William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (book club reads txt) 📕

1801 exceeded 140, were fraught with evil to the Upper House, lowering

the intellectual level of its debates, and impairing the balance of

parties, with results damaging to the constitution.[625] It has even

been suggested that the friction between the two Houses in the years

1830-1911 resulted in no small degree from the reckless conduct of Pitt

in this respect. Vague and sweeping assertions like these can neither be

substantiated nor refuted. But the only definite part of them, namely,

that Pitt's creations degraded the House of Lords, is obviously

overstrained. At no period was the tone of its debates higher than in

that of Pitt's supremacy, witness those on Warren Hastings, the disputes

with Spain and Russia, and the Great War. They have not the brilliance

of those of the Commons in the days of Burke, Fox, Pitt and Sheridan;

but they often excel them in statesmanlike qualities; and a perusal of

them reveals the fact that the ablest of the Lords were, not those of

the old governing families, which at that period showed signs of

decadence, but those for whose creation Pitt was mainly responsible.

Malmesbury, Buckingham, Grenville, Auckland, Carrington, Minto, and at a

later period, Sidmouth and Castlereagh, excelled in ability and weight

the representatives of the older nobility. Far from degrading and

weakening the peerage, Pitt strengthened it by an infusion of new blood

which was sorely needed at that time of strain and stress. Further, it

must be remembered that Burke's Economy Bill had abolished many of the

sinecures which were considered due for steady support in Parliament;

and, while at Bath in the year 1797, he admitted that his reform was

accountable for the large increase of peerages, thenceforth the chief

hope of the faithful.[626] Pitt's correspondence also shows that he

frequently repulsed the insistent claims of his supporters for titles, a

theme on which piquant letters might be adduced.

Surely, too, it is unjust to say that Pitt entirely altered the

political complexion of the Upper House. During the greater part of his

career the so-called political differences were based mainly on personal

considerations; and throughout the struggle against France, Whigs and

Tories, with the exception of a small coterie, were merged in the

national party which recognized in Pitt the saviour of British

institutions. The charge that he was largely responsible for the

friction between the two Houses after 1830 needs little notice; for that

friction was clearly due to the progress of democratic principles and

the growth of an enormous industrial community in these islands. Both of

those developments told strongly against the parity of political

influence of the two Houses of Parliament. Amidst the torpor of the

previous age the prerogatives of the Peers had gone unchallenged. After

the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution a challenge was

certain to come; and in this, as in many other respects, the conduct of

Pitt was such as to strengthen our institutions. By adding to the House

of Lords a considerable number of commoners he enabled it to withstand

the storms of the Revolutionary age and the inevitable conflicts of the

future.

                  *       *       *       *       *

To revert to the year 1801, there occurred early in the autumn an event

of high import. The struggle of eight years between Great Britain and

France ended in stalemate. The collapse of the Armed Neutrality League

together with the capture of Malta and the surrender of the French

garrisons in Egypt left the Union Jack triumphant at sea and the

tricolour on the Continent. Each State had need of rest to restore its

finances and consolidate its conquests. Therefore, though Bonaparte had

at the end of March 1801 sharply repelled the pacific overtures of the

Addington Cabinet, yet negotiations were resumed at the close of summer,

a fact which proves that the First Consul was influenced, not by spite

to Pitt and goodwill to his successor, but by the constricting grip of

the Sea Power. Hawkesbury, Grenville's successor at the Foreign Office,

asserted that shortly before the end of the negotiation Pitt sat up with

him through part of a night discussing finance, and finally advising the

cessation of hostilities.

Not that Pitt directed the negotiations; for both Addington and

Hawkesbury were proud and sensitive men, and Pitt at some points

criticized the conditions of the Preliminaries of London (1st October

1801). They were as follows: Great Britain agreed to restore to France,

Spain, and the Batavian, or Dutch, Republic all their possessions

recently conquered by her, with the exception of Trinidad and Ceylon,

ceded to her by Spain and the Dutch respectively. She also retired from

Elba and restored Malta to the Knights of St. John, under conditions to

be further specified. The French restored Egypt to the Sultan, and

evacuated Naples and the Papal States. Portugal was also saved from

danger of partition. Nothing was said respecting the resumption of

trade between England and France; and no assurance was forthcoming as to

the independence of the Republics bordering on France. By his recent

compact with Austria the First Consul agreed to respect their

independence; but England had no definite ground for complaint if it

were violated.

While the London rabble shouted itself hoarse with joy at the advent of

peace, Grenville, Windham, and Canning saw disgrace and disaster ahead.

Pitt thought otherwise. At the small house in Park Place which he had

leased for his visits to London, he wrote to Long on 1st October,

describing the terms as not all that could be wished but "highly

creditable, and on the whole very advantageous." Finding that Grenville

considered them disastrous, he on the 5th expressed concern at their

disagreement. Though regretting the surrender of the Cape, and the

uncertainty of the fate of Malta, he considered the acquisition of

Ceylon and Trinidad most beneficial; and he hailed with satisfaction a

peace which saved Turkey and Portugal from spoliation. He therefore

suggested an interview for the sake of reconciling their differences. To

this Grenville somewhat coolly assented, remarking that the differences

were fundamental and could not be concealed, and that his confidence in

the Addington Cabinet was irretrievably destroyed by a treaty which

ceded to France Martinique, Malta, Minorca, the Cape, Cochin China, and

all the Dutch settlements. Clearly, then, Grenville looked on the Dutch

Republic and Spain as dominated by Bonaparte, who would seize Minorca,

Malta, and the Cape whenever it suited him. He also wrote to the King

expressing regret that he could no longer support Addington, whose

conduct towards France and Russia was "marked throughout by a tone of

unnecessary and degrading concession."[627]

Here, then, the two cousins began sharply to differ. On 3rd November,

during the debates on the Peace, Pitt rose to rebut the censures of

Thomas Grenville on a policy which implied the surrender of the

Mediterranean to France. He deprecated these sweeping criticisms; for he

had ever been ready to frame a treaty which, though falling short of our

just pretensions, was not inconsistent with honour and security. The

present terms did not fulfil all his wishes; but the difference between

them and the best possible terms was not worth the continuance of war.

