The Ego and his Own by Max Stirner (most read books txt) π
Those not self-conscious and self-willed are constantly acting from self-interested motives, but clothing these in various garbs. Watch those people closely in the light of Stirner's teaching, and they seem to be hypocrites, they have so many good moral and religious plans of which self-interest is at the end and bottom; but they, we may believe, do not know that this is more than a coincidence.
In Stirner we have the philosophical foundation for political liberty. His interest in the practical development of egoism to the dissolution of the State and the union of free men is clear and pronounced, and harmonizes perfectly with the economic philosophy of Josiah Warren. Allowing for difference of temperament and language, there is a substantial agreement between Stirner and Proudhon. Each would be free, and sees in every increase of the number of free people and their intelligence an a
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concept, only the Man, who, as he is called Tom, could just as well be Joe
or Dick. You see in me not me, the bodily man, but an unreal thing, the spook,
i.e. a Man.
In the course of the Christian centuries we declared the most various persons
to be "our equals," but each time in the measure of that spirit which we
expected from them -- e. g. each one in whom the spirit of the need of
redemption may be assumed, then later each one who has the spirit of
integrity, finally each one who shows a human spirit and a human face. Thus
the fundamental principle of "equality" varied.
Equality being now conceived as equality of the human spirit, there has
certainly been discovered an equality that includes all men; for who could
deny that we men have a human spirit, i. e., no other than a human!
But are we on that account further on now than in the beginning of
Christianity? Then we were to have a divine spirit, now a human; but, if
the divine did not exhaust us, how should the human wholly express what we
are? Feuerbach e. g. thinks, that if he humanizes the divine, he has found
the truth. No, if God has given us pain, "Man" is capable of pinching us still
more torturingly. The long and the short of it is this: that we are men is the
slightest thing about us, and has significance only in so far as it is one of
our qualities,(4) i. e. our property.(5) I am indeed among other things a
man, as I am e. g. a living being, therefore an animal, or a European, a
Berliner, etc.; but he who chose to have regard for me only as a man, or as a
Berliner, would pay me a regard that would be very unimportant to me. And
wherefore? Because he would have regard only for one of my qualities, not
for me.
It is just so with the spirit too. A Christian spirit, an upright spirit,
etc. may well be my acquired quality, my property, but I am not this spirit:
it is mine, not I its.
Hence we have in liberalism only the continuation of the old Christian
depreciation of the I, the bodily Tom. Instead of taking me as I am, one looks
solely at my property, my qualities, and enters into marriage bonds with me
only for the sake of my -- possessions; one marries, as it were, what I have,
not what I am. The Christian takes hold of my spirit, the liberal of my
humanity.
But, if the spirit, which is not regarded as the property of the bodily ego
but as the proper ego itself, is a ghost, then the Man too, who is not
recognized as my quality but as the proper I, is nothing but a spook, a
thought, a concept.
Therefore the liberal too revolves in the same circle as the Christian.
Because the spirit of mankind, i.e. Man, dwells in you, you are a man, as
when the spirit of Christ dwells in you are a Christian; but, because it
dwells in you only as a second ego, even though it be as your proper or
"better" ego, it remains otherworldly to you, and you have to strive to become
wholly man. A striving just as fruitless as the Christian's to become wholly a
blessed spirit!
One can now, after liberalism has proclaimed Man, declare openly that herewith
was only completed the consistent carrying out of Christianity, and that in
truth Christianity set itself no other task from the start than to realize
"man," the "true man." Hence, then, the illusion that Christianity ascribes an
infinite value to the ego (as e. g. in the doctrine of immortality, in the
cure of souls, etc.) comes to light. No, it assigns this value to Man alone.
