William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (book club reads txt) 📕

success of their unfounded claims would not only give rise to

new pretensions, but would give them additional influence."[116] Pitt's

views were the same, though he stated them more firmly and not as an

alarmist. On 9th December he wrote to the Earl of Westmorland, Lord

Lieutenant of Ireland, that the gross disregard of treaties shown of

late by France, her encouragement of the spirit of revolt in all lands,

and her public reception of addresses from English societies, "full of

treasonable sentiments," compelled the Government, though very

reluctantly, to add to the armed forces. He added these words: "I am

clear that the circumstances require vigour and decision both at home

and abroad. And the spirit of the country seems within these last ten

days to have taken so favourable a turn that I think we may look with

great confidence to the event."[117] Thus Pitt and Grenville equally

felt the need of firmness in resisting the French decrees, partly

because of their aggressive and illegal nature, but also because

surrender would inflate the spirits of British malcontents.

 

Current events served to strengthen this opinion. France had hitherto

won all the points of the game by sheer audacity. Everywhere she had

attacked, and everywhere she had found unexpected weakness. Custine's

army had extorted a forced loan from Frankfurt. Dumouriez was

threatening Aix-la-Chapelle on the east, and the Dutch on the north. The

spirit which animated the French Foreign Office appears in the letter

which Lebrun, its chief, wrote to Dumouriez on 22nd November: "To the

glory of having freed the Belgian Catholics, I hope you will join that

of delivering their Batavian brothers from the yoke of the

Stadholder."[118] There can be no doubt that the general laid his plans

for that purpose, though he also sent pacific overtures to Auckland at

The Hague.[119]

 

To crown the indignation of royalists, there came the tidings that on

3rd December the French Convention decreed the trial of Louis XVI for

high treason against the nation. The news aroused furious resentment;

but it is noteworthy that Pitt and Grenville rarely, if ever, referred

to this event; and that, before it was known, they had declared the

impossibility of avoiding a rupture with the French Government if it

persisted in adhering to the November decrees. On this question the

final court of appeal is the despatches and letters of our Ministers. An

examination of them discloses the reasons for their firmness. On 13th

November, when the evacuation of Brussels by the Austrians was known,

Ministers assured the Dutch Government that they would oppose a French

invasion of Holland. They charged Auckland to declare that His Majesty

had "no hesitation as to the propriety of his assisting the Dutch

Republic as circumstances might require, against any attempt on the part

of any other Power to invade its dominions or to disturb its

Government." This declaration was to be published in order to discourage

the plots of the Dutch "Patriots," and to warn the French Government and

its general of the danger of a hostile advance. Auckland replied on 16th

November: "It is impossible to convey to Your Lordships an adequate

sense of the impression made by this voluntary declaration of His

Majesty's sentiments and intentions respecting the Republic on the

occasion of the present crisis. The generosity of this measure, which in

a few hours was generally known, and which to-morrow will be circulated

on the Continent in the newspapers of the Republic, is acknowledged by

everyone." The Prince of Orange at once wrote to thank the King for this

proof of his friendship, and added the suggestion that the anchoring of

a British squadron in the Downs would, more than anything else, tend to

"hold in check our enemies."[120]

 

Pitt and Grenville did not comply with this last request; and the

British declaration itself came just two days too late to give pause to

the National Convention, before it published the decree on the opening

of the Scheldt. Possibly in the days of telegraphs the warning would

have been flashed from The Hague to Paris in time. As it was, both

Powers publicly committed themselves on the same day to opposite courses

of action from which pride or conviction forbade them to recede. So

narrow sometimes is the space that at first divides the paths leading

towards peace and war.

 

The concern of Pitt and Grenville at the French conquest of Belgium

appears in their instructions to Stratton, our _chargé d'affaires_ at

Vienna, to confer with the Austrian Chancellor, Cobenzl, on the

threatening situation, setting forth the desire of George III to

contribute to the tranquillity of all the States of Europe. In his reply

of 22nd December Cobenzl declared that Austria and Prussia must have

indemnities for their expenses in the war, the restoration of monarchy

at Paris being another essential to a settlement.[121] These statements

were most discouraging: the former pointed to a speedy partition of

Poland; and the forcible restoration of the Bourbons was at this time

wholly repugnant to the feelings of Pitt.

 

Meanwhile the prospect of war with France had become far more

threatening. The decree of 16th November on the Scheldt, and that of

19th November on helping foreign malcontents, were a direct defiance to

all neighbouring States, and especially to Great Britain and Holland. In

the latter country the Patriots were, as in 1787, actively helped from

Paris, and threatened the existence of the Orange _régime_, of which we

were the guarantors. Moreover, the opening of the Scheldt was a serious

blow to Dutch commerce. Sir James Harris, writing from The Hague in

December 1784, when this very question brought Joseph II to the brink of

war with Holland, quoted the declaration of the Grand Pensionary, that

the Dutch ought to spend their last florin "rather than submit to so

destructive and humiliating a measure as the opening of the

Scheldt."[122] The effusive thanks of the Dutch when the Court of

Versailles opposed the demand of Joseph II, shows that they looked on

the control of that estuary as vital to their interests. This question

was brought to an issue on 23rd November, when French gunboats entered

the Scheldt, and, despite the fire of the Dutch guardship, made their

way up the river in order to assist in the reduction of the citadel of

Antwerp. The senior captain of the gunboats announced that he did this

by order of Dumouriez. On 8th December seven French ships sailed up to

that city, the first since the Treaty of Münster.

