William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (book club reads txt) 📕

probably held those of

Grenville.

 

The prejudices of the King and the resolves of the two chief Ministers

proved fatal to an ardent appeal which came from Paris in the middle of

June. As the attitude of the Court of Berlin became more and more

warlike, Dumouriez put forth one more effort to gain the friendly

mediation of England and thus assure peace with Prussia. Chauvelin,

swallowing his annoyance at Grenville's recent note, pointed out that

Austria was making great efforts to induce Prussia, Holland, and the

lesser German States to join her in the war against liberty. The designs

of the monarchs against Poland were notorious; and it was clear that a

vast conspiracy was being hatched against the free States of the

Continent. Would not England, then, endeavour to stop the formation of

this reactionary league?

 

The occasion was, indeed, highly important. It is conceivable that, if

British influence had been powerful at Berlin, a spirited declaration

would have had some effect at that Court. Unfortunately our influence

had sunk to zero since the Oczakoff fiasco of 1791. Moreover, the

Prussian Government had by that time decided to break with France. Her

envoys were dismissed from Berlin in the first week of June, and it is

probable that Pitt and Grenville by 18th June knew of the warlike

resolve of the Prussian Government. In any case, after a delay of twenty

days, they sent once more a reply to Chauvelin's request, affirming the

earnest desire of His Majesty to contribute to the restoration of peace,

but re-asserting his decision in favour of unswerving neutrality. On

24th July Prussia declared war against France, and three days later the

Duke of Brunswick issued the famous manifesto to the French people which

thrilled the French people with indignation against the hapless

sovereigns at the Tuileries whom it was designed to protect.[77]

 

                  *       *       *       *       *

 

The outbreak of war on the Rhine and Meuse was an event of incalculable

importance. As we have seen, Pitt discouraged the bellicose tendencies

of the _émigrés_ and of the Austrian and Prussian Courts. But the

passions of the time ran too high to admit of the continuance of peace;

and State after State was soon to be drawn into the devouring vortex of

strife. Strange to say the first to suffer from the outbreak of

hostilities was Poland. That Republic entered on a new lease of life in

the spring of the year 1791. The constitution adopted with enthusiasm on

3rd May substituted an hereditary for an elective monarchy, and

otherwise strengthened the fabric of that almost anarchic State. Social

and civic reforms promised also to call its burghers and serfs to a life

of activity or comfort. But the change at once aroused keen dislike at

St. Petersburg and Berlin. Prussian statesmen resented any improvement

in the condition of their nominal ally, and declared that, if Russia

gained a strong position on the Euxine, Prussia and Austria must secure

indemnities at the expense of Poland.

 

The Czarina soon succeeded in heading them in that direction. After the

signature of the Peace of Jassy with the Turks early in January 1792,

she began openly to encourage the factious efforts of Polish

malcontents. The troubles at Paris also enabled her to engage the Courts

of Vienna and Berlin in a western crusade on which she bestowed her

richest blessing, her own inmost desires meanwhile finding expression in

the following confidential utterance: "I am breaking my head to make the

Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin intervene in the affairs of France. I wish

to see them plunged into some very complicated question in order to have

my own hands free."[78] Though her old opponent, Kaunitz, fathomed her

intentions, she partly succeeded in persuading the Austrian and Prussian

Ministers that their mission clearly was to stamp out Jacobinism at

Paris, while Providence reserved for her the duty of extirpating its

offshoots at Warsaw. In the Viennese Court, where the value of a

regenerated Poland as a buffer State was duly appreciated, there were

some qualms as to the spoliation of that unoffending State; but Prussian

politicians, in their eagerness for the Polish districts, Danzig and

Thorn, harboured few scruples as to betraying the cause of their allies

at Warsaw.

 

Little by little the outlines of a scheme were sketched between Austria

and Prussia for securing indemnities for the expenses of the war against

France; and it was arranged that Prussia should acquire the coveted

lands on the lower Vistula; also Anspach and Baireuth; Austria was to

effect the long-desired Belgic-Bavarian exchange, besides gaining parts

of Alsace; and it was understood that Russia would annex the Polish

Ukraine and work her will in the rest of Poland. The Polish part of the

scheme was, however, stiffly opposed by Kaunitz; and in the sequel the

old Chancellor ended his long and distinguished career by way of protest

against a change of front which he deemed unwise and disgraceful.[79]

 

Early in May everything was ready for the restoration of anarchy in

Poland. Catharine ordered her troops to enter its borders; and the

factious Polish nobles whom she had sheltered during the winter returned

to their land and formed a "Confederation" at Targowicz on 14th May for

the purpose of undoing the reforms of 1791. Daniel Hailes, our envoy at

Warsaw, kept Grenville fully informed of this affair. On 16th June he

reported Austria's desertion of Poland, the brutal refusal of the Court

of Berlin to accord help to its ally, the heroic efforts of Kosciusko

and the Polish levies to resist the Russian armies, and the despair of

the patriots of Warsaw, adding the cynical comment that at Warsaw

patriotism was only a cloak for private interest, and that the new

constitution was generally regarded as the death-blow to Polish

independence.[80] Whether he added these words to please Grenville, who

had always discouraged the Polish cause,[81] is not easy to say; but the

statement cannot be reconciled with Hailes's earlier enthusiasm for that

well-meant effort.

 

On all sides the Polish patriots now found indifference or hostility.

The Elector of Saxony (their King-elect) gave them cold words; and

Catharine demanded the restoration of the old constitution of which she

was a guarantor. King Stanislaus, a prey to deep despondency, saw the

defence collapse on all sides, and at the close of June the Russians

drew near to Warsaw. Many of the Polish reformers fled to Leipzig and

there prepared to appeal to Europe against this forcible suppression of

a truly national constitution.