If both Trinidad and Malta could not be retained, he commended Ministers

for choosing Trinidad; for the sight of the Union Jack at Malta would

have hurt the pride of France. With regard to the Cape of Good Hope he

deemed it a far more important possession than Hawkesbury had

represented, though inferior to Ceylon. He deplored our failure to

restore the House of Savoy to its capital, Turin; but the chief object

of the war, the security of Great Britain, had been attained. True, the

restoration of the French monarchy would have furnished a better

safeguard for peace; but we had never insisted on it as essential,

though it might have been assured if the Allies had fulfilled their

duties. As to the future, if the First Consul aimed at founding a

military despotism, he probably would not select England as the first

object of his attack; and we had every prospect of enjoying a long

peace. Remembering, perhaps, that he made the same prophecy early in

1792, he uttered this warning: "I am inclined to hope everything that is

good; but I am bound to act as if I feared otherwise." In none of his

speeches did Pitt display less foresight. The preference of Trinidad to

Malta and of Ceylon to the Cape is curious enough; but the prophecy as

to a long period of peace and the probable immunity of England from

Bonaparte's attack argues singular blindness to the colonial trend of

French policy since the year 1798. Despite acrid comments by Fox and

Windham, the speech carried the day and firmly established Addington in

power.

The sequel is well known. In the interval of six months, during which

the aged and gouty Cornwallis sought to reduce the Preliminaries of

London to the Treaty of Amiens (27th March 1802), Bonaparte remodelled

the Batavian, Ligurian, and Cisalpine Republics in a way wholly at

variance with the Treaty of Lunéville. Against these breaches of faith

the Addington Cabinet made no protest; and the treaty in its final form

provided a complex and unsatisfactory compromise on the Maltese

question.[628] Canning and Windham strove to elicit from Pitt a public

expression of his disapproval of the treaty; but their efforts were in

vain. On 20th April 1802 Canning, while at his country seat, South Hill,

Bracknell (Berks), wrote thus to Windham:[629]

    ... Do not suppose that this is because I have the slightest

    doubt as to the impression which may be made by pointing out the

    gross faults and omissions, the weakness, and baseness, and

    shuffling, and stupidity, that mark this Treaty even beyond the

    Preliminaries that led to it. But I think people do not want to

    be convinced of this; that they will not take it kindly, but

    rather otherwise, to have it forced upon their observation;

    that, if parted to a division, they will vote for the Treaty

    with all its imperfections upon its head.... Now as to Pitt

    himself. He cannot and does not think of this as he did of the

    Preliminary Treaty. But debate it; and he will, he must, debate

    as warmly for it. He can take no distinction without seeming to

    abandon Addington; and that he will not do. He cannot object to

    any part of the Peace in public, without weakening the grounds

    upon which he contends peace upon the whole to be preferable to

    war, and _that_ he will not do. ... Leave it possible for Pitt

    to say six or eight months hence that the Preliminaries promised

    well, but that the Treaty did not come up to them. I do not

    promise you that he ever will say this. But I am fairly

    persuaded that, if you force from him a public approbation of

    the Treaty, you defer for at least as many months as have passed

    since the debates of October, the chance of his coming to see

    things almost as you and I see them....

                                                 _April 27 1802._

    Since I wrote to you, I have seen Lord Grenville, and I think

    the plan of action, which he tells me had been concerted between

    you and him, so perfect, that I retract everything in what I

    wrote to you (if anything there were) which could be construed

    as making against it. To debate "about it and about it," as much

    as you will, to move for papers, to move for taking the Treaty

    into consideration--all this may be done with great and good

    effect, but a condemnation of the Treaty, such as would force

    P[itt] into a defence of it, and identify him with the makers of

    it, is what of all things is to be avoided. I hope you think

    so.--Whether P[itt] _will_ save us I do not know. But surely he

    is the only man that _can_.

All was in vain. Pitt, having promised to support Addington, deemed

himself in honour bound to fulfil that pledge. But, as the events of the

year 1802 showed more and more the imbecility of the Addington Cabinet,

torturing doubts preyed upon his mind. His friends, especially Canning,

now began to discern the pathos of his position, but sought to draw him

from his seclusion at Walmer. An opportunity occurred in the month of

May. Pitt's birthday was on the 28th. Would not all who foresaw ruin

for England in the supremacy of "the Doctor" welcome a demonstration on

behalf of his predecessor? For more than a year Pitt's friends had been

puzzled and abashed by his unexplained retirement, witness the

uncharitable surmise of the usually benevolent Dr. Burgh--"Can I see

Addington climb upon the stooping neck of Mr. Pitt, and not believe that

it is done in hostility or in a masked confederacy? If the former,