 

The affair of the Scheldt was not the only cause of alarm. The Dutch

authorities managed to get a copy of a secret letter (dated 20th

November) from Dumouriez to Maulde, French envoy at The Hague, in which

he assured him that he would do his best to keep him in that post

(despite the ill will of the Paris Government); for he had much need of

him for certain negotiations. He added these words: "I count on carrying

liberty to the Batavians (Dutch) as I have done to the Belgians; also

that the Revolution will take place in Holland so that things will

return to the state they were in 1788." The Dutch Government gave a copy

of this letter to Auckland, who forwarded it to Grenville on 23rd

November. It reached Whitehall three days later. Curiously enough,

Grenville did not hear of the French decree for the opening of the

Scheldt until 26th November. But on that day he wrote to Auckland a

despatch which shows his conviction that France meant to force us into

war, and that the chief question for Great Britain and Holland now

was--when should hostilities begin? Clearly, then, Grenville, and

probably Pitt, regarded a rupture with France as unavoidable, unless she

revoked the aggressive decrees. Nevertheless they decided to send a

special envoy to Paris, and drew up rough drafts undated and addressed

to some person unnamed, bidding him make careful inquiries into the

state of affairs at that capital.

 

We cannot wonder that Pitt took a gloomy view of things; for on 24th

November a "moderate" member of the French Convention proposed an

addition to the decree of 19th November (offering help to malcontents in

other States), so as to limit it to nations with which France was at

war. This proposal--obviously designed to soothe the apprehensions of

Pitt--displeased the "patriotic" majority, which disposed of it by

carrying the "previous question." After this the decree of 19th November

could no longer be treated as a meaningless effervescence of Gallic

enthusiasm; and, when taken with the disloyal addresses presented by

certain English clubs on 28th November, its reaffirmation produced the

worst possible impression.

 

On the 29th, Nagel, the Dutch envoy in London, proffered a formal appeal

for help, in addition to requests which he had made to Grenville a few

days before. He further begged him to order the assembling of a squadron

at the Downs, or at Gravesend, so as to assist the Dutch speedily, if

need arose.[123] Meanwhile our allies (as usually happens with small

States in presence of danger) sought to temporize; and herein, as also

in the caution of Pitt and Grenville, lay the reason why war did not

break out at once. No one can peruse the despatches of our Ministers

without seeing that they considered war inevitable, unless the French

retracted the obnoxious decrees. It is well to notice that at this time

the question of the trial of Louis XVI had not come up for

consideration. The dispute turned solely on the frontier rights of the

Dutch, which Pitt and his colleagues believed to be violated by France,

and which we were in honour bound to vindicate.

 

On 1st December, then, came the first of those precautionary measures

which not seldom precipitate the conflict they are designed to avert.

The Cabinet issued a royal proclamation, calling out part of the

militia. Ministers took this step partly as a retort to the seditious

addresses of English Radical clubs to the French Convention,[124] partly

in order to repress tumults. There had been rioting in a few towns, and

the reports from Scotland were alarming. On 22nd November Dundas,

writing to Pitt from Melville Castle, N.B., stated that sedition had

spread rapidly of late in Scotland, and he estimated that five regiments

would be needed to hold down Dundee, Perth, and Montrose. He added that

the clergy of the Established Church and their following were loyal, the

others far otherwise.[125]

 

Still worse was the news from Ireland. Early in 1792 the Dublin

Parliament repealed one or two of the most odious statutes against Roman

Catholics; but later in the year contumeliously rejected their petition

for the franchise. Consequently the mass of Irishmen was ready to join

the Society of United Irishmen, a formidable association founded in

Ulster in 1791 by Wolfe Tone. This able young lawyer, fired with zeal

for the French Revolution, conceived the statesmanlike notion of banding

together both Presbyterians and Catholics in a national movement against

the exclusive and dominant English caste. The conduct of the Dublin

Parliament made his dream a reality. At once the ultra-Protestant

traders of the North clasped hands with the Catholic gentry and peasants

of the Centre and South. This unheard-of union was destined to lead Pitt

on to a legislative experiment which will concern us later. Here we may

notice that the clubs of Irish malcontents proceeded to act on a plan

already mooted in the English societies, that of sending delegates to

form a National Convention in Dublin. The aim was to constitute a body

far more national than the corrupt Protestant clique that sat in

Parliament, and, after overawing that body, to sunder the connection

with England. The precedent set by the Ulster Volunteers in their

meeting at Dungannon in 1782 warranted the hope of an even completer

triumph than was then secured. The correspondence that passed between

Pitt and the Lord-Lieutenant, Westmorland, reveals the concern which

they felt at the news. Pitt advised the early meeting of the Dublin

Parliament, the proposal of concessions sufficient to allay discontent,

and a determined resistance to all attempts at intimidation. He also

suggested the keeping a close watch on the importation of arms, and

levying a Militia if it were practicable.[126] In reply Westmorland

stated (1st December) that the manifesto of a meeting of United Irishmen

in Dublin was most threatening, and that the "French mania" was

spreading everywhere. He added: "Belfast is, as always, noisy and

republican; but not above 200 or 300 Volunteers are there."[127] It

seems probable that the embodying of the Militia in Great Britain was

partly with the view of enabling a few regular regiments to proceed to

Ireland.

 

While taking these precautionary measures, Pitt and Grenville adopted a

tone far from unfriendly to the French envoy. Earlier in the autumn

Grenville refused to see Chauvelin on the ground that the French

Government which sent him no longer existed. But after some

_pourparlers_ he consented to receive him on 29th November. With his

usual _hauteur_ he prepared to teach the ex-Marquis his place from the

outset. He placed for him a stiff small