Only Man is immortal, and only because I am Man am I too immortal. In fact,
Christianity had to teach that no one is lost, just as liberalism too puts all
on an equality as men; but that eternity, like this equality, applied only to
the Man in me, not to me. Only as the bearer and harborer of Man do I not
die, as notoriously "the king never dies." Louis dies, but the king remains; I
die, but my spirit, Man, remains. To identify me now entirely with Man the
demand has been invented, and stated, that I must become a "real generic
being."(6)
The human religion is only the last metamorphosis of the Christian
religion. For liberalism is a religion because it separates my essence from me
and sets it above me, because it exalts "Man" to the same extent as any other
religion does its God or idol, because it makes what is mine into something
otherworldly, because in general it makes out of what is mine, out of my
qualities and my property, something alien -- to wit, an "essence"; in short,
because it sets me beneath Man, and thereby creates for me a "vocation." But
liberalism declares itself a religion in form too when it demands for this
supreme being, Man, a zeal of faith, "a faith that some day will at last prove
its fiery zeal too, a zeal that will be invincible."(7) But, as liberalism is
a human religion, its professor takes a tolerant attitude toward the
professor of any other (Catholic, Jewish, etc.), as Frederick the Great did
toward every one who performed his duties as a subject, whatever fashion of
becoming blest he might be inclined toward. This religion is now to be raised
to the rank of the generally customary one, and separated from the others as
mere "private follies," toward which, besides, one takes a highly liberal
attitude on account of their unessentialness.
One may call it the State-religion, the religion of the "free State," not in
the sense hitherto current that it is the one favored or privileged by the
State, but as that religion which the "free State" not only has the right, but
is compelled, to demand from each of those who belong to it, let him be
privatim a Jew, a Christian, or anything else. For it does the same service
to the State as filial piety to the family. If the family is to be recognized
and maintained, in its existing condition, by each one of those who belong to
it, then to him the tie of blood must be sacred, and his feeling for it must
be that of piety, of respect for the ties of blood, by which every
blood-relation becomes to him a consecrated person. So also to every member of
the State-community this community must be sacred, and the concept which is
the highest to the State must likewise be the highest to him.
But what concept is the highest to the State? Doubtless that of being a really
human society, a society in which every one who is really a man, i. e.,*not
an un-man*, can obtain admission as a member. Let a State's tolerance go ever
so far, toward an un-man and toward what is inhuman it ceases. And yet this
"un-man" is a man, yet the "inhuman" itself is something human, yes, possible
only to a man, not to any beast; it is, in fact, something "possible to man."
But, although every un-man is a man, yet the State excludes him; i.e. it
locks him up, or transforms him from a fellow of the State into a fellow of
the prison (fellow of the lunatic asylum or hospital, according to Communism).
To say in blunt words what an un-man is not particularly hard: it is a man who
does not correspond to the concept man, as the inhuman is something human
which is not conformed to the concept of the human. Logic calls this a
"self-contradictory judgment." Would it be permissible for one to pronounce
this judgment, that one can be a man without being a man, if he did not admit
the hypothesis that the concept of man can be separated from the existence,
the essence from the appearance? They say, he appears indeed as a man, but
is not a man.
Men have passed this "self-contradictory judgment" through a long line of
centuries! Nay, what is still more, in this long time there were only --
un-men. What individual can have corresponded to his concept? Christianity
knows only one Man, and this one -- Christ -- is at once an un-man again in
the reverse sense, to wit, a superhuman man, a "God." Only the -- un-man is a
real man.
Men that are not men, what should they be but ghosts? Every real man,
because he does not correspond to the concept "man," or because he is not a
"generic man," is a spook. But do I still remain an un-man even if I bring Man
(who towered above me and remained otherworldly to me only as my ideal, my
task, my essence or concept) down to be my quality, my own and inherent in
me; so that Man is nothing else than my humanity, my human existence, and
everything that I do is human precisely because I do it, but not because it
corresponds to the concept "man"? I am really Man and the un-man in one;
for I am a man and at the same time more than a man; i.e. I am the ego of
this my mere quality.
It had to come to this at last, that it was no longer merely demanded of us to
be Christians, but to become men; for, though we could never really become
even Christians, but always remained "poor sinners" (for the Christian was an
unattainable ideal too), yet in this the contradictoriness did not come before
our consciousness so, and the illusion was easier than now when of us, who are
men act humanly (yes, cannot do otherwise than be such and act so), the demand
is made that we are to be men, "real men."
Our States of today, because they still have all sorts of things sticking to
them, left from their churchly mother, do indeed load those who belong to them
with various obligations (e. g. churchly religiousness) which properly do
not a bit concern them, the States; yet on the whole they do not deny their
significance, since they want to be looked upon as human societies, in which
man as man can be a member, even if he is less privileged than other members;
most of them admit adherence of every religious sect, and receive people
without distinction of race or nation: Jews, Turks, Moors, etc., can become
French citizens. In the act of reception, therefore, the State looks only to
see whether one is a man. The Church, as a society of believers, could not
receive every man into
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