, I think I have shown

sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from God’s supreme

power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things-that is,

all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of

ways, or always flow from the same necessity ; in the same way as

from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for

eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right

angles. Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from

all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state

of activity. This manner of treating the question attributes to

God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect. For,

otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an

infinite number of creatable things, which he will never be able

to create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would,

according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render

himself imperfect. Wherefore, in order to establish that God is

perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time,

that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power

extends ; this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd, and most

repugnant to God’s omnipotence.

Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the

will which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain

to the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some

significance quite different from those they usually bear. For

intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God,

would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human

intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with

them but the name ; there would be about as much correspondence

between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly

constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks. This I will

prove as follows. If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it

cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be,

posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood,

inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality

(Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.). On the contrary, the truth and formal

essence of things is as it is, because it exists by

representation as such in the intellect of God. Wherefore the

intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute

God’s essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their

essence and of their existence. This seems to have been

recognized by those who have asserted, that God’s intellect,

God’s will, and God’s power, are one and the same. As,

therefore, God’s intellect is the sole cause of things, namely,

both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ

from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its

existence. For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely

in the quality which the latter gains from the former.

For example, a man is the cause of another man’s existence,

but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and,

therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but

must be different in existence ; and hence if the existence of

one of them cease, the existence of the other will not

necessarily cease also ; but if the essence of one could be

destroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be

destroyed also. Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of

the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ

from such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in

respect to its existence. Now the intellect of God is the cause

both of the essence and the existence of our intellect ;

therefore, the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to

constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in

respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in

anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before. The

reasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyone

can easily see.

PROP. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause

of all things.

Proof.-All things which are, are in God, and must be

conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi.,

Coroll. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him.

This is our first point. Further, besides God there can be no

substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to

God. This is our second point. God, therefore, is the

indwelling and not the transient cause of all things. Q.E.D.

PROP. XIX. God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.

Proof.-God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.)

necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains

to its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its

definition ; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. viii.). Further,

by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def.

iv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance-in other

words, that which appertains to substance : that, I say, should

be involved in the attributes of substance. Now eternity

appertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in

Prop. vii.) ; therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the

attributes, and thus all are eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.-This proposition is also evident from the manner in

which (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God ; it is

evident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God,

like his essence, is an eternal truth. Further (in Prop. xix. of

my “Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy”), I have proved the

eternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here repeat.

PROP. XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the

same.

Proof.-God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are

eternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses

existence. Therefore the same

attributes of God which explain his eternal essence, explain at

the same time his eternal existence-in other words, that which

constitutes God’s essence constitutes at the same time his

existence. Wherefore God’s existence and God’s essence are one

and the same. Q.E.D.

Coroll. I.-Hence it follows that God’s existence, like his

essence, is an eternal truth.

Coroll. II-Secondly, it follows that God, and all the

attributes of God, are unchangeable. For if they could be

changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be

changed in respect to essence-that is, obviously, be changed from

true to false, which is absurd.

PROP. XXI. All things which follow from the absolute nature of

any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in

other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.

Proof.-Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the proposition

to be denied), that something in some attribute of God can follow

from the absolute nature of the said attribute, and that at the

same time it is finite, and has a conditioned existence or

duration ; for instance, the idea of God expressed in the

attribute thought. Now thought, in so far as it is supposed to

be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its

nature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God,

it is supposed finite. It cannot, however, be conceived as

finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.) ; but it is

not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted

the idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite) ;

therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not

constituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.)

must necessarily exist.

We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the

idea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally

follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for

it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting,

the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, if

the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed,

anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any

example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from

the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the

said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first

point.

Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of

the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. For

if it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of

the nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God,

for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought,

and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to