 

Amidst these scenes Hailes was replaced by Colonel Gardiner, who

received from Grenville the following instructions, dated 4th August

He informed him that Hailes had last year been charged "to confine

himself to such assurances of His Majesty's good wishes as could be

given without committing H.M. to any particular line of conduct with

respect to any troubles that might arise on the subject [of the Polish

Revolution]. The event has unhappily but too well justified their

reserve; and the present situation is such as to leave little hope that

the tranquillity of that unfortunate land can be restored without its

falling again into the most entire dependence on the power of Russia,

even if no further dismemberment of territory should take place."

Grenville then stated that Prussia's conduct was due to fear of a strong

Government in Poland; but the present alternative (a Russian occupation)

would probably be worse for her. He added these sentences: "No

intervention of the Maritime Powers [England and Holland] could be

serviceable to Poland, at least not without a much greater exertion and

expense than the importance to their separate interests could possibly

justify.... You are to be very careful not to do anything which could

hold out ill-grounded expectations of support from this country."

 

In these words Grenville passed sentence of death upon Poland. On this

important subject he must have acted with the consent of Pitt; but the

opinion of the latter is unknown. It would seem that after the weak

treatment of the Oczakoff crisis by Parliament, he gave up all hope of

saving either Turkey or Poland. If that was impracticable in the spring

of 1791, how much more so in August 1792, when French affairs claimed

far closer attention? It is worth noticing that several of the Foxites

(not Fox himself, for he was still intent on a Russian alliance),[82]

now revised their opinion about Catharine II and inveighed against her

for trampling on the liberties of Poland. Did they now discover the

folly of their conduct in previously encouraging her?

 

In despair of help from England, some of the patriots of Warsaw turned

towards France. But this added to their misfortunes. It gave the

schemers of Berlin the longed-for excuse of intervening by force under

the pretext that they must stamp out "the French evil" from States

bordering on their own. On hearing of the advance of three Prussian

columns, Catharine threw her whole weight into Polish affairs.

 

So closely did the fortunes of Poland intertwine themselves with those

of France. The outbreak of the Franco-Austrian war meant ruin for the

reformers at Warsaw. Had Austria held to her former resolve, to prevent

the triumph of Russia or Prussia in Poland, it is possible that Pitt and

Grenville would have decided to support her. As it was, they maintained

their cautious and timid neutrality. The reports of Hailes were explicit

enough to show that another partition was at hand; but, so far as I can

discover, they lifted not a finger to prevent it. The excess of Pitt's

caution at this crisis enables us to gauge the magnitude of the disaster

to the Polish cause involved by his surrender to the Czarina in the

spring and summer of 1791. By a wonderful display of skill and audacity

she emerged triumphant from all her difficulties, and now, while egging

on the German Powers to war with France, planted her heel on the

liberties of Poland. Her conquest was easy and profitable. The

restoration of order at Paris proved to be fraught with unexpected

dangers, and the German sovereigns scarcely set their hands to the task

before they discovered that they were her dupes. If the French war

worked disaster at Warsaw, the prospect of a partition of Poland

undoubtedly helped to lessen the pressure on France during the campaign

of Valmy. Hope of further spoils in 1794-5 distracted the aims of the

Allies; and Pitt was destined to see the efforts of the monarchical

league in the West weaken and die away under the magnetic influence of

the eastern problem. Well would it have been for him if he could have

upheld Poland in 1791. By so doing he would have removed the cause of

bitter dissensions between the Houses of Romanoff, Hapsburg, and

Hohenzollern. As will appear in due course, Revolutionary France

achieved her marvellous triumphs partly by the prowess of her sons, but

still more owing to the intrigues and feuds which clogged the efforts of

the Allies and baffled the constructive powers of Pitt.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

[43] "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 810-15.

 

[44] _Ibid._, 834.

 

[45] "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 551-602, 1404-31.

 

[46] Stanhope, ii, 148-50, and App., xv.

 

[47] Twiss, "Life of Lord Eldon," ch. x.

 

[48] Fitzmaurice, "Shelburne," iii, 500-4; Salomon, "Pitt," 596. The

King later on teased the Duke of Leeds by a more compromising overture.

 

[49] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 454-64.

 

[50] "Leeds Mem.," 188.

 

[51] _Ibid._, 194.

 

[52] "Auckland Journals," ii, 417, 418.

 

[53] Pitt MSS., 103.

 

[54] I accept, with some qualification, Mr. Oscar Browning's

explanation, that Lord Loughborough had exaggerated the accounts of his

interviews with Pitt and the Whig leaders. (see "Leeds Mem.," 197,

note).

 

[55] Stanhope, ii, 160.

 

[56] "Bland Burges P.," 208.

 

[57] Stanhope, "Miscellanies," ii, 57-63. Letter of Canning to W.

Sturges Bourne, 3rd September 1792. This interview is not referred to by

Mr. H. W. V. Temperley ("Canning," ch. ii), Mr. Sichel ("Sheridan"),

Captain Bagot ("Canning and his Friends"), or E. Festing ("Frere and his

Friends"). In "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies" I shall publish new

letters of Canning. One, dated 15th March 1793, declines an offer of

Portland to bring him into Parliament.

 

[58] Pallain, "La Mission de Talleyrand à Londres," 41.

 

[59] Keith's "Mems.," ii, 494. Keith to Grenville, 14th January 1792.

 

[60] "Gower's Despatches," 142, 143, 145, 149.

 

[61] Pallain, pp. xv-xviii.

 

[62] Pallain,